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Pathways for Future Justice*
THE HONORABLE BEN F. OVERTON
Chief Justice
The Supreme Court of Florida
Our judicial system is said to be in a state of crisis. Courts across the
entire United States are being asked to absorb increased court work;
the judiciary is losing its attractiveness for outstanding lawyers; and the
public continues to be uninformed about the legal system. On the one
hand, many are turning to the courts as the only branch of government
available to solve many new types of actions, a number of which could
be resolved by either the legislative or the executive branches of our
government. On the other hand, "we hear. . .[that the courts are really
not properly resolving the matters brought to them, they] protect only
the rich and the powerful, that justice is on the side of the best lawyer,
and that delays and technicalities make the fair administration of justice
impossible."' It is exceedingly important that we develop ways to over-
come this explosion in legal proceedings and current lack of confidence
in our system.
There are three major problems facing our judicial system: first, the
inability of the courts to resolve all the disputes that are being submitted
to them; second, the problem of the future quality of the judiciary; and
third, the individual citizen's lack of familiarity with our judicial system.
NEW PROBLEMS FOR OUR COURTS
A new era has begun in our judicial system. It is a time when the
courts are being asked to resolve more and more disputes and to accept
many types of new matters for resolution. In Florida, for example, the
Supreme Court and the District Courts of Appeal disposed of as many
cases in the first six months of 1976 as they did in the entire year of
1972 (see Table 1).
*This article was adapted from an address delivered before the League of Women
Voters, Tampa, December 2, 1976.
1. Heflin, Can the Rule of Law Survive? 58 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 368 (1975).
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Table 1. COMPARISON OF 1972 AND 1976 CASE LOADS,
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND DISTRICT COURTS
OF APPEAL
1972 1976 (first hall)
New Disposed of New Disposed of
Cases Cases Cases Cases
Supreme Court 1,288 1,229 1,141 1,363
First District
Court of Appeal 994 922 959 1,101
Second District
Court of Appeal 1,063 895 1,063 928
Third District
Court of Appeal 1,523 1,521 1,238 1,056
Fourth District
Court of Appeal 1,233 1,068 1,372 1,105
Source: Administrative Records of the Supreme Court of Florida, Office of the Clerk.
There are many reasons for the multiplying case loads of Florida's
courts. Population growth has certainly contributed to the increase. It
should be noted, however, that the courts in areas of the country with
relatively stable population have also experienced these increases. The
factors largely responsible for this increase include the following: (1)
new theories in the law evolving from consumer and environmental
actions; (2) the expanded use of old theories, such as in malpractice and
other tort actions; (3) a substantial increase in new legislation both by
Congress and state legislatures, which places the burden of construction
on the courts; (4) new regulatory legislation, which requires a review
within at least the appellate courts; and (5) the increase in crime and
the changes in criminal procedural requirements which have joined to
increase the criminal case load.
This increase in legal proceedings, however, is just beginning. In the
future, citizens will make even greater use of lawyers and the courts.
Prepaid and group legal services will be the principal reason.2 These
programs, which are a kind of Blue Cross-Blue Shield for legal services,
2. See generally Cornish & Cornish, Group Legal Services Today. 14 WASHBURN
L.J. 31 (1975); Wilcox & Schneider, Prepaid Legal Services and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 (1975); Young, Group Legal Services and
Canon II, 34 MD. L. REV. 541 (1974).
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gained momentum in 1973 when Congress amended the Taft-Hartley
Act to allow unions to negotiate for employer contributions to fund
legal services for employees.3 Labor unions, however, are not the only
prepaid legal service groups now operating. Other organizations now
establishing such groups include credit unions and other cooperative-
type associations. At present, prepaid legal service groups have been
formed in Dade, Orange, and Escambia counties,' and nationwide there
are four thousand such groups.' Within the next ten years, a substantial
number of family units in the United States should be covered by some
form of prepaid or group legal services.
The question of how the court system can absorb additional work
resulting from increased availability of legal services is now timely.
Priorities must be set to determine how additional court proceedings can
be handled. The courts must be responsive to the needs of both the
public in general and the individual litigant in particular.
Courts are attempting to cope with increased case loads by more
efficiently resolving the cases now before them and by developing meth-
ods to resolve certain matters outside the court system without judicial
labor. Florida is a leader in this area. At present, Florida has adopted
four innovative approaches to relieve the case loads of our courts in
certain problem areas. First, traffic offenses have been decriminalized;'
this has reduced our judicial labor in traffic court cases by at least 66
per cent.7 Second, pilot programs have been established for Citizens
Dispute Councils in Broward, Dade, and Duval counties. This program
allows minor criminal offenses to be resolved without invoking All the
requirements of the criminal justice system. Third, a pretrial diversion
program has been organized in most circuits of this state.' This program
allows prosecutors the discretion to approve a conditional probation at
3. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)
(1973).
4. Florida Integration Rule, art. XIX, as amended on April 30, 1976, to allow
attorney participation in Bar-approved group legal services. Nine new plans for such
services have been submitted to the Bar for approval.
5. Murphy, A Vision of the Future, 11 TRIAL 12, 13 (1975).
6. Florida Uniform Disposition of Traffic Infractions Act, Ch. 318, Fla. Stat.
(1975).
7. Judicial Council of Florida, Twenty-First Annual Report, Schedule E, at 53
(approximately 66 per cent of the traffic infractions disposed of between January and
June of 1975 required no hearing at all). The informal assessments reported to me by
the chief judges of circuit courts support this estimate of the reduction in the judicial
workload.
8. § 944.025, Fla. Stat. (1975).
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an initial stage in the criminal justice proceedings, thereby eliminating
labors ordinarily expended by prosecutors, public defenders, and judi-
cial officers in carrying a defendant, who would eventually be put on
probation anyway, completely through the criminal justice system.
Fourth, some circuits in this state have appointed an administrator to
attempt conciliation of child support disputes, thereby avoiding unnec-
essary judicial hearings.'
These programs are a good start, but much remains to be done. For
example, there must be improved communications between lawyers to
ensure that judicial time is not wasted and that the court's calendar is
not used as a trial tactic. There must be improvements in summary
claims proceedings to make them more usable by the individual citizen
without his having to resort to more formal legal proceedings and repre-
sentation by an attorney. The State must also improve its appellate
structure. A new proposal to that end seeks to solve the troublesome
problem of multiple appeals in the same case. 0 The "unified appeal"
doctrine would require a full appeal in every criminal case, but would
foreclose any collateral attack by post-conviction relief proceedings.
Although the courts of Florida are now disposing of more cases
than ever before, they must continue to seek and find new methods to
improve our judicial system. The flexibility of the state constitutional
provisions" on the organization of the judiciary has greatly assisted this
state in meeting these new challenges. It is important that everyone,
both within and without the judiciary, share the concern for the quality
of a much-expanded system of justice. It will take work, cooperation,
and funding to solve the problems now facing the courts.
THE JUDICIARY OF THE FUTURE
I am concerned about the future quality of the judiciary. The State
of Florida is now losing outstanding judges with twelve to twenty years
of experience. In less than three years, numerous judicial officers, in-
cluding the chief judges of three metropolitan circuits, and the chief
judge and the immediate past chief judge of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, have resigned their posts. These judges did not reach retire-
9. Pursuant to § 61.181, Fla. Stat. (1975), the Fourth, Tenth, and Thirteenth
Judicial Circuits have appointed administrators.
10. See generally P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, AND M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON
APPEAL, 1 10-14 (1976).
11. Art. V, Fla. Const.
Nova Law Journal 1:1977 1
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ment age. They resigned to re-enter the private practice of law. Florida
cannot afford to lose these people and others of their caliber. They are
necessary for a strong, independent judiciary of the future.
The judiciary places special restrictions on its officers. A judge is
not like a legislator or an executive officer. He cannot be an advocate.
Those who come before a judge entrust to him their liberty and prop-
erty. They demand and deserve dispassionate justice. In doing so, a
judge must decide issues in a way which will retain the respect of both
sides. It is recognized that judges must have integrity, intelligence, and
judicial temperament. Just as important is the need for those seeking
judicial positions to be interested in making the judiciary a twenty- or
thirty-year career. The judiciary must never be a stepping-stone to a
better law practice or a political office in the legislative or executive
branches, nor should it be a position of retirement.
Outstanding attorneys will be difficult to obtain for the judiciary
in the future because of a loss in the prestige of the office caused by the
proliferation of the office and the misconduct of a few. The reduction
of prestige is also linked to a judicial officer's compensation.12 The
circuit judge was once the highest paid public official in the community.
Now state, county, and municipal funds pay more to law professors,
county and assistant county attorneys, city and county managers, super-
intendents of public instruction, and, in some instances, court clerks.
About ten years ago, the compensation of a judge was within reasonable
range of that of a good trial lawyer. This is no longer true in many areas
of the state. This lack of parity in compensation, when coupled with
investment restrictions that are much greater than for other public offi-
cials, may well limit the persons who will seek judicial office. Last, but
not least, an individual contemplating a judicial career may be con-
cerned about the political uncertainty of the office even though he has
been diligent and industrious.
These problems are not insoluble. Obviously, the State cannot
compensate judges for the amount many of them could earn practicing
law. But compensation on a par with that of other public officials in the
community, together with the security of a fully funded retirement plan
which offsets investment restrictions, will solve this problem. With ref-
erence to specific compensation for the judiciary, it is suggested that a
cost-of-living increase or decrease formula be established and thereby
12. The Legislative Committee of the Florida Bar is preparing a report on the
inadequacy of judicial salaries.
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avoid annual legislative requests for pay increases. 13
Finally, the merit retention plan, approved by Florida voters on
November 2, 1976, will substantially aid restoration of much of the
prestige of the office." There are many who are concerned about merit
retention and believe that it removes the judge from the people of his
community. Merit retention is, in fact, a compromise between the politi-
cally elected judge and the judge who is appointed for life. It is a device
that takes the judge out of the political sphere but still requires that
periodically he be accountable to the people. It is interesting to note that
fourteen states' s now have a merit retention process for at least their
court of last resort, and at least ten have no election process whatever."
The fact that a judicial officer will be selected on merit and retained on
merit will substantially enhance the prestige of the office in the eyes of
those who may seek the office as well as in the eyes of the public.
CITIZEN EDUCATION
To most Americans, the law is a strange realm shrouded in mys-
tery, presided over by awesome figures speaking in an arcane language,
unintelligible to the average person. Knowledge of how our government,
and particularly our judicial system, work is extremely important to our
self-government. If a person does not understand the system of justice,
it is difficult for him to respect it. But ignorance of the judicial system
and its place in our society costs us more than just the loss of a citizen's
respect. The system is effective only to the extent that people intelli-
gently use it to their advantage and voluntarily comply with its restric-
tions. Those acting on misconceived notions of the law brought about
13. California increases the salaries of its justices in proportion to increases in
the California price index. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 68203 (West).
14. See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE: SELECTED READINGS (G. Winters ed. 1967). See also Garwood, Judicial Revi-
sion-An Argument for the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. I
(1973); FLORIDA BAR, MERIT RETENTION OF JUDGES HANDBOOK (1976).
15. These states include the following: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and
Wyoming. See generally FLORIDA BAR, MERIT RETENTION OF JUDGES HANDBOOK
(1976).
16. These states include the following: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Vir-
ginia. In New Hampshire, judges are initially elected, but serve during good behavior.
In Vermont, there is constitutional merit retention for all judges, but it is the legislature
that passes on the judges, not the electorate.
Nova Law Journal 1:977 1
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by their ignorance become discontent; as a result, their potential contri-
bution to our society is lost.
The legal profession has done little to convey to the ordinary citizen
an understanding of how the judicial system operates and how it can
help the individual. That responsibility has been left to anyone who will
take it. No one really has. A social studies textbook used in Florida
public schools, for example, contains less than ten pages about our
judicial system. Is it surprising then, in light of their lack of knowledge,
that our youth are cynical about the law and distrust those who adminis-
ter it?
Today's student is restless and independent and wants to be in-
volved with real problems relevant to his world. Why not teach him how
the judicial system deals with those problems? A high school graduate
should know his obligations under the law, how to legally protect him-
self when he buys a house or car, what to do when there is a death in
the family, what is required of him as a witness or a juror, what his
rights are if he is charged with a criminal offense, and when to seek legal
assistance.
A number of states are attempting to educate students and the
public about how our system of justice operates." I recently requested
the Young Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar to develop, in coopera-
tion with the Supreme Court and the Department of Education, written
educational materials on this subject. The Section accepted this respon-
sibility. This, however, is only a first step. We need the participation of
the entire legal profession, not only in the development of these educa-
tional materials, but in aiding teachers in instructing students and con-
veying the same information to the community itself. Increased knowl-
edge will come with increased understanding and respect for the law. It
also should produce knowledgeable citizen support to improve and fund
a system of justice that can properly absorb all new matters and dispose
of them with high quality judicial officers. These are some of the prob-
lems our judiciary faces now and in the near future. To solve them, there
17. In its booklet entitled Law, the Law in American Society Foundation-
National Center for Law-Focused Education (33 North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois
60602) reports ongoing projects in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Washington, and the District
of Columbia. The materials produced by the Foundation include the Justice in America,
Justice in Urban America, and Trailmarks of Liberty series. Also, the Conference of
California Judges has produced a public information and education program called
Project Benchmark, and the Wisconsin Bar Foundation has developed an educational
program for high school students called Inquiry.
11
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must be full recognition of the existence of our problems and active
participation and interest by both the legal profession and the individual
citizen.
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Studies of Legal Education:
A Review of Recent Reports
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT*
THOMAS L. SHAFFERt
Early in 1972, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education published
its report on legal education.' It is the most prominent study of legal
education in the last decade, and typical of discourse in and about law
schools-urbane, speculative, unempirical, conceptual, rarely student-
centered. The authors of the Carnegie report were articulate law teach-
ers. They wrote with their feet up and their pipes lit, without attention
to facts which did not come from their considerable experience. The
value of such reports is the thoughtfulness of the people who write them,
and their predictive accuracy is due to the fact that people who are
powerful in legal education deal in self-fulfilling prophecy. Reports on
legal education are therefore characteristically thin on new information,
well informed about yesterday, incisive on tomorrow, and weak about
today.
A less prominent, less urbane movement in the organized Bar is
particularly noticeable in and around the American Bar Association,
in which lawyers and judges report on legal education. The Ameri-
can Bar Association Section on Legal Education, a diffuse, voluntary
This is a modified version of the third chapter in the authors' forthcoming book,
LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE. Research for the book was sponsored by the
Spencer Foundation. The authors acknowledge also the valuable assistance of Ms.
Karen Bulger of the Wisconsin Bar and Mr. Craig Boyd of the Pennsylvania Bar-both
members of the Notre Dame Law School class of 1974-and of Mr. Tyson Dines of
the University of Virginia School of Law.
*Ph.D., J.D.; member of the Bar in Connecticut; clinical psychologist, Hamden,
Connecticut.
tProfessor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Visiting Professor of Law (1975-
1976), University of Virginia.
I. The law-school report was written by the late Professor Herbert L. Packer and
Dean Thomas Ehrlich, both of the Stanford University Law School. It incorporated as
an appendix a global study on law-school curricula which had been prepared a year
earlier by the Association of American Law Schools; the curriculum effort was the work
of a committee of law teachers headed by Professor Paul D. Carrington of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School.
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group of professors, lawyers, judges, and officials of government, for
example, controls law-school accreditation. The Section's governing
Council chooses committee members for Section activities, including
the Committee on Law School Accreditation. National movements and
concerns about legal education often find their way into the discussions,
resolutions, and activities of the Section on Legal Education, and the
Section usually defends the interests of law professors in the broader
debates which go on in the American Bar Association and in the na-
tional legal profession. Recent examples include a 1975 resolution
brought in the American Bar Association's House of Delegates by law-
yers from Idaho, to remove from accreditation rules the requirement
that law schools provide tenure to professors. Another continuing argu-
ment arranges itself around rules of state supreme courts which impose
curricula on law schools. 2 Movements of this sort generate reports and
discussions. The reports and discussions are rarely empirical, usually
conceptual, and more than occasionally anti-intellectual. Printed aggre-
gations of testimony and documents on the imposed-course rule of the
Indiana Supreme Court are an example of all three features and are of
significant concern to the schools we studied.
The concern expressed in studies of this sort is concern about the
availability and quality of legal services. Students, when they are consid-
ered at all, are treated as malleable. They are the raw material with
which public need is to be met. Student feelings are beside the point, a
neglect which is probably advertent. The implication of these studies is
that students can be "taught" almost anything, good or bad. The impli-
cation when translated means that lawyers can be made to behave in
whatever way the public interest requires, and the anvil on which lawyer
behavior is shaped is the law school. Studies of legal education tend,
therefore, to talk about training for public service, training for
specialties in the practice of law, training for specific skills (especially
courtroom skills), and training for moral behavior ("professional re-
sponsibility").
The Carrington Report was built around a list of educational goals,
and around an elective three-tiered curriculum. Goals covered five law-
yer functions-counseling, specialized practice, interdisciplinary re-
search, allied professions, and grounding for other disciplines. The cur-
riculum, given reader tolerance for new titles, was almost typical of
2. See Beytagh, Prescribed Courses as Prerequisites for Taking Bar Examina-
tions: Indiana's Experiment in Controlling Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 449
(1974).
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what law schools teach now, and was therefore a generally acceptable
list. But lists (and most studies of curricula) tend, as the broader studies
do, to assume student malleability and to neglect what is, in our view,
the heart of professionalization. If the strongest sources of lawyer be-
havior are in law school at all-and we doubt that they are-the sources
rest more in environmental factors-climate, teaching style, etc.-than
in curricular factors; more in the way people treat one another than in
syllabuses for courses. Even taken on their own terms, discussions of the
Packer-Ehrlich and Carrington sort tend, because they are unempirical,
to assume more uniformity in legal education than we believe to be
there. Methods and devices in teaching, for example, are more diverse,
in numerous instances, than the report suggests. This diversity is a
product of the fact that law professors are the prima donnas of higher
education. They are free to be eccentric and many try idiosyncratic
forms of teaching more often than the reports indicate. Professors in law
school are, it appears, relatively uninterested in methods of teaching
other than their own; they innovate, by and large, only on their own
terms; they tend to be uninformed about the psychological effect of their
methods on students, and their effect as teachers turns less on what they
say than on the fact that a law classroom, operating at its traditional
best, builds a personal connection between teacher and student.
A second report on legal education, the Packer-Ehrlich report,
urged (1) that law schools collaborate with social science, (2) that they
mount more programs of clinical education, and (3) that they revise the
terminal end of the law-school program toward less boredom. The last
point is usually stated in terms of student boredom, but not documented
by any measures of boredom. We suspect one of the real problems, in
any case, is professor boredom. Our research findings, and our general
impression about legal education, are that collaboration with social
science is talked about, but not practiced. The facts that studies of legal
education are pervasively unempirical, and what empirical studies there
are-in unpublished dissertations, for example-are ignored, tend to
verify the impression.
"Clinical legal education," in the typical conceptual report on legal
education, means one or more of three distinct forms of educational
experience. First, the term may be used to describe a classroom device
in which students learn by doing, rather than by absorption or imitation.
This might better be called experience-based learning and made to de-
scribe everything from encounter groups, used to teach counseling skills,
to practice-court programs in which students try suppositious cases to
mock courts and juries. It removes the teacher as model, tends to make
him a companion, or, even, a mildly quaint, academic consultant.
15
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Second, "clinical legal education" is used to mean student involve-
ment in legal programs for poor and disadvantaged clients. Most "clini-
cal programs" in law schools are, in our observation, of this second sort.
Their principal successes have been a contribution toward redressing the
legal profession's neglect of the poor, an exposure of students to the
"real world" of law practice, and the provision of free or low-cost
personnel to courts and law offices. Their dynamic is a simple, inexpen-
sive one in which students spend what they regard as educational time
in the practice of law. Such programs are regarded with ambivalence
by legal educators, which ambivalence reflects concern at loss of control
over law students, skepticism about the educational value of the pro-
grams, and concern over the quality of legal service which is provided
by untutored, usually unsupervised law students. The growth of these
programs has been stimulated by court rules which permit students to
represent clients in litigation.3
Finally, "clinical legal education" may mean one of the rare course
programs in which students and teacher join in collaborative law prac-
tice. These programs are rare because they are expensive. They reduce
student-teacher ratios from the typical 1:25 to 1:10 or lower. The com-
parison illustrates the fact that law schools have never partaken of the
financing which graduate education in social science or the humanities
enjoys. They are inevitably less expensive than graduate education in the
health sciences. Most law schools have made money for their universi-
ties. Clinical collaborative practice tends to duplicate the experience
students and young lawyers have with practitioners. A few of the pro-
grams have produced a sub-profession within law teaching-the "clini-
cal professor," who, more practicing lawyer than academic, is the func-
tional equivalent of the older lawyer in an apprenticeship system.
In our view such programs, where they exist, are financed by short-
term grants from outside agencies, rather than from budgets of the law
schools which develop them. Their survival, we suspect, depends on the
continuation of this outside funding.
The most remarkable suggestion coming out of these recent studies
was that the third year of law school be abolished. It was presented, in
a public hearing, mounted by the Section on Legal Education of the
American Bar Association, to the deans of approved law schools, at the
American Bar Association's mid-winter meeting in New Orleans early
3. See COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(C.L.E.P.R.), STATE RULES PERMITTING THE STUDE T PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed.
1973).
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in 1973. The law deans literally shouted it down.' The fact that the
suggestion was made in the first place was remarkable for two reasons.
First, it was politically unrealistic. Law schools at that time were the
only segment of higher education which was enjoying prosperity, and
the two-year-law-school idea invited law schools to forfeit a third of this
bonanza. Second, it implied that legal education was substantively inef-
fective. If, as everyone conceded, the law becomes more complex daily,
the natural response, if legal education were effective, would be to make
law school longer. The two-year suggestion and its fate in the law-school
market place were, we think, empirically indicdtive of the fact that
thoughtful legal educators are not confident of the value of law-school
education.
Other studies about legal education can be described, more summa-
rily, under a number of broad headings, such as studies about law
students, complaints about legal education, studies on methodology -
and studies about curriculum.
1. LAW STUDENTS
In 1972, a first-year law student at Harvard killed himself. Some
of his schoolmates reacted by inviting a number of their fellows
from Columbia to join them in a conversation about student feel-
ings in law school. Some of their interaction was recorded and pub-
lished in The Journal of Legal Education,5 a relatively recondite periodi-
cal which is overseen by law professors 'in the Association of American
Law Schools, and is printed and distributed to law teachers, free of
charge, by the largest American publisher of law books. "One conclu-
sion was evident," the article said: "Law students are disillusioned about
the nature of legal education, andthey are confused about the role of a
lawyer in society. Perhaps more important they are distressed by what
becoming an attorney does to their chosen profession." One student was
reported to have said: "You really become obnoxious to anyone who is
not a lawyer."
That episode reveals a number of things about the subject matter
of this article: lawyers rather than the law, and law students more than
either lawyers or legal education.
4. See Stolz, The Two-Year Law School: The Day the Music Died, 25 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 37 (1973).
5. See Mohr & Rogers, Legal Education: Some Student Reflections, 25 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 403 (1973).
1 1:97
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A. There is a general impression throughout the enterprise that
no one knows anything about how students feel. The impression is
probably no more accurate of legal education than it would be if said
about clerks in the Department of Agriculture or welders at General
Motors, but the impression has not been met by studies which are both
available and regarded as useful. One reason is that almost everything
written about law students is admonitory. It either admonishes them to
do something or their teachers to do something to them.
A principal source of admonition since about 1960 has been the
observation of psychiatrists who teach in law schools. These are not, for
the most part, "clinical" observations. That is, they are not the product,
or by-product, of psychotherapy as practiced on law students. (Dr. An-
drew Watson occasionally writes a paragraph or two which is clinical,
but that is exceptional, even in his work.)' These studies may fairly be
seen as sophisticated, even in some cases informed, speculation About
law-student behavior. They usually assume that the law student is in a
behavioral or emotional dilemma, and then characterize the dilemma
as involving both anxiety and ignorance. Perhaps one reason law profes-
sors seem not to react to this literature is because it evokes in them a
"so what" response. They know their students are anxious and ignorant.
In fact, they depend on it.
Davis' article7 on law students in first-year criminal law classes is
an example. Davis said he noticed too few students who were interested
in criminal law (dilemma), and that this circumstance was caused by
anxiety created in the student himself by the study of criminal law and
the antipathy he builds as a defense to that anxiety, and by the laying
of blame on the criminal defendants and lack of understanding of the
social problems which cause their criminality (ignorance).' Davis wrote
that law students could be made more interested in crime and criminals
through a process of self-discovery which psychiatry, not law, is able to
make available to them. Much of Dr. Watson's extensive labor in legal
6. See A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968); Watson, The Watergate
Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease, 26 . LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1974);
Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 91 (1968); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of
Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1963); Watson, The Law
and Behavioral Science Project at the University of Pennsylvania: A Psychiatrist on the
Law Faculty, I I J. LEGAL EDuc. 73 (1958).
7. See Davis, Psychological Functions in the Teaching of Criminal Law, 44 Miss.
L.J. 647 (1973).
8. Id.
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education is of this sort, and much of it, we think, is accurate and useful.
Psychiatric comment does not, though, so far as we can tell, result in
changing the conditions which these psychiatrists see as the source of
student difficulty. It is perhaps typical of concern and change among
legal educators that, in 1963, Dr. Watson called attention to the psy-
chological difficulty of professional identity among law students.' He
focused on the fact that law schools cannot seem to teach legal ethics.
So far as we know, his essay did not produce a change in method or
curriculum. However, in 1974-75, there was widespread ferment and
change in the teaching of ethics to lawyers, ferment which has caused
the American Bar Association to require instruction in professional
responsibility." The ferment resulted from the efforts, not of Dr. Wat-
son, but of Richard Nixon and the erstwhile lawyers who gathered
around Mr. Nixon when he returned to Washington in 1968.
Watson is also critical (as we are) of the "Socratic method" in law
teaching. He sees authoritarian law teaching (however called) as abu-
sive, demeaning, destructive of creativity, and wrenching (if not worse)
to personalities. Because of it, he writes, students avoid close personal
relationships with one another, or with their teachers, and become dys-
functionally competitive. Psychiatrists recommend more personal ap-
proachability among law teachers, less emphasis on grade competition,
less study of abstract "case" materials and more of personal experience,
and increased opportunities for supervised student practice.
Marul" summarizes several studies on the social and economic
background of law students. Most of these do not correlate attitudes
with background, or trace the effect of background on the choice either
of professional employment or student experience in law school.'2 These
background studies are exhaustive, though thei'r principal disadvantage
seems to be that they do not agree with one another. Warkov and
Zelan, 3 working for the National Opinion Research Council, for ex-
ample, reported that the strongest indicator of a college student's choos-
9. See Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Responsi-
bility. supra note 6.
10. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE, STANDARDS FOR THE
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, No. 302(aXiii) (1973).
It. 0. MARu, RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK
DONE (1972).
12. Although somewhat dated and addressed to a limited professional experience,
a notable exception is J. CARUN, LAWYERS ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR (1966).
13. See WARKOV & ZELAN, LAWYERS IN THE MAKING (1965).
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ing to study law was the fact that one of his parents was a lawyer. This
they found to be the essential element in socio-economic status as a
predictor. Other studies which Maru summarizes found socio-economic
status the highest predictor (in other words, legal careers are normally
launched from positions of advantage) and found also that high status
is strengthened and increased in and through law school. Young lawyers
from ,the best families end up in the best firms; those from poor ethnic
minorities go to small offices, and to a less aesthetic professional prac-
tice. Both studies agreed that law is more attractive to Jews than Chris-
tians, and more attractive to Catholics than Protestants.
B. The enterprise expresses shock when the charge is made that
law school is destructive. Otherwise, we take it, there would have been
nothing remarkable about the student conversation at Harvard, cer-
tainly nothing remarkable enough to commend itself to the law-
professor editors of The Journal of Legal Education. Dominant forces
in legal education recognize that the study of law is hard work, often
boring hard work, but they have not recognized that it does anybody
harm. Data to the contrary fly in the face of what is seen as experience
and first-hand knowledge, and are therefore resisted, which in turn
provokes strong language from the other side. Savoy's turbulent tour
de force" is an example of anger in the face of resistance to the charge
that law school is harmful. But Savoy brought no data to the enterprise,
other than his own observations as a young law teacher. Other data
hinted that law students come to legal education with habits and atti-
tudes which law school could improve, but does not. A study by Eron
and Redmount,"' for example, indicated that beginning law students
have more cynicism than beginning medical students, but that law
school has little effect on cynical attitudes, while medical school in-
creases them. Theilens'" found that medical students know more about
medicine than law students know about law, and that both medical and
law students believe medicine to have higher prestige. Personality stud-
ies summarizes by Marul7 indicate that law students are high in cyni-
14. See Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444
(1970).
15. See Eron & Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 431 (1957).
16. See Theilens, The Socialization of Law Students: A Case Study in Three
Parts (1965) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
17. These studies describe the students as hard to entertain; legal educators know
about their boredom, have in fact written about it at boring length, and about their
ambition, competitiveness, and resistance to socialization. Early studies of emotional
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cism, have an untypically high interest in manipulating other people,
and hence a high demand for creative, well-paying, prestigious, and
independent professional lives.
C. Uncertainty is to be expected. Geoffrey Hazard, a law pro-
fessor who is uncommonly outspoken about behavioral studies by and
about lawyers, who was once director of the American Bar Foundation,
reviewed four studies of lawyer feelings and found them all wanting:
Weyrauch because his social science was bad; Smigel and Carlin be-
cause their social science was inadequate; and O'Gorman, whose social
science was good, because he did not understand that the word "lawyer"
doesn't mean anything:
The term "lawyer" refers less to a social function than to a type of
training, a type which in fact is shared by people doing a bewildering
variety of tasks. . . . To consider the study of lawyers as the study of
one of "the professions" is to assume that the moit distinctive feature of
"lawyers" is that they are lawyers, and this assumes the answer to proba-
bly the most interesting question about "lawyers.""
Watson, commenting on "Watergate,"" said that its cause lay in
the fact that the "lawyers" involved lost their consciences (in law school,
apparently), and that a principal reason for that result is that law stu-
dents come seeking certainty and find more uncertainty than they are
able to cope with. Donnell," a social scientist, reports that lawyers in
corporations relish the ambiguity in their lives. Strickland,2' a legal
historian, thinks it would be dishonest to provide certainty, which can
only be an illusion, and that the business of legal education is rigorous
thought and the ability to change with changing circumstances.
attitudes among law students at Stanford, Chicago, and Columbia, readings taken
before and during law school, indicate that law students choose law as a career later
than medical students; that they understand well enough not to be damaged by uncer-
tainty as to what will be expected of them as lawyers; and that they experience little
emotional movement while they are studying law. See 0. MAR1U, supra note 11.
18. See Hazard, Reflections on Four Studies of the Legal Profession, Law and
Society. A Supplement to Social Problems (summer 1965), reprinted in I AM. B.
FOUNDATION (pamphlet, 1967).
19. See Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency
Disease. supra note 6.
20. See DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL (1970).
21. See Strickland, Continuity and Change in Legal Education, 10 TULSA L.J.
225 (1974).
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D. Law students always demand something different. They are
restless, bright, pushy people. One school of response2 has it that law
students' demands are inevitable, unwise, and to be resisted. This school
tends to cite the traditional strengths of the legal profession, especially
in England and the United States, and to attribute those to the fact that
legal educators resist demands for change.2 Oliver Cromwell said the
key to his success was that he knew how to deny petitions; there is
similar Puritan gravity in those who defend traditional legal education.
Another result of the demand, and one which produces a significant
amount of oblique and impressionistic literature on law students, is the
sporadic experimental educational venture in law schools.24
In terms of what can be learned about law students from these
studies, one may conjecture that it is not exposure to substantive law
which makes students demand change, but rather something in the atti-
22. See Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REv. 35 (1950); Fuller, What the
Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, I J. LEGAL EDUC. 189 (1948);
Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, N.Y. ST. B.J. 485 (1974); Griswold, Teaching
Alone is Not Enough, 25 J. LEGAL EDuc. 251 (1973); Griswold, Law Schools and
Human Relations, 37 CHI. B. REc. 199 (1956).
23. See Strickland, supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., Botein, Simulation and Roleplaying in Administrative Law, 26 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 234 (1974); Dutile, Criminal Law and Procedure-Bringing It Home, 26
J. LEGAL EDuC. 106 (1973) (use of informal, extracurricular, voluntary seminars for
first-year students toward increasing the vitality of class discussion); Grismer & Shaffer,
Experience-Based Teaching Methods in Legal Counseling, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 448
(1970) (use of law student encounter groups); Katsch, Preventing Future Shock: Games
and Legal Education, 25 J. LEGAL EDuc. 484 (1973) (advocates use of games and
roleplaying); Miller, A Report of Modest Success with a Variation of the Problem
Method, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344 (1971); O'Meara, The Notre Dame Program: Training
Skilled Craftsmen and Leaders, 43 A.B.A.J. 614 (1957); O'Meara, Legal Education at
Notre Dame, 28 NOTRE DAME LAw. 447 (1953) (reported success with problem-
centered adaptations of the case method); Sacks, Human Relations Training for Law
Students and Lawyers, II J. LEGAL EDUC. 316 (1959) (use of "human relations" meth-
ods). All of these teachers report enthusiastic student response; skeptical researchers
might conjecture that this result was more because of change than because of creative
methodology. These teachers also reported that their new approaches require additional
effort and time on the part of the teacher.
A related body of experimentation involves teaching law to non-law-students. See.
e.g., Gibson, Law Students: A Valued Resource for Law Related Education Programs,
25 J. LEGAL EDuC. 215 (1973) (advocates use of law students as teachers); Sbarboro,
Introducing Young Students to Law, 59 A.B.A.J. 1171 (1973) (report based on pretest-
ing and post-testing of 40,000 elementary and secondary students in Chicago that stu-
dents leave such programs with heightened appreciation for the law and an im-
proved-i.e., less cynical-attitude about it).
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tudes they bring to law school, or something in the methodology and
climate they find there, or both.
E. Success in law school requires conformity and effort, more
than it requires personality change, but demands for conformity and
effort are heavy, and some students react to them with the fear that
personalities are being changed for the worse: Patton25 describes an
experimental study among first-year students at Yale Law School, the
results of which indicate that first-year law students are capable of
working as hard as the system demands. This is an important point,
since it means that competitive strategies are not necessary for the task
at hand, but are employed by law students, and provoked by law teach-
ers, for other purposes. 2 ' The best performers, Patton says, are those
who: (a) are systematic and well organized; (b) do not resist law-school
teaching methodology (Patton says they believe that it does in fact teach
them to "think like a lawyer"); and (c) admire and heed their teachers.
Those who do not do well: (a) believe the management of the material
is largely a matter of memorization; (b) feel misled and let down; (c)
question their own competence; and (d) tend to dislike their teachers.
If one compares these experimental results with other conversations of
students,1 it is possible to conclude that those who do not conform (and
these may be most students or relatively few, depending on the times
and on local climate) are unhappy in law school. It is they who feel that
it is best not to volunteer answers in law classes; they who find other
law students unattractive people; they who tend to form associations
with other law students who share their level of achievement and their
ambitions for professional employment;2' and they who find non-legal
subjects, and the cross-disciplinary aspects of law courses, to be more
interesting than the study of "hard law." Patton found that the personal
characteristics a student brings to law school play a dominant part in
his ability to maintain self-esteem as he studies law and to obtain satis-
faction from the system of legal education. He concluded that a belief
in one's self as a capable and self-reliant person is necessary for con-
structive adaptation to law school. That sort of person is least likely to
be touched deeply by his educational experiences; he knows how to
25. See Patton, The Student, the Situation, and Performance During the First
Year of Law School, 21 J. LEGAL EDuc. 10 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wisc.
L. REv. 1201.
27. See Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 5; Silver, supra note 26.
28. See Shultz, Law Schools and the Differentiation of Recruits to Firm, Solo.
Government and Business Careers (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago).
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"manage them," which means that he .can keep them at psychological
arm's length.?
It is on this point, probably, that the researchers and the complain-
ers and defenders might converge in their commentary on the lives of
law students. It is an anxious experience for those who will not or cannot
conform to it enough to maintain self-esteem. It is, for most students,
particularly today, not a deeply touching experience, and this is why
strident complaint, such as that evidenced by the Harvard conversation
or by Savoy's iconoclasm," tends-to provoke resistance. Law-student
experience does not comport with the experience of those responsible for
legal education, and, maybe because they are typically without evidence,
reports about law students do not challenge and do not produce change.
The point is perhaps summarized in Harvard Professor Lon
Fuller's assessment of American legal education as it entered upon its
present incarnation .3 He recognized that law schools are supposed to
provide training in skills, and some knowledge, but he saw the principal
mission of law schools as exposure to "great" minds and to the pro-
cesses in which lawyers participate. He emphasized processes over either
skills or people. He said that lawyers participate in processes; he did not
say they participated in the lives of their clients. The trouble with the
study of skills, he said, is that "it converts what ought to be a disin-
terested exploration of issues into an exercise in self-improvement."''
He left no doubt about his preference for issues rather than human
beings: "Skills and techniques," he said, "should be the by-product of
an educational system that concentrates on problems rather than
men."
2. COMPLAINTS
Those who charge that the profession of law does more harm than
good to human beings, along with those who charge that law schools
are harmful to students, invite incredulous resistance. That is not true
of those who complain about legal education in more abstract terms.
The law-school world is, after all, a vast enterprise, uncertain enough
29. See Patton, supra note 25.
30. See Savoy, supra note 14.
31. See Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers,
supra note 22.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id.
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/1
21 11:1977
to provide something unpleasant for everyone. Most of the complaints
are unempirical, but the lack of empiricism may be insignificant when
compared with the realities of politics. Many complaints about legal
education, most particularly the complaint that it provides too little
experience and exposure to the realities of the practice of law, have been
effective without evidence. There have been changes in legal education
since Fuller's defensive essay of 1948. One can trace them even in essays
written by Fuller's Harvard colleagues. Erwin Griswold," former Har-
vard law dean and former Solicitor General (and a prestigious defender
of the traditional in legal education), wrote in 1956 that the principal
failure of the case method in legal education was that it had tried to
teach too much. He had noticed that complaints about traditional meth-
ods were that they were too narrow, neglected recent development, and
were inhumane and amoral.
By 1973, Moore,3 writing in an intramural Harvard publication,
was able to say that Harvard emphasized individuality in instruction, a
remarkable change from the 1948-56 observations of Fuller and Gris-
wold. Moore instanced clinical education, programmed learning, advo-
cacy skills, and, most of all, experimentation. He quoted a point often
made about his, the mother of all American law schools-a point which,
in the nineteen-seventies, could be made of many other law schools, and
which may prove too much: Harvard law students are so able that they
would become good lawyers without even coming to law school. "As
Professor Warren Seavey used to say, 'Our people are good enough so
that nothing we did to them could spoil them.'" Professor Bok, then
dean of the law school and now president of the university, implied the
same spirit of change when he wrote, in 1969, that law students found
the "Socratic method" unsatisfying;" he recommended a two-year pro-
gram and advanced study (on a graduate school model) for those who
propose to teach law. 7 Five years earlier, Professor Paul Freund
hoped that law schools would be able to keep alive a spirit of intellectual
34. See Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, supra note 22.
35. See Moore, Legal Education: The H.L.S. Community Speaks Out, HARV. L.
ScH. BULL. 12 (April 1973).
36. See Bok, A Different Way of Looking at the World, HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 2
(March & April 1969).
37. Dean Albert Sacks, successor of Professor Bok, led the charge against these
recommendations in 1973. See Stolz, supra note 4. Compare Shapira, Changing Patterns
in Legal Education in Israel, 24 AD. L. REv. 233 (1972) with Bok, supra note 36.
38. See Freund, Dedication Address: The Mission of the Law School, 9 UTAH
L. REv. 45 (1964).
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inquiry, systematization, and community leadership. The former attor-
ney general, Edward Levi, a law professor, law dean, and university
president, expressed the same hope in 1972.31
More specific complaints about legal education, from a broader
variety of law-school observation and experience, have emphasized
these points:
A. It is an elite system.1 This complaint is focused most clearly,
and most typically, on the processes of student selection and the almost
universal tendency among admissions committees to rely heavily on
undergraduate grades and scores on the Law School Admission Test.
The result is an intellectually elite national law student body. The com-
plaint is that young lawyers are, as a result, narrow, bookish, and intol-
erant of the mundane elements of daily practice. Complainers"' suggest
a lottery system for admissions, emphasis on psychological qualities
other than academic ability, and open-gates admission followed by high
academic attrition. The commentators emphasize the emotional (and
social) aloofness of the law school learning community, a circumstance
which makes Hessians of law teachers and resentful conformists of
students." They find in their own experience that the educational atmos-
phere is hostile and.oppressive, and they tend to argue, sometimes by
implication, for greater attention to what we call humanistic climate.
B. It is an inflexible system. Stolz'3 blames this on accredita-
tion rules. Complainers of the future" may make the same criticism of
state-supreme-court rules. State supreme courts affect law-school pro-
grams by setting minimum requirements for admission to practice; na-
tional accreditation becomes significant because state supreme courts
require law degrees from nationally accredited law schools. Accredita-
tion is, for the most part, handled by the Section on Legal Education
of the American Bar Association. A few courts recognize the Associa-
39. See Levi, The Place of Professional Education in the Life of the University,
U. CHi. L. SCH. REc. 3 (Winter 1972).
40. See, e.g., Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA.
L. REV. 637 (1968); Frierson, And the CStudents Make Money, 59 A.B.A.J. 61 (1973);
Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1970 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 71;
Smith, Academic Aloofness: Stimulant or Depressant to Legal Education?, 21 J. LEGAL
Euuc. 89 (1968).
41. See Frierson, supra note 40.
42. See Bergin; Kennedy; Smith, supra note 40. Compare Bergin, supra note 40,
with Savoy, supra note 14, and McDowell, The Dilemma of a Law Teacher, 52 B.U.L.
REv. 247 (1972).
43. See Stolz, supra note 37.
44. See Beytagh, supra note 2.
J
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tion of American Law Schools as an accreditor. Griswold defends the
accreditation system; York finds logic in it."s
C. It is not diverse. There will soon be 200 accredited American
law schools. A frequent complaint about legal education is that they all
tend to be the same.'6
D. It does not produce ethical sensitivity. Some of the literature
focuses narrowly on the Code of Professional Responsibility and on
other professional concerns; some of it might more properly be called
"moral." Manning'e addresses both aspects in terms of what he believes
to be decay in the moral fiber of American lawyers. He argues for
interdisciplinary study of ethics and morals, and a spirit of public serv-
ice, but he implies that neither attitude is currently available in legal
education. Starrs" reviews the debate between the "pervasive" teaching
of legal ethics and the provision of courses; he'and Manning favor the
latter.
Manning's studies," like several other studies of the morals of
lawyers, are speculative and accidental. These often succeed, to the
extent they do, because their authors have a poetic insight which tends
to operate independent of their data. Hazard, complaining about Wey-
rauch's readable observations on the disenchantment of European law-
yers, sounds a typical and accurate theme for the poetic insight and its
limitations:
[M]ost people in the law are idealists who at any early age in their
profession have had the searing experience of realizing that the world can
be remade only by narrow degrees, no matter how brilliant and dedicated
its would-be law-givers. It is in my view a capital problem of the sociology
of the legal profession that underneath most lawyers are boy scouts.5
E. Legal education is too vocational. Brown, who is identified
45. See Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, supra note 22; York, The Law
School Curriculum Twenty Years Hence, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160 (1963).
46. Stevens and Omrod conducted a debate on diversity, focused on English legal
education. Much of their data is about American law schools. See Omrod, Reforming
Legal Education in England, 57 A.B.A.J. 676 (1971)- Stevens, American Legal Educa-
tion: Reflections in Light of Omrod, 35 MoD. L. REv. 242 (1972).
47. See Manning, A Socio-Ethical Foundation for Meeting the Obligations of the
Legal Profession, 5 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 237 (1964).
48. See Starrs, Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont Via the Pervasive System, 17
J. LEGAL EDuC. 356 (1965).
49. See Manning, supra note 47.
50. See Hazard, supra note 18.
23 1
27
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
24 Nova Law Journal 1:1977
with legal education at a Roman Catholic institution, argues that legal
education does not meet the needs of those who wish to study law as a
humanity and who may not wish to practice law. He emphasizes "scien-
tific" analysis, jurisprudence, legal history, and unspecialized subject
matter-noting a number of trends, such as clinical programs, and
summer study to shorten the time needed for a law degree, which evi-
dence a vocational bias.-" Gellhorn sees vocationalism as the source of
a return to the lecture in law classes.52 He argues, as Griswold did, that
the "Socratic method" fails when law schools teach too much.0 Brown
tends, as defenders of the traditional often do, to favor an intensification
of the intellectual aspects of legal education."
F. Legal education is not vocational enough. Every volume of
The American Bar Association Journal, which reaches more American
lawyers than any other professional publication, echoes this complaint.
Hervey (who was a legal educator, a law dean, and a leader in legal
education) represented the mood-as do movements for the detailed,
stringent imposition of curricula on law schools. The common assump-
tion in this part of the literature is that lawyers are made in law school.
For example: "The practicing profession is . ..but the mirror that
reflects the schools in which the lawyers were trained. If the bench and
the bar give back distorted images of justice, it is only because the
schools have failed to inspire devotion to high ideals and have not shown
the paths of true nobility, intellectual greatness, and real culture.",, On
these formidable premises, Dean Hervey lamented the decline in tradi-
tional teaching methods. A questionnaire research among practicing
lawyers indicates that most of them would agree with Hervey.56
51. See Brown, Recent Trends in U.S. Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 283
(1974).
52. See Gellhorn, The Secondiand Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDuc.
1 (1964). See also Richardson, Does Anyone Care for More Hemlock, 25 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 427 (1973).
53. See Griswold, supra note 34.
54. See Brown, supra note 51. Goodhart and Robertson, both of whom compare
English and American legal education, echo Brown; Goodhart from the perspective of
an English university legal educator. In England, university legal education is an under-
graduate subject and is conducted somewhat the same way a rigorous American under-
graduate program in history or literature is conducted. See Robertson, Some Sugges-
tions on Student Boredom in English and American Law Schools, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC.
278 (1968).
55. See Beytagh, supra note 2; Hervey, What's Wrong with Modern Legal
Education, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 381 (1957).
56. See Dunn, Legal Education and the Attitudes of Practicing Attorneys, 22 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 220 (1969).
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It is useful, in discussing both the too-vocational and not-
vocational-enough schools of complaint, to review Hazard's criticism of
O'Gorman, particularly Hazard's point that the word "lawyer" de-
scribes a body of training more than either a social function or a profes-
sional career5 7 Hazard points to three realities:
(1) Lawyering as a social function, rather than a professional
function, is impossibly broad in American culture. It is never embodied
(and therefore is not studiable) in a single lawyer's life and work.
(2) Lawyering as ministering to people is similar to other one-on-
one, ministering professions and therefore studiable, as Donnell demon-
strated," with the tools of the sociology of professions (role theory, etc.);
and
(3) Lawyering is a convenient focus for the study of power rela-
tionships-something which has been developed in a number of political
science studies of lawyers in positions of power.59
Hazard's urbane criticism illustrates an important fact about stud-
ies in legal education: Studies of lawyers and law students, as distin-
guished from studies about curriculum and method (teaching profes-
sionalism), or studies about lawyer's law (legal professionalism) tend to
fall into broad categories, ripe for condemnation, when they come to
their natural reading publics, lawyers and law teachers."
3. METHOD
Those who discuss method build their arguments on their experi-
57. See Hazard, supra note 18. But see O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL
CASES (1963).
58. See DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL: A ROLE STUDY (1970).
59. See 0. MARU, supra note 17; Dertke & Wills, Investigation of the Use of
Programmed Material in Legal Education, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 444 (1963); Schlesinger,
Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View, I MIDW. J. POL. Sci. 26 (1957). The
readable explorations of W. DoMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967) into the "ruling
class" in America affords both instruction and methodology.
60. See J. CARLIN, supra note 12 (interviews with Chicago "solo" practitioners),
and E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN?
(1964) (a study of the large New York City law firms), for two famous studies of lawyer
conduct that are criticized by lawyers who dabble in behavioral science, and by behav-
ioral scientists, as methodologically inadequate, or as obvious, or as both inadequate
and obvious. Studies which are more carefully controlled (see, e.g., O'GORMAN, supra
note 57, a study of New York City matrimonial lawyers) are criticized as too narrow
and technical. Both bodies are to some extent warranted; our present point is that they
are also inevitable.
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ence as students and teachers. There is rarely any indication in the
literature that the writer observed classrooms other than those he has
occupied as participant. Much of what is said about teaching method is
either speculative or built upon generalizations from personal experi-
ence. This limited observation should be taken into account in assessing
the continuing, bookish debate over traditional law-school methods.
Patterson" provided a useful analysis for the advantages and disad-
vantages of the case method, noting that it was pedagogically attractive
(because problem oriented), pragmatic, and sensitive to history; that it
conformed to the thought patterns of judges and lawyers, required self-
synthesis of doctrinal material, stimulated thought, provided contextual
introduction to terminology, and kept law teachers on their toes. He
reported, though, that many teachers find students cannot synthesize,
that the method wastes time. Llewellynl reviewed criticisms of the case
method and Franka condemned it. Llewellyn said he found the study
of cases to be too answer-oriented; that it focused too much on subject
matter and not enough on skill, and that, as literature, it provided too
little information. He felt, though, that creative use of appellate opin-
ions would be sufficient reform. More recent and less academic sources
of complaint focus less on these intellectual deficiencies than on the fact
that appellate opinions do not speak to the interests of human beings
who come into law offices.u
Austin's 1965 essay6 is a valuable description of the case method,
dynamically and historically. He noted, as seems clearly to be the case,
that aggregations of study material for law courses have begun to in-
clude vast amounts of non-case material, including non-legal material.
He said he found the traditional method, meaning both cases and
question-and-answer discussion, inadequate for the raising of conscious-
ness for law practice, too impractical, too time-consuming, boring, and
61. See Patterson, Legal Services and Legal Education, 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 457
(1973).
62. See LLEWLLYN, THE BRmBLs BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951).
63. See Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1933).
64. See, e.g., Redmount, A Clinical View of Law Teaching, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
705 (1975); Redmount, Transactional Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 . LEGAL EDuc.
253 (1974); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REV.
98 (1969); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, I CONN. L. REV. 201
(1968).
65. See Austin, Is the Casebook Method Obsolete? 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157
(1965).
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confusing, and inappropriate to the large law classes which had begun,
even in 1965, to appear in many theretofore small law schools. He
recommended, as compromisers have in law faculties, that the tradi-
tional method be retained in first-year (required) courses and otherwise
dropped. Second-year courses would then tend to text-book and lecture,
and third-year courses to seminar discussion.
There are a number of movements to replace case-method classes;
the literature on these tends to be descriptive of experiments. As long
as the writer is a teacher and is describing what he does in his own
classes, he feels little need to convince others of the value of his
methods."
It is implicit in case-method teaching that the reality of the legal
order has been divided into subject-matter compartments. Boyack and
Flynn 7 argue that its classification system, more than the case method
itself, produces the excessive conceptualization which is often found in
case-method teaching. They describe (but do not report results on) a
federally-funded experiment in which classes are organized around
groups of learners, rather than around subject matter.
One can classify these suggestions toward a number of objectives
which might, in some utopian law school of the future, be seen as a
convenient way to organize instruction. Some of them"8 argue for train-
ing in the ministering aspects of law practice; some" for skills training
in advocacy; and some 0 for deeper training in social leadership. All of
66. See, e.g., authorities cited, supra note 24; Casper, Two Models of Legal
Education, 41 TENN. L. REV. 13 (1973); Dauer, Expanding Clinical Teaching Methods
into the Commercial Law Curriculum, 25 3. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1973); Hayes & Hayes,
Towards Objective Assessment of Class Participation, 12 J. Soc. PUB. TCHRS. L. 323
(1973); Moulton, Clinical Education: As Much Theory as Practice, HARV. L. ScH.
BULL. I I (October 1972); Spring, Realism Revisited: Clinical Education and Conflict
of Goals in Legal Education, 13 WASHBURN L.J. 421 (1975). Dauer argues for client-
based methods in teaching commercial law; Moulton and Spring describe and defend
clinical methods for teaching legal procedure; Sacks's (supra note 24) is a classical
argument for human relations training; Hayes & Hayes observes that classroom discus-
sion in law school depends on intimidation more than on rewards, since few law teachers
base grades on discussion; and Casper compares the pedagogical effects of deductive
and inductive reasoning.
67. See Boyack & Flynn, Conceptual Approach to Legal Education, 6 Sw. U.L.
REV. 592 (1974).
68. See, e.g., Dauer, supra note 66; Grismer & Shaffer, supra note 24; Sacks,
supra note 66; Redmount, supra note 64.
69. See Casper; Hayes & Hayes; Moulton; Spring, supra note 66; Grossman,
Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974).
70. See, e.g., Boyack & Flynn, supra note 67.
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them point, again, to Hazard's observations about the diverse functions
lawyers in American are thought to perform, and many lead to the hope
that Moore's description of a system in which students choose is accur-
ate and is some sort of harbinger for a more satisfying, more human
future.
4. CURRICULUM
Method is an individual matter; every law teacher, within very
broad limits, is free to choose his own. Curriculum is a corporate mat-
ter; it is, typically, determined in a political process characterized by
conflicting ideology, student pressure, limited resources, and the log-
rolling which is familiar in the allocation of time and money by those
who make decisions. Discussions of curriculum tend, therefore, to be
more global and strident than discussions of method. They tend also to
be diverse." What tends to happen, in our observation, is that propo-
nents who propose to teach new courses are accommodated (often,
depending on the density of political log-rolling involved, at an incon-
venient time or in a limited format) and that those who are proposing
that someone else teach the new courses are ignored. Subject-matter
areas which are compelled by social and legal changes (labor law, inter-
national trade, etc.) are, of course, another matter, but, by and large,
curriculum reform has tended to be either an extension of the comity
which tolerates eccentric changes in methodology, or a matter for fruit-
less advocacy and conversation at professional meetings.
There are, for all of this, some persisting trends in the demands for
curricular change, and some of this persistence may finally have an
effect. One is the demand for "humanistic" legal education. Professor
Reich's short essay on this subject72 has been passed around more than
law-review articles usually are, and many of his points are congruent
with the essay (and experimental report) of Sacks7 on human-relations
training. Reich's argument was that students should be able to pursue
their interests in greater detail and should be offered broader
71. A casual sampling of suggestions in the literature for new law courses for new
retooled traditional courses illustrates this diversity: behavioral science, the daily life of
the law, drafting, group dynamics, humanities, interdisciplinary study, interviewing and
counseling, judicial process, legal history, legal methodology, legal techniques, legisla-
tion, mediation and negotiation, problem solving, process, professional relations, public
law, and social research.
72. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
73. See Sacks, supra note 68.
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consideration of behavioral science, art, and natural science, as part of
their consideration of law (which, he said, should be pursued as a single
subject). He argued for deeper training of law teachers and for more
attention in law school to social leadership.74 Sacks' article was in large
part the report of an experiment, the results of which he found encourag-
ing, in training law students in self-discovery and in human-relations
skills." Somewhat related to this are a number of essays which urge
greater attention to interpersonal morality and to ethical sophistica-
tion .76
Another body of literature on curriculum n argues for experimenta-
tion among legal educators and for diversity among law schools; this
genre sometimes even suggests a return to undergraduate legal educa-
tion.78 There are, of course, a number of essays in defense of the tradi-
tional curriculum.7'
The classical attack on traditional methodology and curriculum
remains the "plea for lawyer schools" of the late judge and educator,
Jerome Frank." Frank's argument for more "actual observation" of
74. See also Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the President Day, 79 YALE
L.J. 505 (1970); Peden, Goals for Legal Education, 24 J. LEGAL EDUc. 379 (1972);
Strong, Pedagogic Thinking of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226 (1973); Minsky,
Learning as an Acquired Skill, SEMINAR REP., May 14, 1975.
75. See also Grismer & Shaffer, supra note 24.
76. See, e.g., Christenson, In Pursuit of the Art of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 629
(1972); Kionka, Education for Professional Responsibility: The Buck Stops Here, 50
DEN. L.J. 439 (1974).
77. See Levi, supra note 39; Meyers, Education of Present and Future Lawyers
(an unpublished paper for the American Assembly, June 1975).
78. See, e.g., Holton, Outline for an Integrated Law Curriculum, 24 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 195 (1972).
79. See, e.g., Goda, Curriculum Changes: Philosophy and the Behavorial Sci-
ences Versus a Devil's Advocate, 22 J. LEGAL EDuc. 206 (1969); Griswold, supra note
34.
80. It is mildly tempting to reformers such as ourselves to note whether Frank
has had any effect. His argument of restricting appointment of new law teachers to
lawyers who have had at least five years of professional experience seems to have been
heeded in a few quarters; it is our impression (without data) that the employment of
new law teachers from professional university programs, without professional experi-
ence, has increased; that the practice of employing teachers directly from first-degree
law programs has declined somewhat; and that the practice of employing experience
practitioners has, if anything, declined. His argument to make the case system "rele-
vant" encompasses most of the change which has occurred. This is obvious in the decline
of appellate material in law books, and is heralded in reports of experiments and other
indications that traditional teaching methods are used less than they were in 1947.
Frank's argument for more "actual observation" of legal operations and for the estab-
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legal operations and for the establishment, in every law school, of a legal
clinic appears to have been widely adopted.
5. CONCLUSION
A review of the Packer-Ehrlich report"1 identifies the principal in-
tellectual difficulty with most proposals for the reform of legal educa-
tion-they are purely speculative. They proceed without evidence and
offer suggestions which are seen as obvious, commonplace, trivial, or
unproved. We are left, after surveying the literature, with the impression
that it has had no effect, except, possibly, the advancement of professors
who wrote it, because writing is part of a professor's life. Most of what
is said is no more (or less) than good shop talk. Some of it speaks to
individual teachers in a compelling way. Some of it reports on episodes
and experiments which may have unseen effect in the eccentric academic
world where choices are made for law students.
The moods we find most compelling in the literature are those
which offer, or promise, and even seek, information for reform based
on more than personal speculation and singular experience; those which
open legal education to information from behavioral science, particu-
larly from educational psychology and learning theory; and those which
speak prophetically about the sinful neglect of the feelings and needs of
the students who pay for the enterprise and who come to it hoping for
formation in ministry, in leadership, and in professional fraternity.
lishment, in every law school, of a legal clinic appears to have been widely adopted. See
Grossman, supra note 69.
81. Soberman, The Future of Legal Education, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 96 (1974).
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The Insurer's Liability for Judgments in Excess of
Policy Limits and the Movement toward Strict Liability:
An Assessment*
DONALD A. ORLOVSKYt
Standard liability insurance policies typically contain a clause vesting
in the insurer the right to "make such investigation, negotiation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient."' While this clause
gives the insurer complete control over the settlement of claims arising
under the policy, it also forms the basis of the insured's right to recover
damages for liability in excess of policy limits incurred as a result of
the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle claims within those limits. 2 It is
to be noted at the outset that this right of the insured presupposes the
existence of several variables, since it is, at best, questionable whether
an insurer must accept every settlement offer or be liable for the excess.
The scope of the insurer's liability for failure to settle claims within
policy limits is a controversial issue in the law of insurance, replete with
an extensive bibliography. 3 The purpose of this article is not merely to
* The author would like to thank Professor Malcolm D. Talbott of the Rutgers
University School of Law for his assistance, guidance, and encouragement in the prepa-
ration of this article.
t A.B. 1973, Cornell University; J.D. 1976, Rutgers University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., R. Keeton, Insurance Law-Basic Text 658, Appendix G (1971),
where the clause states:[Tihe company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient.
2. See Note, Insurer's Liability to Judgment Creditor of Insured for Wrongful
Refusal to Settle a Claim, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 778 (1967).
3. See generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement,
67 HARV. L. REv. 1136 (1954), for a most expansive but somewhat dated analysis of
the conduct of an insurer regarding settlement and the rights and duties arising there-
from. See also Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 739 (1971); Appleman, Circumstances Creating
Excess Liability, 1960 INSURANCE L.J. 553; Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer
to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L.J. 100 (1938); Arnall, Excess Liability Suits-The
Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968); Cochran, The
Obligation to Settle within Policy Limits, 1970 INSURANCE L.J. 583; Annot., 68
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delineate the metes and bounds of the insurer's liability for its wrongful
refusal to settle within policy limits, but also to explore the considera-
tions underlying the growing demand that an insurer be absolutely liable
for any judgment in excess of policy limits following its refusal to settle
a claim. The best point at which to begin is with Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.,4 the first modern case to give serious consideration to
the strict liability approach.
The facts in Crisci are substantially as follows: The plaintiff, a
seventy-year-old widow, purchased a $10,000 general liability policy to
protect herself against any liability she might incur as a result of injuries
sustained on the premises of her apartment building. As in most liability
policies, Mrs. Crisci's policy contained a clause authorizing her insurer
to conduct her defense and to negotiate any settlement which the insurer
might deem expedient. June DiMare, one of the plaintiffs tenants,
sustained serious injuries as a result of falling through the stairs in
plaintiff's building. Consequently, an action was filed by the tenant
against Mrs. Crisci claiming damages of $400,000.
Pursuant to this defense clause contained in Mrs. Crisci's policy,
Security Insurance Company assumed the defense against the claim,
and twice rejected offers of settlement within the policy limits, even in
the face of several factors indicating that a verdict substantially in excess
of the policy limits was highly probable. The insurer's counsel and
claims adjuster, in fact, believed that a verdict of at least $100,000 would
A.L.R.2d 892 (1959); Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure
to Settle: A Move toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REv. 799 (1968);
Erstgaard, Liability beyond Insurance Policy Limits, 1958 INSURANCE L.J. 404; Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Failure to Settle, 9 MD. L.
REV. 349 (1948); Note, 13 U. CHI. L. REv. 105 (1945); Evans, The Practical Handling
by Defense Counsel of Lawsuits in Excess of Policy Limits, 1960 INSURANCE L.J. 565;
Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1037 (1951); Comment, Insurer's Liabilityfor Judgments Exceeding
Policy Limits, 38 TEx. L. REv. 233 (1960); Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 314 (1959);
Comment, Liability of an Insurer for Failure to Settle Claims, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 124
(1959); Note, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 198 (1958); Levit, The Crisci Case-Something Old,
Something New, 1968 INSURANCE L.J. 12; Note, Direct Action by Injured Judgment
Creditor against Insurer for Excess of Policy Limits, 14 N.Y.L.F. 629 (1968); Luvaas,
Excess Judgments-Defense Counsel's Liability, 18 DEFENSE L.J. 259 (1968); Com-
ment, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968); Comment, 28 MD. L. REv. 166 (1968); Note, 27
Prrr. L. REV. 726 (1967); Note, 46 TEx. L. REV. 113 (1967); Note, Insurer's Liability
to Judgment Creditor of Insured for Wrongful Refusal to Settle a Claim, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 778 (1967); Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration ofCalifornia's Bad Faith Neg-
ligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475 (1966).
4. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
5. DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962).
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be returned if the jury believed the claimant's persuasive evidence that
the injuries resulting from her fall proximately caused the development
of her psychosis. Notwithstanding the insurer's inability to produce
evidence which would impeach the claimant's allegations, the insurer
continued to reject offers for settlement within policy limits.6
As a result, the injured tenant recovered judgment for $101,000, and
Mrs. Crisci, through her efforts to meet the $91,000 balance, became
indigent. In addition, Mrs. Crisci suffered a decline in her mental and
physical well being and attempted on several occasions to commit sui-
cide.
Mrs. Crisci brought suit against her liability insurer for wrongfully
refusing to settle the claim within the limits of her policy. At trial, the
court found that Security Insurance breached its duty to settle the claim
in good faith, and awarded plaintiff the amount of the excess judgment
plus interest accrued since the day judgment was entered against her.
In addition, the court awarded the plaintiff $25,000 for the mental suf-
fering which she endured as a result of being forced to dispose of her
property to satisfy the judgment.7
The California Supreme Court upheld Crisci's recovery against the
insurer, holding, inter alia, that Security Insurance had breached its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.8 What is of greater
significance, however, is the California Court's willingness to find
"more than a small amount of elementary justice"' in the suggestion
made by amicus curiae that an insurer be held absolutely liable when
an excess judgment follows an insurer's refusal to settle within policy
limits."0 The adoption of a strict liability standard for insurers would,
no doubt, mark a drastic turning point in this area of insurance law."
6. See 28 MD. L. REv. 166 n.1 (1968).
7. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 428-29, 426 P.2d 173, 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15.
8. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as applied in the Crisci case requires that the parties to the
insurance policy conduct themselves so as not to impair the rights of the other party to
receive benefits under the contract. Among the benefits inuring to the insured is peace
of mind and security. The court also reasoned that the settlement of claims without
litigation is another benefit owed by the insurer to its insured and, afortiori, a duty is
imposed upon the insurer to accept reasonable settlement offers as if the policy in
question were without limits.
9. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
10. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
I1. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 177-78 (1955), indicating that such an approach
has not been successfully contended. But see, e.g., Arnall, Excess Liability Suits-The
Mounting Need for Strict Liability, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 292 (1968); Note, Excess
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1. THE EXISTING STANDARDS
It is often stated that a claimant's offer to settle a claim against
an insurer for an amount within the limits of a policy nearly always
creates a conflict of interest between the liability insurer and its in-
sured.' 2 The insurer's interest is often best served by accepting only the
lowest possible settlement offer, since, in normal cases, the insurer's
potential liability is fixed by the limits of the policy. Hoping to further
limit his liability through litigation, the insurer may also reject, in toto,
an offer of settlement. The interest of the insured, on the other hand, is
cast in a different mold, since it would distinctly be to his advantage to
have all claims settled within policy limits so as to foreclose forever the
risk of excess liability. The temptation would seem great, then, for the
unconscionable insurer to gamble with the money of its insureds by
rejecting all settlement offers, proceeding to litigation, and virtually
saying to the insured, "heads I win, tails you lose."' 3
Since insurers, in drafting policy provisions, have reserved for
themselves the right to negotiate the settlement of claims, the courts
have responded by imposing a duty upon the- insurer to consider the
interests of the insured when negotiating settlement. 4 The question re-
maining, however, is how much weight is to be given to these conflicting
interests in reaching the decision to settle a given case.
Early decisions indicate that an insurer is not bound to consider the
interest of an insured to the prejudice of its own interest when conflicts
arise during the negotiation of a settlement."5 Opinions of other courts
Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv.
475, 482-85 (1968); Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1951)-all calling for the adop-
tion of a strict liability standard.
12. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc., v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974). See generally Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 778, 780 (1967); Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 168, 170 (1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136, 1142 (1954).
13. See Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933). In an age of mounting consumerism, it is highly questionable whether
the insurance industry would risk a substantial loss of its business by outwardly mani-
festing such an attitude.
14. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952); Zumwalt v.
Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950). Cf Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168,
170-71 (1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra
note 3, at 1138.
15. Neuberger v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 18 Ala. App. 72, 89 So. 90, cert. denied,
206 Ala. 700, 89 So. 924 (1921); Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 298 Mass.
141, 10 N.E.2d 82 (1937); McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 308, 162
Nova Law Journal :977 1
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have varied as to the relative weight to be accorded the interests of the
insured. Some courts have held that the insurer may give paramount
consideration to its own interests,"6 while others firmly insist that it is
the insured's interest which must be the primary concern.' 7 What seems
to be the most widely accepted standard is that the insurer give equal
consideration, 8 or at least as great consideration," to the interest of the
insured, although, compared to the more extreme positions, this is the
most difficult standard to administer.2
The duty imposed upon the insurer to consider the interests of the
insured in negotiating settlement offers has taken on different dimen-
sions in its construction by the courts. One standard upon which the
courts have predicated a finding of the insurer's liability for not consid-
A. 620 (1932); Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A.
653 (1914). It is interesting to note that New York has been one of the few jurisdictions
which strongly supports this view. See Brochstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F.
Supp. 223 (1967); Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160
N.E. 911 (1928); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
Brunswick Rlty. Co. v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 99 Misc. 639, 166 N.Y.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
16. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1,231 N.W. 257 (1930);
City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 651-53, 225 N.W. 643, 645
(1929).
17. National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948); but see
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibilityfor Settlement, supra note 3, at 1141 n. 1,
for a brief discussion of the uncertainties of the Oklahoma rule. See also Tyger River
Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933).
18. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 340, 313 P.2d 404,
407 (1957), where the court stated:
By refusing the $4,000 plus property damage and submitting to trial, the limit of
the company's hazard under the policy limits was an additional $1,200. Admit-
tedly the property damage could not exceed $1,500. The jury might infer under
the conditions that a plaintiff's verdict was strongly probable; that the insured's
loss hazard was much greater than that of the company. After the case was
submitted but before verdict, the insurer, by not settling for $6,000 incurred a $500
loss hazard and. . . [the insured] a great deal more. The jury could conclude that
the company in turning down the opportunities to terminate this litigation was
guided principally by its own risk and ignored or at least did not give equal
consideration to the risk which it compelled [the insured] to incur. The jury
therefore was entitled to conclude that the company did not act in good faith.
19. See Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924);
Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947); see also
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 3, at 1145
n.23.
20. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note
3, at 1146.
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ering the interest of his insured is the negligence standard.2' In applying
this, courts must determine whether an ordinarily prudent person in
business would have rejected or accepted a particular settlement offer.2
This test, however, is subject to variation2 when framed in terms of
what action an ordinarily prudent insurance company would take in
reaching a determination on a particular offer if the policy were without
limits.21
Apparently the basis of the negligence formulation is twofold.
First, since the insured has divested himself of the right to control the
defense and settlement of claims, he is entitled to expect reasonable care
and circumspection in the insurer's conduct.21 Secondly, "when one
knows or has reason to anticipate that the person, property, or rights
of another are so situated . . . that they may be injured through his
conduct, it becomes his duty to so govern his actions as not negligently
to injure the person, property, or rights of another."" Thus, it would
seem that an insurer's honest mistake in judgment would not, under the
negligence formulation, render it liable for refusing to settle a claim
within policy limits. t The negligence test has found success when ap-
plied in situations where the insurer fails to consider the extent of the
plaintiff's injuries,2 refuses to act upon the advice of counsel,2 or has
21. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 186-90 (1955), and the cases cited therein, along
with additional cases cited in the updated supplement to the annotation, for a detailed
analysis of the negligence standard.
22. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d
57 (1947), wherein the insurer refused an opportunity to settle the claim for $1,000 less
than the policy limit, whereupon a subsequent judgment was entered against the insured
for an amount in excess of his policy limit. The court found that, in light of the
claimant's expenses and the permanence of her injuries, a prudent businessman would
have accepted the settlement offer. Accord, Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81
N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
23. See note 21, supra, at 186-90.
24. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d
57 (1947), where the court used the negligence test interchangeably with the test of the
ordinarily prudent businessman.
25. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935).
26. Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).
27. Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
28. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Com. App. 1929).
29. Royal Transit, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 844 (1948); accord, Lanferman v. Maryland Cas. Co., 222 Wis.
406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936).
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acted upon the advice of misinformed counsel.3 Moreover, the negli-
gence standard is frequently employed to hold insurers liable for failing
to properly investigate a claim.3'
Another widely adopted standard used for evaluating an insurer's
liability is that of good faith, which, unlike the negligence standard,
requires a showing of an intentional disregard of the financial interests
of the insured.32 It may be said that the good faith rule requires con-
vincing evidence that the company rejected a settlement offer which, in
fact, it considered to be reasonable.? One writer suggests that the
distincton between the good faith and negligence tests is less marked
than those terms, on their face, would suggest.3 Perhaps the major flaw
of the good faith standard is the difficult, if not impossible task of
proving an intentional disregard of the insured's interests. In theory, all
that an insurer need show under this standard is some rational basis to
support its decision to litigate rather than settle a claim.3 Examples
of conduct construed to be acts of bad faith have been found in an
insurer's inducing an insured to contribute to the amount needed to
settle a claim within policy limits; advising an insured to place his
property beyond the reach of an anticipated judgment;7 failing to in-
vestigate a claim so as to ascertain adequate evidence on the issues of
liability and the amount of anticipated damages;8 setting up a reserve
of funds to cover possible liability to the policyholder;" refusing to
accept settlement offers recommended by the adjuster or counsel;40 fail-
30. Douglas v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708 (1924).
31. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th
Cir. 1963).
32. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938). See
generally Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note 3,
at 1139 n.6.
33. See, e.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).
34. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, supra note
3, at 1140.
35. See Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle-A Proposal for Imposition of Liability
above Policy Limits, 60 YALE L.J. 1037, 1040, n.13 (1951).
36. Boling v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935).
37. Noshey v. American Auto Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934).
38. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934); accord,
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th .Cir. 1963).
39. Lanferman v. Maryland Cas. Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936).
40. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965); see
also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933);
37 1
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ing to settle when the chances of prevailing at court are extremely
doubtful and the accumulated expenses of the case have already ex-
ceeded policy limits;4 and delaying unnecessarily the negotiation of a
settlement offer. 2
It matters little what terminology is used to describe the standard
by which the conduct of the insurer in negotiating settlements will ulti-
mately be judged, for the standard, as applied, is neither good faith nor
negligence but rather a curious blending of the two, designed to meet
the exigencies of a given case.
Before returning to the strict liability analysis suggested in Crisci,
brief mention should be made of the legal underpinnings of an insurer's
duty regarding settlement.
It has often been thought that an action against an insurer for the
wrongful refusal to settle a claim within policy limits sounds in tort;3
however, it is to be noted that aggrieved insureds have also successfully
based their claims in contract.44 Generally, the measure of damages will
depend upon the theory utilized by the plaintiff in framing his com-
plaint. In contract actions, damages are frequently recoverable for
breach of contract only to the extent that they were within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of the making of the contract, whereas
in tort, the doctrines of foreseeability and proximate cause are determi-
native of the amount of compensation. 45 As Professor Robert Keeton
suggests, however, the theoretical characterization is rarely critical, ex-
cept perhaps in cases involving differing statutes of limitation. 6
Whether one will ultimately view the obligation of an insurer to
settle a claim as a tort or contract obligation depends upon whether the
duty is deemed to arise from the insurer's implied covenant of good
Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 325 I1. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d
869 (App. Ct. 1945).
41. City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).
42. Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
43. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BAsic TEXT § 7.8 (a), 509 n. 3 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
45. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 199 (1968) for more detailed coverage on this
point.
46. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw-BAsic TEXT, § 7.8 (a), 509 (1971), where
the author states:
There are a few situations, though only a few, in which the classification is critical.
For example, characterizing the cause of action as one sounding in contract may
result in the application of a longer period of limitation and tends to favor
assignability of the chose in action. On the other hand, characterizing the cause
of action as one sounding in tort may broaden the measure of damages.
_ i
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faith, or from the nature of the relationship existing between the liability
insurer and its insured. A contract action is proper if the duty to settle
is deemed to have arisen out of the insurer's covenant of good faith.
Although no rigid formula exists for determining when an insurance
contract will give rise to a relationship of such independent significance
that a breach of duty arising therefrom will be deemed a tort, it is safe
to say that this will occur in situations where one party contractually
limits himself to such an extent that he is dependent upon the other
party for that protection which he would otherwise be able to provide
for himself.' The California cases are particularly interesting in this
regard, since an injured plaintiff may bring his action in either tort or
contract."
2. THE CRISCI ANALYSIS-TOWARD STRICT LIABILITY
Though it refused to pass on the merits of the strict liability claim,
the court in Crisci" did regard as meritorious the suggestion that insur-
ers be held absolutely liable for their conduct regarding a claim settle-
ment." The court based its findings on four factors: First, the court
recognized that it is within the reasonable expectation of the insured that
his policy coverage will protect him against any claim which may be
settled within policy limits. Second, the court reasoned that, given the
conflict between the interests of the insurer and its insured, and since
only the insurer stands to benefit by refusing a settlement offer and
proceeding to trial, the insurer should be the party to bear the risk of
an adverse judgment. Third, the court stated that since the insurer re-
quires the insured to divest himself of the valuable right to settle claims,
47. Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952); cf. Ritchie v. Anchor
Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955).
48. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17, where the court states:
[Tihe duty of the insurer to consider the insured's interest ... arises from an
implied covenant in the contract, and ordinarily contract duties are strictly en-
forced and not subject to a standard of reasonableness .... [Tihe rejection of a
settlement within the limits where there is any danger of a judgment in excess of
the limits can be justified, if at all, only on the basis of the interests of the insurer,
and, in light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the usual methods
by which an insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may not be
unreasonable for an insured. . . to believe that a sum of money equal to the
limits is available.
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the contractual duties of the insurer should be strictly enforced. Finally,
the court based its recognition of strict liability as a viable theory on
considerations of "elementary justice."
At first glance, the arguments favoring the adoption of a strict
liability standard appear persuasive and certainly merit discussion. It is
only in light of the potentially deleterious results of such a standard that
the nonfeasibility of this approach becomes apparent. To this, the court
in Crisci did not address itself.
The strict liability approach to excess recovery would provide a
larger measure of clarity and certainty than the frequently uncertain and
often arbitrarily applied standards of reasonableness and good faith. 5'
Its adoption could eliminate the insurer's difficult task of evaluating
whether a jury will make the determination, based upon a given set of
facts, that a reasonably prudent insurer, in the exercise of good faith,
would have settled the claim within policy limits if the policy were
unlimited. Too often, the only evidence against the insurer is its refusal
to settle within policy limits which, without more, is neither negligence
nor bad faith.52 Moreover, it is argued that, in a private law suit, an
individual who rejects a settlement believing he can benefit through
litigation will be obligated to pay the entire judgment in the event that
he loses. An insurer, more skilled in evaluating risks and better able to
distribute losses, should be treated no more favorably.-
Strict liability would also shift the burden of loss to the insurer, and
create a conclusive presumption of unreasonableness against the insurer
who refuses to settle a claim within policy limits.Y Under the existing
formulations, it is not the clearly culpable insured who suffers, but
rather those defendants whose fault is not as clearly established. In the
case of the clearly culpable defendant, it may be said with some confid-
ence that the insurer would be eager to settle for the lowest possible
amount within the policy limits.
The strict liability approach would further serve to undercut the
temptation of liability insurers to adopt a "no settlement" or "selective
51. See Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 202 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Viclana, 123 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777
(1932).
53. See generally Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 288, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (3rd Dist. 1964). See also Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's
Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 484 (1966).
54. See Radio Taxi Serv. Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.J. 299, 304-06, 157
A.2d 319, 323 (1960).
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settlement" policy. In essence, the insurer would be prevented from
using the court system, at the expense of its insured, to establish favora-
ble economic policies. Absolute liability would demand responsible
decision-making. Strict liability would operate to force insurers to po-
lice their own conduct or suffer harsh consequences.
Finally, by holding the liability insurer strictly liable for judg-
ments in excess of policy limits, the public policy consideration of
compensating injured claimants would be better served, since a
judgment-proof insured is not likely to be able to pay an excess judg-
ment. Thus, the protection that would be afforded through the adoption
of strict liability would run not only to the insured but to the injured
claimant as well.
Advocates of the strict liability approach agree that the insurer
should be held to the standard of a fiduciary in light of the valuable right
of settlement foregone by the insured under the policy." Certainly, it
cannot be doubted that an insurer should be held to something stricter
than the morals of the marketplace," yet strict liability, even though it
offers several advantages, is not the answer. Perhaps a fairer and more
conscientious application of the good faith and reasonableness standard
55. See Rova Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974), where the court stated:
We, too, hold that an insurer, having contractually restricted the independent
negotiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative
and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage. Any doubt as
to the existence of an opportunity to settle within the face amount of the coverage
or as to the ability and willingness of the insured to pay any excess required for
settlement must be resolved in favor of the insured unless the insurer, by some
affirmative evidence, demonstrates there was not only no realistic possibility of
settlement within policy limits, but also that the insured would not have contrib-
uted to whatever settlement figure above that sum might have been available.
Id. at 490, 323 A.2d at 507. See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 173 n.8 (1955).
56. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), where Chief Judge
Cardozo said of the fiduciary:
[Fiduciaries] owe to one another. . . the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arms length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule
of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrated erosion" of particular exceptions. Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.
Id. at 461, 164 N.E. at 546.
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by the courts would be better suited to cope with the problem of excess
liability.
Although the arguments supporting strict liability appear attrac-
tive, the adoption of such an approach would serve only to create more
serious problems which, in the long run, would work to the detriment
not only of the insurance industry, but, more importantly, of the insured
public as well. Oversimplified and specious, the arguments supporting
strict liability appear to propose solutions, but in truth they create new
problems.
Strict liability has the undesirable potential of creating new moral
hazards in the field of liability insurance. First, it would allow insureds
to receive what in essence amounts to excess liability coverage without
properly paying for it. No matter how high an insured's liability cover-
age is, it is always possible that some unfortunate event could take place
which would expose the insured to liability in excess of his policy limits.
If the claims asserted against the insured are unreasonable, it seems
neither fair nor consistent with elementary justice to force an insurer to
settle such a claim. Strict liability has this effect; it precludes the liability
insurer from protecting its financial interest. The insured, on the other
hand, may well gain "blanket coverage" arising from the insurer's sim-
ple refusal to settle-a situation that neither he nor his insurer contem-
plated at the time of making the policy. It would seem that "elementary
justice" should be applicable not only to the insured's interests but to
those of the insurer as well. When an insured purchases a policy with
established limits, he assumes the risk that a judgment could be entered
in excess of those limits. When an action is filed against an insured for
an amount in excess of the policy limits, the threat of excess judgment
should be heavily considered by the insurer in negotiating a settlement,
but it should not be controlling.
On its face, the absolute liability standard would seem the easiest
to apply, since the issues are narrowly confined to whether a good faith
offer of settlement was made, communicated to the insurer, and re-
jected. But, in fact, judicial administration becomes a more onerous task
in light of the greater likelihood of collusion between the insured and
the claimant which would undoubtedly accompany the implementation
of strict liability. Since the insured would be free from the threat of
excess liability once a settlement offer were made within policy limits,
it would be to the insured's advantage to urge the claimant to make a
settlement offer. If the claimant is assured of receiving the excess judg-
ment from the insurance company, the two might easily conspire to
mislead the insurer to believe that the chance of recovery is slight. Once
an offer of settlement is made and rejected, the insured would find
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himself with excess coverage, and the insurer would incur the additional
expense.5 Perhaps such collusion would be rare, but strict liability is,
at the least, encouragement for claimants to pursue the insurer instead
of the wrongdoer. The risk seems hardly worthwhile.
A further consideration arises when an insured is subject to multi-
ple claims stemming from a single occurrence, particularly when the
totality of the claims substantially exceeds the policy limit. In this situa-
tion, strict liability provides a strong incentive for the insurer to settle
a single claim within the stated obligations of the policy. In so doing,
the insurer is discharged from further liability with respect to the other
claims.58 Such situations are potentially harmful. Frequently the in-
sured's interests are best protected by litigating the multiple claims to
avoid excess recovery. Strict liability would not only cause an insurer
to act with circumspection and restraint, but also would deter the in-
surer from pursuing litigation when litigation might, in the long run, be
the best course of action.
In addition, the strict liability approach not only encourages the
insurer to settle specious claims, but also provides a better bargaining
position for a claimant's so-called nuisance value claims.59 Certainly,
strict liability would provide a climate conducive to an increase in the
number of such claims.
The ultimate detriment of the strict liability formulation would run
not to the insurer, as intended by its proponents, but to the insuring
public who will find the effects of this policy reflected in higher premium
rates. Strict liability would further encourage insurers to raise the mini-
mum coverage of liability policies so as to minimize excess recoveries.
As a result of such risk-spreading, those of moderate income could be
forced either to forego liability coverage altogether or pay a substan-
tially higher premium."
3. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
There are a series of cases, though few in number, which refuse to
57. See Note, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute,
41 So. CAL. L. REV. 120, 139-42 (1968).
58. Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 203 (1968).
59. Id. at 203, 204, where the author states: "To a certain extent, such a develop-
ment seems unavoidable; at least, nuisance plaintiffs would obtain a stronger bargaining
position."
60. See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J.
474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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hold an insurer liable for failing to settle claims within the limits of the
policy. The most recent noteworthy case is Brochstein v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. ,6 in which the court decided that an action could
not be predicated on an insurer's wholly self-interested refusal to settle
within policy limits. The court explicitly rejected the suggestion pro-
pounded by Professor Keeton that an insurer must, in good faith, ap-
proach settlement negotiations as if the policy had no limit.62 Such a
view is not without support.
In Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity Casualty Co.,13 an insured
employer brought an action against Fidelity for the amount of the judg-
ment in excess of policy limits on the ground that the insurer's refusal
to settle an employee's claim within policy limits created a contractual
obligation on the part of the insurer to pay the excess judgment. Al-
though the court did recognize that the insured could be placed in a
position of substantial economic danger by the insurer, the court re-
jected the plaintiff's reasoning, holding that the alternative of compel-
ling an insurer to settle all cases or be liable for any excess would leave
the insured free to disregard "those rules of prudence and vigilance
which are indispensible for the reasonable protection of the laborers
engaged in [the insured's] service."'" The court ultimately found that the
settlement clause contained in the policy evidenced the intention of the
contracting parties to vest in the insurer absolute discretion regarding
decisions to settle claims."5 The court clearly recognized that giving an
insured the power to control the settlement of his own case encourages
the settlement of claims which may well prove unfounded if litigated.
In Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co.," both the insurer and its
insured agreed that the claim in question should be settled rather than
litigated. Disagreement resulted when the parties failed to agree upon
their respective contributions, the insurer insisting that it would contrib-
ute only 70% of the policy limit, the insured demanding the entire policy
limit.67 Consequently, no settlement was reached, and the claimant re-
covered judgment for an amount substantially in excess of the policy
limit. The court reasoned that an insurance policy, like other contracts,
61. 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
62. Id. at 226.
63. 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899).
64. Id. at 587, 43 A. at 506.
65. Id. at 580, 43 A. at 504.
66. 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
67. Id. at 253, 140 N.E. at 579.
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should be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms
used by the parties. Since the insurance contract unambiguously gave
the insurer complete control over settlement, the insurer was free from
liability for the excess.68 Subsequent cases have adopted this approach,69
which, simply stated, indicates that, for an insurer to be liable, fraud or
misrepresentation amounting to concealment of relevant facts from the
insured must be shown. 70
In a similar case, Best Building Co. v. Employer's Liability Insur-
ance Co.,7 1 the injured claimant offered to settle at an amount equal to
85% of the insured's policy limit. The insurer, however, refused to settle
for more than 65%. Based on an excess judgment of 160% of the policy
limit, the insured brought suit, alleging that if the insurer had advised
him of the claimant's settlement offer, he would have contributed the
difference to avoid excess liability. Adhering to past New York deci-
sions, the court reaffirmed the reasoning that without a clear showing
of negligence or bad faith, the insurer will not be liable. A further
holding was that an insurer is under no duty to settle claims.
In Brochstein, the claim against the insurer was based upon the
insurers failure to accept an offer to settle the case at 80% of the policy
limit. The verdict returned against the insured amounted to 212% of the
policy. 72 The insurer had offered to settle for 70% of the policy limit.
The claimant refused to settle for less than 90%. The insurer, unable to
reach an amenable settlement figure, apprised the insured that it would
be in his best interest to hire independent counsel, and further warned
the insured of the possibility of an excess verdict. The insured, however,
chose to take no action, relying solely upon the insurer to handle the
case. The court found that there was no mismanagement of the insurer's
investigation or of the court proceedings, and further found that there
was neither a breach of contract nor any other wrong on the insurer's
part." As a result of the factual finding, the court dismissed the action
on the merits, holding that a liability insurer is under no duty to settle
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Streat Coal Co. v. Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co., 237 N.Y. 60, 142 N.E.
352 (1923).
70. Id.
71. 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
72. 266 F. Supp. at 224. It should be noted, however, that the actual judgment
was for an amount equal to 190% of the policy limit. Costs and interest brought the
total figure to 212% of the policy limit.
73. Id. at 224.
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within policy limits;7' that bad faith is not shown by refusal to settle or
by other acts suggesting that the insurer pursued its own interest; 5 and
that a liability insurer is not liable for any implicit negligence or lack
of due diligence if neither fraud nor bad faith is proven."
At least one writer criticized the Brochstein opinion for not consid-
ering New York precedents which would have favored the insured. Real-
istically viewed, however, the Brochstein case is merely a fair applica-
tion of the good faith rule. When one examines the many cases involving
the issue of an insurer's liability for refusing to settle claims within
policy limits, it becomes apparent that almost all of the cases are de-
cided in favor of the insured. Could it be that over the years liability
insurers have grown to adhere to a standard of wholly self-interested,
bad faith conduct? It is possible that many jurists and legal scholars
have become missionaries for insureds in many cases where the insurer
acts in good faith and with reasonable care. Brochstein comes at an
appropriate tiie, for it reveals the court's willingness to hold an insurer
liable for judgments in excess of policy limits, but only if fraud or bad
faith conduct is clearly shown. Such a practice, it is urged, will best serve
the principles of "elementary justice" by protecting the rights of both
parties, as opposed to the harsh standard of strict liability which will
leave the insurer and the insuring public without the right to protect
their own interests.
74. Id. at 226.
75. Id. at 225.
76. Id. at 226.
146
Nova Law Journal 1:977 1
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/1
I I
Anti-Sex Discrimination Laws: A Mandate for the
Redistribution of Social Resources Based upon
the Emerging Constitutional and Statutory Equality
'of the Sexes
Not since the era when feminists such as Susan B. Anthony and Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton fought for women to attain the right to vote, receive
an education, and own property has the women's movement achieved
its present potentiality for revolutionizing the basic tenets of our social
structure. Historically, women's entrance into the hierarchial spheres of
our social, economic, and political institutions has been precluded by
our society's strict adherence to traditional sex roles. However, Ameri-
can society is presently undergoing a consequential transitional period
during which both female and male sex roles are being redefined and
expanded. It is axiomatic that legal change is often necessary to initiate
progressive change in society's mores, as well as to implement and
institutionalize such change.' The legal ramifications necessary to im-
plement a potential sex-role equalitarianism are that women's rights and
responsibilities be recognized as equal to those of men for the first time
in our American constitutional history.
Accordingly, the contemporary emergence of the women's move-
ment is asserting that dysfunctional social institutions and laws based
upon outmoded sex-based stereotypes be modified to reflect the pro-
found historical transformations that have occurred during the past two
hundred years within our political, economic, and educational institu-
tions. This article will describe the legal and political change which has
occurred and is presently occurring in response to women's evolving
historical role, and the movement which bears the burden of reforming
the underlying legal principles which have been molded by ubiquitous
traditions that have restricted women's roles in the past.
I. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, Introduction. IMPACT
ERA, LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 3 (1st ed. 1976).
51
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
48 Nova Law Journal 1:1977
1. THE PROBLEM
The unfortunate history of sex discrimination was acknowledged by
the United States Supreme Court in 1973 in Frontiero v. Richardson,2
in which the Court held unconstitutional medical and housing benefit
statutes that allowed a serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent
without showing her actual dependency, but required a servicewoman
who claimed her husband as a dependent to show his actual dependency.
Exemplifying the "unfortunate history' 3 of sex discrimination that was
recognized by the Supreme Court in this opinion is a decision a century
earlier in which the Supreme Court denied a woman the right to practice
law solely because of her sex.! In a 1948 decision, the Supreme Court
continued to accept the traditional social classification of a "woman's
place" when it upheld a state statute which barred women from becom-
ing bartenders, on the theory that "[t]he Constitution does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards,
any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific
standards."' However, twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court dra-
matically reversed its former philosophical view and unequivocally took
judicial notice of the issue of "shifting social standards" in relation to
women's changing role:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of
the family and only the male for the market place and the world of
ideas. . . The presence of women in business, in the professions, in
government and, indeed, in all walks of life, where education is a desira-
ble, if not always necessary antecedent, is apparent and a proper subject
of judicial notice.
2. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In the plurality opinion, Justices Brennan, Douglas,
White, and Marshall concluded that classifications based upon sex were inherently
suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny in order to afford women equal
protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun found pending
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment a compelling reason to defer designation of
sex classifications as suspect so as not to preempt current legislative action on a major
political decision.
3. Id. at 684.
4. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
5. Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). In this case, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a Michigan statute that limited the employment of women as
bartenders to establishments owned by the father or husband of the female employee.
6. Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct. 1373 at 1378 (1975). The Utah Supreme Court
decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which held that a Utah statute was
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The women's movement has been a primary stimulus in effecting
such change of opinion in the United States Supreme Court and in
implementing recent successful enforcement activity of existing anti-
discrimination legislation. Because the burden of change is upon those
who want change, women's advocates have had to continually "...
challenge their adversaries' claims with argumentation and documenta-
tion, to monitor law enforcement, to prod the bureaucracy, to pressure
the legislators and, at the same time, to extend their support and enlarge
their resources" 7 to their constituents.
2. THE STATISTICS
Abundant evidence of a demand for change to eliminate the sex-
stereotyping replete in our social institutions is apparent from an assess-
ment of women's actual roles during the past twenty-five years in con-
trast to their "mythological" roles. Such contrast is clearly evidenced
by that statistical figure which gainsays the myth of "women's place in
the home," by revealing that the number of women working in the labor
force nearly doubled during this period, while the number of working
men increased by only one-fourth.8 Challenging the myth of mother-
hood is the statistic which shows that fertility rates for the century
dropped from near record highs in the 1950's to record lows in the
1970's.' The myth of marriage as woman's primary career is belied by
those statistics which indicate that college enrollments for women rose
far more rapidly than those for men;10 that the rocketing entrance of
women into professional schools is historically unprecedented;" and
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection which declared that girls attained
majority at age eighteen, but boys did not attain majority until they reached twenty-
one years of age.
7. Cowan, Legal Barriers to Social Change: The Case of Higher Education, in
IMPACT ERA, supra note 1, at 179-80.
8. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, A Statistical Re-
port of Women in the United States, VI Women Today 66 (May 10, 1976).
9. Id. See Sicherman, American History, I No. 2 SIGNS, JOURNAL OF WOMEN
IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 472 (Winter 1975).
10. A Statistical Report, supra note 8, See also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, School Enrollment in the United States: 1972. CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, from I. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, I ll n. 18 (2d
-ed. 1973).
I1. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF WOMEN 66 (1975).
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that the rate of women remaining single has risen rapidly. 2 The myth
that women work merely for spending money is gainsaid by the statistic
that in 1975 women comprised 40% of the total labor force, although
60% of these women worked because of pressing economic need. 3 In
1975, the number of families headed by women rose to an historic high
of 13%, but 45% of all families below the poverty level were headed by
women." Challenging the myth of equal opportunity are those statistics
which reveal in 1974 that women earned only 40%-70% of what men
earned with comparable education-and training,15 despite the passage of
fair employment laws as early as 1963. The myth of egalitarian mar-
riage is belied by the harsh reality of women's financial rights in those
forty-three separate property states which makes the earnings of each
spouse after marriage the property of the earning spouse alone, regard-
less of the other's domestic services or child care;" and by the realization
that upon divorce only 10% of women in this country receive the law's
guaranteed support, and that most divorced mothers do not receive
court-ordered child support. An understanding of such changes and the
proposed solutions to cope with such problems are critical to an under-
standing of a major social and economic phenomenon of our time.
3. THE HISTORY
During the past two hundred years, those conditions which caused
the exclusive stereotypical picture of women as wife, housewife, and
mother to become obsolete were: (1) the amount of time women spent
in actual mothering being reduced to an historical low; 8 (2) women's
12. A Statistical Report, supra note 8. See also J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF
WOMEN'S LIBERATION 29 (1975). Since 1970, the number of households in which a
person lived alone or with non-relatives had risen in 1976 by 41%. Rise in Number of
Women-Headed Households Is Reported by Census Bureau, VI WOMEN TODAY 131
(Sept. 27, 1976).
13. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor Employment Standards Ad., Women
Workers Today I (Oct. 1976), TwErY FACTs ON WOMEN WORKERS 2 (June 1975).
14. TWENTY FACTS, supra note 13, at 13-14. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. WORKING WOMEN, A CHARTBOOK, chart 31 (1975).
15. U.S. WORKING WOMEN, supra note 14, at chart 34.
16. Bingaman, The Impact of the ERA on Marital Economics. in IMPACT ERA,
supra note 1, at 116-17.
17. Weitzman, Legal Equality in Marriage and Divorce: The ERA's Mandate.
in IMPACT ERA, supra note 1, at 201.
18. In 1800, the average white woman surviving menopause bore seven children,
50% of whom survived to adulthood. Sicherman, American History, supra note 9, at
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lack of physical strength no longer being a determining factor in their
ability to compete in a technological society; (3) women no longer being
regarded as productive economic contributors within their own homes;"
(4) women's aspirations and expectations being raised enormously
when they were educated to expect the personal application of the demo-
cratic ideals of equal opportunity and equal justice under the law;"
(5) women controlling their reproductive lives by determining the num-
ber of children they wished to bear and rear. Even a cursory assessment
of the de facto opportunities available to women since the Industrial
Revolution through the present reveals that while the "reasons" for
class distinctions based solely on sex existed no more, those distinctions
and corresponding restrictive stereotypes were as firmly entrenched as
ever throughout our institutions and laws.2
1
472. Komarovsky, Women's Role in American Society: Retrospect and Prospect, in
WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63-64 (1972). In 1975, her counterpart
lived 30 years longer, bore one to two children, 95% of whom survived to adulthood.
Fertility. A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF WOMEN IN THE U.S., in I J. OF REPRINTS OF
DOCUMENTS AFFECTING WOMEN 175 (July 1976).
19. The Industrial Revolution was a major cause of job segregation -which has
been repeatedly cited as a primary means by which men have maintained a superior
position in a capitalistic society. Sociologist Jean Lipman-Blumen notes that patriarchy
and capitalism allowed men to control a disproportionate amount of res6urces, such as
power, status, money, land, political influence, legal power, education, occupational
resources, aggression, strength, competitiveness, and leadership, as contrasted with
women's resources of sexuality, youth, beauty, promise of paternity, and domestic and
clerical services. Lipman-Blumen, Toward a Homosocial Theory of Sex Roles: An
Explanation of the Sex Segregation of Social Institutions, in I No. 3 Pt. 2 SIGNS, A
JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 17 (Spring 1976).
20. Women obtained little formal education in America until after the American
Revolution, when education for women was thought desirable so that they, as mothers,
could intelligently educate future citizens of a new republic. However, women met
considerable resistance when they began to enter the non-traditional domains of public
power during their participation in the abolitionist and suffragette movements before
the Civil War. See In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (women not entitled to vote
under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872) (women not entitled to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment). See also
Castle, Susan B. Anthony, Reformer, 59 A.B.A. J. 526 (1973).
21. During the nineteenth century, women seeking paid employment could readily
enter the fields of teaching, nursing, librarianship, and clerical positions, since these
areas were seen as proper extensions of their domestic and homemaking roles. However,
these roles were also characterized by lower pay, infrequent advancement, and lowering
of the status of the profession in the long run. During World War I and World War II,
women provided a readily manipulative source of labor and filled 80% of the war-related
jobs after being given only brief training. These experiences of successfully performing
"male-only" jobs that had been excluded from them during peace time, coupled with
!:1977
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The spark which ignited the Commission on the Status of Women
to action in 1966, the forerunner of the present women's movement, was
the arrogant non-enforcement posture of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission toward women's economic equality as stipulated
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.Y After the Conference of
the Commission on the Status of Women, which was headed by a male,
refused to bring a resolution to the floor from the Commission on the
Status of Women on June 30, 19662 that would have urged the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to treat sex discrimination as
seriously as it had treated racial discrimination, twenty-eight women
who had supported the ignored resolution formed the National Organi-
zation of Women, organized "to bring women into full participation in
the mainstream of American society now, assuming all of the privileges
and responsibilities in truly equal partnership with men. 124
4. THE OBSTACLES
Anti-discrimination laws on the books have not effectively realized
sexual equality because they simply have not been enforced. The cause
of sex discrimination's most visible manifestation, economic discrimina-
tion in the labor force, is directly attributable to those varied attitudes
which affirm the inferior position of women. One such attitude perceives
sex discrimination as the last "socially acceptable" prejudice, but invari-
their increasing educational attainment, made many women aware that they possessed
capabilities far greater than they were allowed to exhibit in their traditional female roles.
During the postwar periods, women suffered hostility and discrimination in entering
male professional and business worlds, and in attempting to enter male labor unions,
which had traditionally insisted on contracts with segregated job categories, seniority
lists, and pay scales for men and women. Women hence began to appreciate the implica-
tions of the 1,000 laws, institutions, and practices that have relegated women to an
inferior status. MacDougal, Lasswell, Chen, Human Rights for Women and World
Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT. L. 497 at
502 (July 1975).
22. FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 53-54. An appalling lack of enforcement activity
against sex discrimination was notarized by such pervasive departmental attitudes as
that of the first Equal Employment Opportunity Commission director, who publicly
stated that the provision of "sex" added to Title VII was a "fluke. . . conceived out
of wedlock," and that "men were entitled to female secretaries." Ironically, the "sex"
provision was added to Title VII by one of its strongest opponents, Rep. Smith of
Virginia, as a joke in an attempt to make the employment section of the bill look silly
and fail to pass. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
23. FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 54 n. 27.
24. Id. at 55.
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ably "more subtle, more sophisticated and more acceptable" than other
forms of discrimination.2 Abundant studies confirm that sex discrimi-
nation has become institutionalized in the labor force due to (1) unin-
formed and prejudicial attitudes of employers, 26 (2) the traditional do-
mestic, dependent, and non-career orientation of women,27 and (3) the
dual role of women as both wife-housewife-mother and employee. 2 The
25. Former U.S. Labor Dep't attorney Thomas Murphy noted that "the accept-
ance of lower wages for females doing work equal to that of their male colleagues has
been widespread and tacitly accepted among those who have displayed indignation
toward similar racial inequity." Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (Fall 1970).
26. A recent study revealed that most administrators of job training and employ-
ment programs, as well as the employees themselves, were either misinformed or unfa-
miliar with job discrimination laws and practices. NEWS FROM THE U.S. LABOR DEP'T,
WOMEN AND WORK 3 (Jan. 1975). In addition, employers sometimes argue that job
discrimination is justified because women get lpregnant, cannot do heavy work, and are
absent from work more often than men. However, it is often pointed out that, in reality,
pregnancy is a short-term disability, and that choices to do work requiring weightlifting
abilities or hazardous conditions should depend upon individual inclinations and ability,
for women as they do for men. Further, it is statistically evident that women's absentee
rates do not differ from those of men. Rights of Working Women: International
Perspective. 14 VA. J. INTERN. L. 729 at 740 (1974).
27. Researchers have found that subtle mechanisms of social control such as the
marriage structure and traditional female roles have channelled women away from male
occupational fields and toward roles which society finds necessary for its maintenance
and continuity. Hearings 805 of H.R. 16098 Before Special Subcommittee on Educa-
tion, House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Congress, 2d Sess. 624 (1970) at
274. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF WOMEN at 60. See also REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT, EXPLOITATION FROM 9
TO 5, Employer Attitudes and Practices (1975).
Numerous studies have concluded that a girl early in life discovers that her expecta-
tions and opportunities have been restricted, that her rights and freedoms have been
limited, and that her femaleness has been defined as a caste-like attribute which sets
her apart from men. Freeman, Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System. 5 VALPARAISO
U. L. REV. 213 (1971). See also Dick and Jane as Victims: Sex Stereotyping in Chil-
dren's Readers, WOMEN ON WORDS AND IMAGES (1972), and Sex Discrimination: The
Textbook Case, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1312 (1974). Many researchers have pointed out that
boys have been encouraged to develop "masculine" traits which are common attributes
found in most professional and occupational roles such as ingenuity, creativity, bravery,
perseverence, achievement, adventurousness, curiosity, autonomy, and self-respect,
while girls have been discouraged from developing these traits as "unfeminine" and sex-
inappropriate behavior for girls. See E. MACOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX
DIFFERENCES (1966).
28. As long as quality child day care is lacking, most commentators point out that
employers will be reluctant to hire women, place them in positions of responsibility, or
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simplest principles of equal opportunity are frequently resisted either
consciously or subconsciously by employers who continue to assume
that the higher status, responsibility, and paycheck of the working man
and the correlatively lower status, responsibility, and paycheck of the
working woman are somehow naturally ordained and "normal." '
Weakness in the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws has fur-
ther been attributed to a lack of executive leadership, 30 and to a lack
of proper legislative drafting, resulting in insufficient staffing, inherent
bureaucratic delay and discretion, and weak management and enforce-
ment authority written into the enabling machinery and legislation it-
self.3' A further non-supportive posture on equal rights for women has
come from the judiciary, as indicated by various law review articles.3
One such analysis written by two law professors who describe them-
selves as "middle-aged, white males who had never been radicalized,
brutalized, politicized or otherwise leaned on by the Establishment,"
concluded:
provide them with extensive job training. However, despite a consensus of studies which
have concluded that maternal deprivation is not a result of working mothers, widespread
opposition to group child care for middle class families exists. This opposition is evi-
denced by the attitudes of board members in public and private child and family agen-
cies, local businessmen, and labor leaders, as well as by President Nixon's veto of the
1970 Child Development Bill and President Ford's veto of the 1976 Day Care and Child
Services Act. The United States Senate on May 6, 1976, failed to override President
Ford's veto of the Day Care and Child Services Act (H.R. 9803) that would have funded
federal staffing standards for day care centers. Day Care Override in Senate Fails, VI
WOMEN TODAY 65 (May 10, 1976). However, the Senate Finance Committee approved
a compromise day care bill (H.R. 12455) on May 11, 1976, that prevented many centers
from being forced to shut down. Senate Finance Committee Passes Compromise Day
Care Bill, VI WOMEN TODAY 72 (May 24, 1976). Current day care facilities provide
for only 18% of the need and are inadequate for most women to utilize because they
are either too expensive or subsidized only for the very poor. TWENTY FACTS, supra note
13, at 10. See also MURPHY, supra note 87, at 58-59, and TASK FORCE, supra note 27,
at 173-85.
29. Gates, Occupational Segregation and the Law, in I No. 3 Pt. 2 SIGNS, JOUR-
NAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY at 68 (Spring 1976). See also Miner, The
Lesson of Affirmative Action for the Equal Rights Amendment, in IMPACT ERA, supra
note I, at 90.
30. During President Nixon's first term, the Citizens Advisory Council on the
Status of Women was provided with a paid staff of only two. 1. MURPHY, PUBLIC
POLICY ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN at 21, 42-43 (2d ed. 1973).
31. Id. at 39. FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 179-80, 182-83. Murphy, Sex Discrimi-
nation in Employment-Can We Legislate a Solution?. 17 N.Y.L.F. 436 at 450-51
(1971).
32. Sangerman, A Look at the Equal Pay Act in Practice, 22 No. 5 LAB. L.J.
259 (1971).
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[tihat by and large the performance of American judges in the areas of
sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to
abominable. With some notable exceptions they have failed to bring to
sex discrimination cases those judicial virtues of detachment, reflection,
critical analysis which have served them so well with respect to other
sensitive social issues. .. [Slexism, the making of unjustified (or at least
unsupported) assumptions about individual capabilities, interests, goals
and social roles solely on the basis of sex differences, is. . . easily dis-
cernible in contemporary judicial opinions. ...
5. THE LAWS
A. WUm Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act was adopted in 1963 as an amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 19 3 8." Directed only to the hourly
worker, it requires the same pay for men and women doing equal work
which demands equal skill, effort, responsibility, and is performed under
similar working conditions in the same establishment.m The Act, which
is enforced by the Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division, per-
mits wage differentials based on a bona fide seniority or merit system,
or on a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality or produc-
tion or by "any other factor other than sex."
On July 1, 1972, the Act was extended to cover executive, adminis-
trative, and professional employees and outside sales personnel.* On
May 1, 1974, the Act was further extended to cover seven million em-
ployees of the federal, state, and local governmentsY Still unprotected
are employees in small retail or service establishments.
The Equal Pay Act has been the most effectively enforced of all
anti-discrimination legislation, primarily because of the power of the
33. Johnstone and Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 at 676 (1971).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (dX) (1964). An equal rights platform had been adopted by
both political parties in every national convention since 1944, and some form of equal
pay legislation had been introduced yearly in Congress since 1945. Equal Pay Act of
1963-Problems In Upholding Standard for Female Employees. 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 409
(1973).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (dXl) (1964). 109 CONG. REC. 8702 (daily ed. May 23, 1963).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, § 906(bXi), 86 Stat. 375, 29 C.F.R. § 3541
(1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 11390 (1973).
37. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD.,
EQUAL PAY UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr I (June 1974).
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Wage and Hour Division in the Labor Department, which has authority
to investigate complaints, assist employers with compliance, and file
lawsuits. By 1974, the Department had further increased its compliance
measures to include intensified enforcement, public education, employer
training programs, ongoing research and review, evaluation of progress,
and cooperative sharing of data between state and local governments.
A judicial statement of the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is found
in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass:3
The Act was intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the eco-
nomic field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's inferior-
ity and to eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced
wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences
which flow from it.
Paradoxically, women's wages were higher before the Act went into
effect than after.39 This trend had stabilized, however, between 1969
and 1973, when the average annual discrepancy between the mean in-
comes of women and men had remained unchanged, but the number of
wage discrimination complaints had doubled. 0
The most frequently litigated exception to the Equal Pay Act has
been the broad exception that permits wage differentials to be based on
"any other factor other than sex." Several law review articles have
noted that the Labor Department lost most of its early Equal Pay cases
because of a misapplication of this statute.4 One such case was Hodgson
38. 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
39. In 1955, women's median salary income as a proportion of men's was 64%.
In 1959 it fell to 61%, and in 1973 to 57%. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD., THE EARNINGS GAP Table I (March 1975). The reason
for the Equal Pay Act's not budging the median pay rate of women for over an eight-
year period may be explained by the fact that, until the 1972 Amendment to the Equal
Pay Act, more than 40% of women in the work force were not covered by the Act. In
addition, economist Barbara Bergmann attributes the decline in female wages to the vast
overflooding of the secretarial labor market after World War II, causing a consequent
lowering of women's wages in this category. Bergmann, The Economics of Women's
Liberation, 208 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 155 (March 15, 1973). In 1974, the
median pay rate for female clerical workers was 67% of that for male clerical workers.
Building the Movement: The New Working Women's Organizations, 6 THE
SPOKESWOMAN 5 (Feb. 15, 1976).
40. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF WOMEN at 63.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1)(iv). See Labor Law-Equal Pay Act-Economic Bene-
fit to Employer is Justification for Wage Differential Between Male & Female
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v. Robert Hall Clothes, 2 a highly criticized decision in which the court
held that an economic benefit to an employer was "a factor other than
sex," thus finding justification for paying salesmen higher wages than
saleswomen who had performed equal work. The court rationalized that
the segregation of salespeople by sex in men's and women's clothing
departments had been justified by reasons of business necessity, and that
the sale of more expensive clothing in the men's department resulting
in a higher dollar volume in gross sales for the men's department had
justified the salary differential. 3
Since this questionable decision, courts have attempted to look at
actual performance and requirements of a job, so that traditional justifi-
cations for paying men more than women doing substantially equal
work are no longer likely to be approved by the judiciary." Congress
has found the following not allowable as a basis for wage differentials
on "any other factor other than sex": that an employee is head of a
household;'" that a woman costs more to employ;" or that legal restric-
tions in the state or other laws limit the number of hours, weightlifting,
and rest periods for women.'" The courts, in addition, have found the
following not justifiable as "any other factor other than sex" by which
to justify wage differentials where male and female employeesperform
substantially equal work: the flexibility of male employees;" a vague
and largely illusory training program for males;" an arbitrary job classi-
fication of "heavy" work for males and "light" work for females;N and
an illusory compensation rate paid for night work because men refused
to work during the day due to the low wages paid to women.5' To offset
past wage discrimination, a court has recently held that a salary equali-
zation formula could be implemented to bring the salaries of female
Employees, 44 Miss. L.J. 1028 at 1031 (Nov. 1973). See generally Sangerman, supra
note 32.
42. 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). See Note
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.: Concealed Sex Discrimination & the E.P.A., 122
U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1973).
43. 473 F.2d at 597.
44. Labor Law-Equal Pay Act, supra note 41, at 1031-32.
45. 29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1972).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1972).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 800.163 (1972).
48. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 398 U.S.
905 (1970).
49. Schultz v. First Victoria Bk., 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971).
51. Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
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faculty members and administrative employees more in line with those
of male employees, provided that the minimum salary required under
the formula was also applied to the opposite sex.52
Since its inception, the Equal Pay Act findings involving sex dis-
crimination as of December 10, 1975, revealed that 900 cases had been
filed; 219,925 employees had been underpaid; $122 million had been
found due in back pay; $23 million of actual income had been restored
to 60,000 employees; and a complaint backlog existed numbering
1,790. 5 During the first quarter of 1976 more than 6,000 employ-
ees-most of them women-were found underpaid by $4.5 million in
violation of the Equal Pay Act. These figures represent a 31% increase
over the same period during the previous year."
B. Title VII of the Cil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits
job discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. The Act prohibits discrimination in hiring or firing, wages, fringe
benefits, classifying, promoting employees, extending or assigning the
use of facilities, training, apprenticeships, and any other terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.u Before the 1972 Amendment,
the Act was severely hampered by lack of an active, powerful, well-
financed agency; by complicated procedural requirements and time lim-
itations that produced a bulk of decisional law;" by its lack of authority
to issue cease and desist orders to enforce the law; and by the Justice
Department's refusal to bring legal action based on sex discrimination.5
Before the 1972 Amendment, the Equal Employment Opportunity
52. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975).
53. Not included in these figures was a $13 million back pay award which was
paid to 13,000 employees by American Telephone & Telegraph Co. This amount was
not included in the Wage & Hour Dept. Compliance action statistics because, although
the violative practice was originally disclosed by Wage & Hour investigators, it was
resolved through the Solicitor's Office, and was not based on individual complaint
actions. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EQUAL PAY FINDINGS (Dec. 10, 1975).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEws, WOMEN AND WORK (Nov. 1975).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(2)-(e)(3)(1970).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(1970), discussed in Murphy, supra note 31, at 451 n.
106.
57. Indicative of the Justice Department's lack of political sensitivity to sex dis-
crimination was the remark of one departmental spokesman in the fall of 1969: "The
fact that women have not gone into the streets is indicative that they do not take
employment discrimination seriously." FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 79.
Nova Law Journal :1977
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/1
Sex-Equality Laws: Mandate for Change
Commission established by Title VII was limited to investigating
charges of violations of Title VII, to bringing about compliance through
"informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion," and to
merely recommending that the attorney general prosecute the most
serious cases.rs
An example of the compromising posture which the early Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission exhibited was its 1965 Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex, which requested that the var-
ious states merely update discriminatory provisions of their protective
labor laws, thereby postponing the more difficult question of whether
such laws would be a basis for the application of the "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" exception to Title VII. For nearly three years fol-
lowing the adoption of the 1965 Guidelines, the E.E.O.C. did not declare
that any of the protective labor laws held by 46 states were pre-empted.5'
The 1972 E.E.O.C. Guidelines, however, stated that protective labor
laws were superseded by Title VII and could not be used as a reason
58. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 259.
59. 30 Fed. Reg. 14, 926-27 (1965). Note, Employment Practices & Sex
Discrimination: Judicial Extension of Beneficial Female Protective Labor Laws, 59
CORNELL L. REV. at 138-39 n. 17 (1973). Female protective labor legislation, which had
been sponsored by the Women's Bureau, feminists labor unions, and social reformers,
was enacted during the first half of the century by many states to shield the growing
number of women entering the work force from employment hazards and potential
abuse by employers. Although originally believed to be desirable social legislation that
primarily limited hours worked and weights lifted by women (see Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908), these laws have been increasingly challenged as "emanating from
Victorian notions of woman's role in society and as proliferating incidents of employer
discrimination." Note, Employment Practices & Sex Discrimination: Judicial Exten-
sion of Beneficial Female Protective Labor Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. at 133-34. The
courts have consistently found these laws to be exclusionary, since they fail to consider
individually qualified women for certain jobs. Id. at 140.
A bulk of decisional law and law review articles have pointed out that protective
labor legislation is opposed to the underlying philosophy of Title VII, and many have
suggested that "most of the so-called protective legislation has really been to protect
men's rights in better paying jobs." 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Martha Griffiths). Note, Employment Practices & Sex Discrimination: Judicial Exten-
sion of Beneficial Female Protective Labor Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. at 134 n. 3.
In 1964, forty states and the District of Columbia had laws or regulations governing
in some way the hours which women were permitted to work. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD., STATE LABOR LAWS IN TRANSITION:
FROM PROTECTION TO EQUAL STATUS FOR WOMEN 12 (1976). The Muller v. Oregon
decision of 1908 upheld protective labor legislation until 1971 when the Ninth Circuit
Court, in Mengelkock v. Industrial Welfare Com., 442 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1971), struck
down a state hours law on equal protection grounds.
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for refusing to employ women.$' By 1975, all states except Nevada had
repealed their maximum hours laws for women.6'
The 1972 Amendment to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
broadened the jurisdictional and enforcement authority of Title VII so
that the E.E.O.C. could file lawsuits in federal district courts against
private employers, employment agencies, and unions when conciliation
failed. It expanded jurisdiction over public and private educational insti-
tutions, and state and local governments. It also extended coverage to
include employers or unions with 15 or more persons, and transferred
authority to file "pattern or practice" suits from the United States
Department of Justice to the E.E.O.C.62 The 1972 Revised Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex illustrated the widened policy cover-
age of the E.E.O.C., which barred hiring based on stereotyped charac-
terizations of the sexes and barred classifications of "men's" and
"women's" jobs by advertising under "male" and "female" help-wanted
advertisements in the newspapers. 3 The Guildelines further stated that
the bona fide occupation qualification would be construed narrowly,"
so that it would be relevant only where sex was needed for authenticity,
as for an actress; for privacy, as for a matron; or for a physiological
function, as for a sperm-donor." Concepts of male and female customer
preferences, based on reputed psychological needs of customers, have
been rejected by the courts, where the essential job functions could be
performed by either a male or female, so that males may now enter non-
traditional fields such as that of airline steward," and females may now
60. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD.,
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS OF MAJOR FEDERAL LAWS AND ORDER ON SEX DISCRIMINATION 2
(June 1974).
61. Only two states, Illinois and Ohio, by 1975, enforced maximum hours laws
for women for employers of 14 or fewer workers who were not covered by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. STATE LABOR LAWS IN TRANSITION, supra note 59, at 12.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1970), as amended by EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN-
iTy AcT OF 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 701(b), 702, 718, 83 Stat. 103.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (Supp., 1971). Because of public pressure generated by the
National Organization of Women on August 14, 1968, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ruled that separate want ads for "male" and "female" headings were
a violation of Title VII and ordered newspapers to desegregate their want ads.
FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 77. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. of Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (Supp., 1971).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (a)(2) (Supp., 1971).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (Supp., 1970). Diaz v. Pan America World Airways, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970) rev'd and remanded, 3 BNA FEP Cas. 337 (5th Cir.
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enter non-traditional fields such as that of baseball umpire" or railroad
switchperson.U
The impact of the 1972 Amendment undoubtedly further extended
to influence government funding of employment programs for women
in non-traditional fields. Such recent training and recruitment programs
funded by the Department of Labor as the Work Incentive Program,
-the Job Corps, and the Apprenticeship Outreach Program for Women
have trained and placed women in many occupations hitherto restricted
to men, such as carpentry, auto mechanics, painting, bricklaying, plas-
tering, welding, shipfitting, railway yard clerks, operators of heavy
equipment, pickup truck drivers, electrical, radio and machine workers,
tool and die makers, and meatcutters.6
Certain of the 1972 Guideline provisions are currently being
challenged by employers in the courts,70 particularly those which provide
that disabilities contributed by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, child-
birth, and recovery are to be treated as temporary disabilities under
health insurance or sick leave plans in connection with employment. The
E.E.O.C. and the courts have labeled as discriminatory restrictive em-
ployment practices that are applied only to one sex, the so-called "sex-
1971). (An argument that female stewardesses were necessary to fill the psychological
needs of air passengers was rejected.)
67. New York State Div. of Human Rts. v. New York-Pennsylvania Professional
Baseball League, 36 App. Div.2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
68. Weeks v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
69. In 1974,99% of the nation's registered apprentices were men; however, during
the 1964 to 1974 decade, women in apprenticeship programs grew from 400 in 1964 to
.3,700 in training in 1974. What Constitutes "Making Headway" in Apprenticeship
Participation? VI WOMEN TODAY 61 (April 26, 1976). Advocates for Women state that
women will be included in affirmative action apprenticeship programs in California, the
first state in the nation to recruit affirmative action goals and timetables for women in
apprentice job opportunities. Women Will Be Included in Apprenticeships in California,
Women's Group Says, VI WOMEN TODAY 69 (May 10, 1976).
Yet after undergoing training programs, many women continue to meet obstacles
in getting hired, despite their equal on-the-job performance to men. Women Working
in Construction and Wider Opportunities for Women filed suit against the United States
Dep't of Labor on March 29, 1976, charging the Dep't of Labor with ignoring women
workers under federal affirmative action hiring plans. The plaintiffs claim they have
been refused jobs because of their sex, and charge the District of Columbia Apprentice-
ship Council with violation of federal law for the past five years because of "its failure
to force apprenticeship sponsors to submit affirmative action plans." Labor Dep't
Charged with Ignoring Women in Construction Trades, VI WOMEN TODAY 53 (April
12, 1976).
70. See note 145 infra.
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plus" factor that includes sex plus an additional factor of status, such
as motherhood or marriage.7 Though almost-all "sex-plus" restrictions
have been declared illegal, two federal court decisions currently conflict
as to whether the "sex-plus" status discrimination is justified under the
bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title VII.7 2
The 1972 Guidelines and the court's interpretation of Title VII
have emphasized that the traditional stereotypes about women as a class
should not be applied to individual members of the class, but that each
woman should have the right to an individualized appraisal of her abili-
ties and capabilities, and should have the right to choose to do that
which society has historically considered unsuitable for women. A judi-
cial expression of this philosophy of Title VII is found in Weeks v. So.
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,73 a suit brought by the National'
Organization of Women:
Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly
Victorian and instead vests individual women with the power to decide
whether or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the
right to determine whether the itcremental increase in remuneration for
strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious,'boring or unromantic tasks is worth the
candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on equal
footing.74
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's enforcement of
Title VII is still beset with inadequate funding and a shortage of staff
with which to meet an ever-increasing backlog of pending cases number-
ing 120,000 as of 1976, with a two- to seven-year waiting period for
processing. 5 However, over the last few years, there has been a growing
feeling that the E.E.O.C. has become at least as active on sex dis-
crimination as on racial discrimination."
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a)(Supp., 1971).
72. Epstein, Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices of Private Employers: Recent
Legal Developments, 48 TULANE L. REV. 125, 142-43 (1973). Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 404 U.S. 991 (1971), Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
73. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 236.
75. EEOC Under Fire, 6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 5 (June 15, 1976).
76. . FREEMAN, THE POLrrCS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 188 (1975) notes that
the growing acceptance of sex discrimination as a legitimate concern was due partially
to the impact of the cases themselves, to the impact of the women's liberation move-
ment, and to the more receptive attitudes of many young attorneys hired.
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Part of this change in attitude within the E.E.O.C. came from its
decision in 1973 to go after the single largest private employer of women
in the United States-American Telegraph and Telephone Co. The
E.E.O.C. presented 30,000 pages of testimony and documents to show
that the Bell system systematically discriminated against minorities and
women, and to show that sex discrimination alone accounted for a
difference of $500 million per year in wages. The suit was settled when
American Telegraph and Telephone Co. agreed to pay $38, million in
back wages which, although far short of the $3.5 billion that was due,
still represented a greater monetary gain for more people than the sum
total of all the E.E.O.C.'s efforts since the Commission was created.7
The task force director coordinating this case stated that the E.E.O.C.
had espoused the feminist view of N.O.W., that is, their view of institu-
tionalized sex discrimination in society: "We wanted to present the
whole sociology and psychology of sexual stereotypes as it was incul-
cated into the Bell System structure."78 A further successful E.E.O.C.
settlement was a 1974 settlement decree involving nine of the largest
steel companies in America and the United States Steel Workers of the
American A.F.L.-C.I.O., that resulted in court approved decrees pro-
viding $31 million in back pay for 40,000 minority and women employ-
ces.7
Recent statistics pointing to the rising enforcement power of the
E.E.O.C. reveal that in 1974 there were almost 40,000 recommended
actionable charges, although the success rate of attempted conciliation
was only 50%. However, although courts have upheld the E.E.O.C.'s
broadened enforcement power, data tabulated during 1975 showed that
among public employers female workers were still concentrated in low
paying, low prestige jobs.' In 1975, the E.E.O.C. filed 180 direct suits
as compared with 86 in 1974, and achieved 90 court settlements or
consent decrees in 1975 as compared with 27 in 1974.82 Most of the
77. Id. at 188-90. E.E.O.C. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 365 F.Supp. 1105 (E.D.Pa.
1975).
78. Shapiro, Women on the Line, Men at the Switchboard: Equal Employment
Opportunity Comes to the Bell System, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1973 (Magazine), at 27,
in FREEMAN, supra note 76, at 189 n. 53.
79. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC 9TH ANNUAL REP'T
] (1975).
80. Id. at 1, 39.
81. Id. at 13-14.
82. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOY. OPPORTUNITY COM., NEWS, FY 1975-RECORD YEAR
FOR EEOC COURT ACTIONS 1 (Oct. 1975).
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charges brought against companies and unions in 1975 were based on
discrimination in job classifications, hiring and discharge policies, and
conditions of employment such as pay, and maternity and disability
benefits. The court settlement cases in 1975 achieved a combination
of injunctive relief, periodic progress reports, back pay awards, affirma-
tive action in recruiting, hiring, advertising and promoting, the setting
of goals and timetables, the elimination of job classifications, the treat-
ment of maternity leave as other temporary disabilities, and increased
vocational training for women. Many of the cases brought by women
workers under E.E.O.C. regulations were directed at unions, where
courts in several instances had found collusion between unions and man-
agement in efforts to keep women segregated in lower paying jobs.u
83. Id. at 1-33.
84. MURPHY, supra note 30, at 50. See Note, Labor Law-Civil
Rights-Invidious Discrimination by Employer Does not Per Se Violate N.L.R.A., 4
N. MEx. L. REv. 261 (May, 1974).
Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal has explained the dilemma between the clash of interest
of the working man and the working woman: "All over the world men have used the
trade unions to keep women out of competition. Women's competition has ... been
particularly obnoxious and dreaded by men because of the low wages women, with their
few earnings outlets, are prepared to work for." Note, Labor Law-Sex Discrimina-
tion-Employer Sex Discrimination and Labor Management Relations Act, 5
RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 585 at 596 (1974). See Jubilee Mfg. Co. v. United Steel-
Workers, 202 NLRB No. 2, 82 LRRM 1482 (1973), for its holding that sex discrimina-
tion was not in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and see 82 LRRM at
1487, for J. Jenkins dissent. See 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. at 602, for the contention
that the National Labor Relations Board is still the most efficient forum for a discrimi-
nated employee to process a grievance, because of the backlog of cases under the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII.
Indicative of their feeling that union membership would not promote their interests,
only 12% of women workers were members of a union in 1971. Hearings on H.R. Res.
35, H.R. Res. 208, H.R. Res. 961, etc. Before the Subcomm. No. 4 of House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2 at 256 (1971). In March 1974, however,
the Coalition of Labor Union Women was formed and had grown to a membership of
5,400 in forty-five local chapters by 1976. The union has been formally endorsed by
seventeen international unions and has declared support of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment as a major goal. Building the Movement: The Coalition of Labor Union Women,
6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 5 (March 15, 1976).
A 1975 United States Commission of Civil Rights report concluded, however, that
despite the adoption of anti-discrimination laws "there is no generally available, effec-
tive means of correcting discriminatory practices in referral unions." U.S. Com. on
Civil Rights Issues Report on Bias in Referral Unions, VI WOMEN TODAY 72 (May 24,
1976). Such unions predominate in the building trades and refer workers directly to
employers through hiring halls, select members, and screen apprentices. Among the
factors cited by the Commission as limiting apprenticeship entry into building trades
Nova Law Journal
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The trend of cases and consent decrees during 1976 indicates a
"ripple" effect calling for broadened enforcement power across the
country of Title VII and related equal employment acts. For example,
settlements won under Title VII in 1976 included: a $1 million back pay
consent decree settlement from United Airlines Corp.;" a decision de-
claring sexual harassment a form of sex discrimination;" the establish-
ment of quotas for job offers made by a New York law firm to women
lawyers;" a $1.9 million back pay consent decree and a $1.3 million
future recruitment program for women and minorities from Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.;m a $935,000 back pay settlement
agreement awarded to women and minorities from a Gulf Oil Company
refinery in Texas;" and a $1 million settlement order awarded to Seattle
women from Safeco Insurance Company." A recent Supreme Court
decision" is likely to be favorable to minorities and women on the "last
hired, first fired" issue because of its holding that seniority and entitle-
ment to benefits must be granted from the date workers applied for
work, but were refused employment because of sex or racial discrimina-
tion, rather than from the date of actual employment. Failure to comply
with equal opportunity employment requirements for policewomen had
caused federal funds to be withheld from Chicago police departments, 2
for women are maximum age limits, experience requirements, and oral interviews,
which are described as being frequently non-job related and often insulting. Id.
85. EEOC and United Airlines Sign Consent Decree, VI WOMEN TODAY 67 (May
10, 1976).
86. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. 1976) held that retaliatory actions
taken by a male Justice Dep't supervisor against a female employee who had rejected
his sexual advances were illegal and constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.
87. A New York law firm agreed to use only job-related criteria in hiring and
not to use sex as a basis for determining conditions of employment, assignment, salary,
or promotion. The firm also agreed to pay $40,000 in legal fees claimed in the suit to
Columbia University. Law Firm Agrees to Hiring Quota, 6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 4
(March 15, 1976).
88. O'Bannon and EEOC v. Merrill Lynch, Civil Action No. 73-905 (D. Pa. July
9, 1976).
89. Women and Minorities Get $935,000 in Back Pay from Gulf Oil Co., VI
WOMEN TODAY 123 (Sept. 13, 1976).
90. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.,
No. 554-72C2 (D.Wash. Sept., 1976).
91. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976):
92. Payments to the Chicago Police Dep't of funds administered under the Crime
Control Act of 1973 were deferred in the fall of 1974. A further $38 million due to be
paid Chicago under the General Revenue Sharing Act was also withheld under court
order. Gates, supra note 29, at 72.
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and had threatened nonrenewal of licenses to Massachusetts television
stations.3 A new federal statute, signed into law on October 2, 1976,
further imposed criminal penalties for sex discrimination in federally-
funded public works and relief projects employment and will subject
violators to one year's imprisonment or a $10,000 fine."
Women's advocates groups have begun to educate women about
the existence of fair employment laws and to provide psychological and,
at times, financial support so that working women are now more willing
to challenge discriminatory practices by pursuing legal action. A current
target of increasing litigation is the insurance industry which, according
to thorough documentation of government reports, has ". . . practiced
pervasive discrimination against women in coverage, availability, under-
writing practices, and rating,""5 thereby intensifying the discrimination
women face in other areas such as employment, credit, domestic rela-
tions, and marital property. Recent settlement successes for working
women's organizations include a $500,000 back pay award won for
employees at CHA, a major insurance firm by Women Employed
(W.E.) in Chicago." In addition, W.E. has placed pressure on the De-
partment of Labor which has brought substantial back pay awards in
the banking industry, and has persuaded the State Insurance Depart-
ment of Illinois to take steps to outlaw the sale of discriminatory insur-
ance policies. Boston's working women's organization, 9 to 5, recently
won a significant "first" in state regulation of company employment
practices, including affirmative action, benefit policies, arbitrary work
93. Springfield Tel. Broadcasting Corp., licensee of WWLP-TV in Springfield
and WRLP-TV in Greenfield, Mass. Two Massachusetts TV Stations Ordered to
"'Show Cause" by FCC, VI WOMEN TODAY 69 (May 10, 1976).
94. Act of Oct. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-453, § 246, 90 Stat. 1517.
95. Brown & Freedman, The Impact of the ERA on Financial Individual Rights:
Sex Averaging in Insurance, in IMPACT ERA, supra note I, at 127. The authors point
out that basic assumptions about women in the work force underlie current insurance
practices: (1) that women are only marginally connected to the labor force, will retire
earlier, and therefore will utilize more insurance than men; (2) that childbirth and
pregnancy are not temporary disabilities but are voluntary; (3) that pregnancy is accept-
able only for married women; hence, coverage for pregnancy, childbirth, sterilization,
and abortion are available only at a prohibitive family rate based ofn two adults and
two children; (4) that only work outside the home in career-type jobs is valuable enough
to insure, not domestic work; (5) that unmarried, separated, and divorced women are
considered unstable. Id. at 128. See also Note, Pregnancy and Sex-Based Discrimina-
tion in Employment: A Post-Aiello Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 57 (1975).
96. Building the Movement: The New Working Women's Organizations. 6 THE
SPOKESWOMAN 5 (Feb. 15, 1976).
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rules, and employee qualifications. The group successfully confronted
political and corporate utilities lobbyists in an effort to establish greater
maternity benefits for working women. In addition, 9 to 5 filed suit
against four Boston-based publishing companies alleging sex discrimi-
nation in hiring, pay, and promotion policies. 7 San Francisco's
Women's Organization for Employment compelled one of the city's
employers, Fireman's Fund Insurance, to produce its first affirmative
action plans for women and has "joined in a suit to insure court-
monitored compliance with the plan." The group has also put pressure
on state agencies to enforce regulations banning discriminatory prac-
tices such as sex-segregated job order files."
C. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 will open for
judicial review numerous aspects of sex discrimination existing through-
out our educational institutions. Congress noted the correlation between
equal education and equal opportunity in its drafting of Title IX when
it stated that one of the avowed purposes of Title IX was to improve
the quality of the American workforce."
With certain exceptions, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in
any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or other
educational program from the pre-school to postgraduate level that is
operated by an organization or agency which receives or benefits from
federal aid.100 However, the notorious lack of compliance with the Act's
requirements by 1976 demonstrated that most schools reacted as if Title
IX had never been enacted. The Project on Equal Education Rights
(P.E.E.R.) sponsored by N.O.W.'s Legal Defense and Education Fund
had filed charges in ten regional offices of the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights in 1976
against 40 states and the District of Columbia, alleging violation of Title
IX of the Education Amendment of 1972. Failure to obey the law by
those 41 agencies could lead to a $3.4 billion loss of federal education
aid. P.E.E.R.'s charges are based on a recent survey of progress under
Title IX that found 41 state departments of education in violation of at
least one of the Act's five requirements, and 33 states in multiple viola-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 117 CONG. REc. 39,248-49, 39,260 (1971).
100. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86.
71
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
tions. 10 Women's advocate groups, however, continue to provide sub-
stantial leadership in attempting to remove sex-stereotyping conditions
from the classroom.0
The lack of H.E.W.'s enforcement of Title IX had caused five
groups, including the National Education Association, the National
Organization of Women, and Women's Equity Action League, to file
suit against H.E.W. in 1974 charging the governmental agency with
non-enforcement of Title IX.10 Early in 1976, a coalition of 57 civil
rights and women's groups urged H.E.W. to end its toleration of dis-
crimination in federally funded programs which violate Constitutional
and Federal law' °4 and its "hands-off" policy of high prestige colleges
and universities.H15 Two months after this censure, H.E.W. publicly re-
versed its previous stance of discretionary enforcement, and instead
101. Peer Files Charges After Survey Shows Violations Under Title IX. VI
WOMEN TODAY 75-76 (May 24, 1976). See generally Sex Discrimination in Vocational
Education: Title IX & Other Remedies, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1121 (1974). Women students
who now comprise over half the enrollees in vocational educational programs are still
confined to women's fields which often lead to low-paying, dead-end jobs. In 1973, girls
formed the vast majority of those taking business and commercial courses (79% female)
and health courses (95% female), while boys were still highly concentrated in technical,
industrial, and trade subjects (98% male). Supra note 11, at 66. A House bill (H.R.
12835) passed on May 11, 1976, included two provisions that are aimed at reducing sex
discrimination and sex stereotyping in vocational educational programs. Vocational
Education Bill Includes Anti-Discriminatory and Stereotyping Clauses, VI Women
Today 71 (May 24, 1976).
102. The Project on Equal Education Rights (PEER) has been established to
monitor and publicize federal legislation banning sex discrimination in education, pri-
marily through enforcement of Title IX at the elementary and secondary school level.
PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, II ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN,
PEER TO WATCH SCHOOLS 6 (May 1975). The Council on Interracial Books, Inc., has
sponsored workshops for parents, teachers, textbook publishers, and librarians to elimi-
nate sexist and racist stereotyping in textbooks and curricular materials used in schools.
PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, II ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN,
ELIMINATING STEREOTYPING IN CURRICULAR MATERIALS at 6. The subject of the Na-
tional Educational Association conference held in Washington, D.C. in February 1976
was "Women's Rights: A Force for Educational Equity," which considered how schools
sort students by developing different expectations and offering different options for
males and females. NEA Conference on Women's Rights Set for Feb. 19-22 in DC. VI
WOMEN TODAY 28 (Feb. 16, 1976).
103. PROJECT ON EQUAL EDUCATION RIGHTS, I PEER PERSPECTIVE, HEW UNIT
STALLS ON SEX BIAS CASES 1-2 (Dec. 1975).
104. Fifty-Seven Groups Cite Deficiencies in HEW Compliance Program, VI
WOMEN TODAY 16 (Feb. 2, 1976).
105. Cowan, Legal Barriers to Social Change: The Case of Higher Education, in
IMPACT ERA, supra note 1, at 173.
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resolved to seek a timely resolution of every complaint it received and
to urge staff and budget increases. 1"6
Since a school is, in some degree, a microcosm reflecting social
stratification, prestige, and occupational choices, it is likely that many
of the obstacles resisting equality in the outside society will also be
encountered in our educational institutions. For example, one study of
Title IX's enforcement progress noted that the recent furor over Title
IX's demand that equal amounts of money be expended on female and
male athletic activities in educational institutions was indicative of the
guarding of athletics throughout our society as a predominantly male
domain.'" Exemplifying such resistance met in the struggle to obtain
equal athletic opportunity for women was the National Organization of
Women's court battle against Little League Baseball in 1974 which
ultimately won for girls the opportunity and right to play Little League
baseball.' Adequate enforcement of Title IX should preclude a repeti-
tion of those court decisions which, in the very recent past, have denied
girls the opportunity to compete in state school athletic events. In one
such decision which prohibited a girl from competing in a state cross-
country track event, the court cited chivalrous and protective reasons
to justify a denial of equal athletic opportunity and concluded: "athletic
competition builds character in our boys. We do not need that kind of
character in our girls, the women of tomorrow."'" The recent defeat of
the Casey Amendment in the United States Congress"' that would have
limited the power of Title IX in prohibiting honorary societies and
single-sex physical education classes exemplifies the ongoing monitoring
activity that women's action groups must pursue in order to avoid a
watering-down of existing laws..
Academic discrimination based on sex permeates all levels of edu-
cation. In February 1976, the United States Office of Education re-
106. H.E.W. Reverses Position on Enforcement of Discrimination Complaints,
VI WOMEN TODAY 52-53 (April 12, 1976).
107. Lipman-Blumen, supra note 19, at 23-24.
108. N.O.W. v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974).
The court, after hearing expert testimony on anatomy, physiology, reaction time, and
maturation rate, made a finding of fact that girls between eight and twelve were not, as
a class, subject to materially greater hazards of injury while playing baseball than boys
of the same age group. On Dec. 26, 1974, Congress amended the national Little League
federal charter to open the League to girls. Act of Dec. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-551.
109. Hollander v. the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conf., 164 Ct. 654
(1971), appeal dismissed 295 A.2d 671 (1972).
110. Lipman-Blumen, supra note 19, at 21 n. 16.
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leased a report showing that women academics had actually lost ground
in salary level and number of positions during 1975, despite the passage
of Title IX."' Dr. Bernice Sandler, an officer of Women's Equity Action
League, confirmed that the position of women in higher education had
worsened over the past 100 years, and that the so-called shortage of
qualified women on campus is an academic myth." 2 A strategy of inac-
tion rather than one of voluntary compliance critical to effective law
enforcement has been forthcoming from the halls of higher educa-
tion."' A course of opposition to enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws at the university level has appeared through petitions circulated,
articles and letters written, and committees formed by university profes-
sors, by the use of substantial resources at their disposal, and sometimes
by the favors of political patronage. Delay inherent in the bureaucratic
process itself; the sheer number and complexity of the institutions cov-
ered; and inherent discretion and decentralized power, making account-
ability difficult in institutionalized bureaucracies, add to the proble-
matic enforcement of Title IX.'
I 11. The report stated that "the average salaries of men continue to exceed the
average salaries of women at every academic rank and at every institutional level, in
both publicly and privately controlled institutions." Feds Release New EEO Plan for
Higher Education, 6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 2 (March 15, 1976). Overall, women's salaries
increased 5.8%, while men's salaries increased 6.3%, from 1974 to 1975. The percentage
of women declined at the ranks of professor, associate professor, and instructor, while
it increased at the ranks of assistant professor, lecturer, and undesignated rank.
National Center for Education Statistics Releases Preliminary Data on Instructional
Faculty in Colleges, VI WOMEN TODAY 57 (April 12, 1976).
In 1975, while women made up 24% of all full-time faculty in this country, they
comprised only 10% of full professors, 17% of associate professors, and 40% of lower
echelon instructors and lecturers. Patterson, Another School with Scandal, Miami Her-
ald, June 5, 1976, § D, at 1, col. 2.
112. In 1870, women comprised one-third of faculty positions, but in 1975 they
held less than one-fourth of faculty positions at the college and university level. National
Center for Education Statistics Releases Preliminary Data on Instructional Faculty in
Colleges, supra note 11, V WOMEN TODAY at 57. Sandier, Patterns of Discrimination
and Discouragement in Higher Education, in WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY
SocImEn, supra note 18, at 568, 570. Dr. Sandier contends that a higher percentage of
women with doctorates are available for college teaching than are men with doctorates.
She notes that exemplary of the widespread attitude on college campuses toward women
being qualified to earn doctoral degrees but not qualified to teach on those campuses
was the situation at Columbia University in 1970, at which time the University had
granted 36% of its doctorates to women in psychology, but could find no women quali-
fied to teach in psychology. Id. at 570.
113. Cowan, supra note 105, at 174.
114. Id. at 170, 173.
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A 1975 lawsuit' in which a New York college was found guilty of
sex discrimination against a woman faculty member has been cited by
the New York City Commission on Human Rights as having important
implications for women seeking to prove sex discrimination in employ-
ment. The court stated in this case:
[Wihat Dr. Winsey did to cause her termination would have not been
considered "troublesome" if she had not been a woman. It often happens
that those who are not not supine and fight for their rights will be re-
garded as troublesome and those disturbed by the struggle would wish
that the troublesome one "would just go away." To terminate Dr. Win-
sey's employment for this reason. . . is to have unlawfully discriminated
against her. "'
A pending 1976 University of Pittsburgh Medical School sex discrimi-
nation suit, brought by the National Organization of Women, could
have important implications for a drastic tenure procedure revision at
almost every college and university in the nation. A successful decision
could significantly ease the entry of women into higher academic ranks
by forcing predominantly male deans and faculties, who now may judge
tenure candidates on abstract standards, to judge such candidates on
objective criteria instead, such as merit, scholarly achievements, and
ability to teach."7
115. Pace College v. Comm'n on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339 N.E. 880,
377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975). Pace College in New York was ordered to reinstate Dr.
Winsey as Assistant Professor, and to pay her $22,650 in back pay plus retroactive
increments and $15,000 damages for mental pain and humiliation.
116. Id. at 34, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 480, 339 N.E. at 886.
117. Dr. Sharon Johnson, Assistant Professor of biochemistry at the Univ. of
Pittsburgh Medical School, contended that her denial of tenure in 1973 was a result of
sex discrimination. Between 1967 and 1972, Dr. Johnson was awarded four grants from
the National Institute for Health and the National Science Foundation, totaling
$256,000, had published seven articles and one review, and was elected to the Society.
The department chairman told her these qualifications would satisfy her tenure require-
ments. However, when that chairman left in 1971, the new chairman denied her tenure,
stated that the faculty deemed her research "irrelevant to the goals of the department,"
and that she was "too chemical." A member of the President's Advisory Council for
Equity in the Education of Women stated that women such as Dr. Johnson often fall
victims of tenure criteria because the existing system works to perpetuate an "old boy"
club in which tenure criteria change to accommodate somebody's protege, a role women
seldom are in. Since the suit was filed, Dr. Johnson's costs have exceeded $50,000, much
of which has been raised through the N.O.W. Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Another School with Scandal, supra note 11l, at 2, col. 1-2.
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D. Executive Order 11246
Executive Order 11246, issued in 1965 and amended in 1967, pro-
hibits employment discrimination based upon sex, race, color, religion,
or national origin by federal contractors employed in $50,000 contracts,
and contractors who perform under federally assisted construction con-
tracts exceeding $10,000.118 One of N.O.W.'s first actions after its for-
mation was to induce President Johnson to amend Executive Order
11246 in 1967 to add the provision of "sex" to its protected minority
groups."' Under the Order, contractors are required to take affirmative
action in recruitment, advertising, hiring, transfer, layoff, rates of pay,
and selection for training and apprenticeship, and may face termination
or suspension of government contracts if sex discrimination is found.
The potential this Executive Order has for achieving equal employment
opportunity in the United States is apparent when one realizes that
about one-third of the nation's total civilian workforce are employed by
federal contractors. The Executive Order is enforced by the Department
of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs through
administrative regulations known as Revised Order 4, issued in May
1968. This Order requires the government to take the initiative to deter-
mine whether contractors are in compliance and to otherwise invoke
economic sanctions, rather than to depend upon the filing of complaints,
as is required for enforcement of Title VII by the E.E.O.C.' ° The Sex
Discrimination Guidelines issued by the Department of Labor in 1970
require that contractors not advertise under male or female classifica-
tions' base seniority on sex, deny jobs because of state protective labor
laws, distinguish between married and unmarried persons of one sex
only, or penalize women because they require leave for childbearing.' 2,
However, the predictable lack of enforcement of this executive
order arises from the same subtle and obvious sources of sex discrimina-
tion that resisted enforcement of the aforementioned laws. A recent
report released by the General Accounting Office indicated that a major
obstacle to compliance is the government's refusal to use the sanctions
it has available:
118. 41 C.F.R.§§60-1.1 et seq. (1974).
119. FREEMAN, supra note 12, at 75. Exec. Order No. 11375, amending Exec.
Order No. 11246, took effect on Oct. 13, 1968. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 17, 1967).
See generally TASK FORCE; supra note 27, at 103-8.
120. Labor Moves to Gut Enforcement Rules, 7 THE SPOKESWOMAN I (Oct. 15,
1976).
121. TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 105.
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Some contractors are not even being asked to run affirmative-action
programs, many are not being asked for a copy of affirmative-action
plans, and some are not giving women equal employment opportunities.
Less than half of the back pay that the Labor Department has found to
be owed to women because of violation of the Equal Pay Act has actually
been paid. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the agency re-
sponsible for implementing Executive Order 11246, has never terminated
a federal contract because of sex discrimination.' m
In addition, the United States Department of Labor had proposed new
enforcement regulations, published in the Federal Register on Septem-
ber 17, 1976, that would seriously weaken existing enforcement mecha-
nisms.12
The supervision of Executive Order 11246 relating to educational
institutions was delegated to the United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. Although the Order has been in effect since
1968, H.E.W. had not officially issued guidelines to the academic com-
munity until October 4, 1972.124 Dr.Sandler, who implemented the first
use of the Executive Order by women at universities, pointed out that
it was not enforced with regard to sex by federal agencies until the
Women's Equity Action League had filed 250 charges in 1970 with
H.E.W. on behalf of women employed at professional and staff levels
in educational institutions.'2 Although the pressure of the Women's
Equity Action League and the National Organization- of Women to
enforce Executive Order 11246 at colleges and universities has not yet
resulted in increased numbers of jobs or promotions for women, its
increased public support"' may strengthen the power of this law as well
as its enforcement effect.
6. THE PROGRESS
By 1972, three-fourths of the 1966 demands of the National Organ-
ization of Women had been achieved, including Congressional passage
122. Griffiths, Can We Still Afford Occupational Segregation? Some Remarks,
in SIGNS, JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra note 19, at I 11.
123. 17 Fed. Reg. 40,339 (1976). See supra note 120.
124. MURPHY, supra note 30, at 37.
125. Id.
126. 1500 citizens signed a full-page petition addressed to President Ford in the
New York Times on April 6, 1975, urging the President to enforce Executive Order
11246 with regard to sex discrimination on academic campuses. Ford Urged to Enforce
E.O. 11246. 12 ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN I (Nov. 1975).
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of the still-pending Equal Rights Amendment.121 and the 1973 landmark
decision of the United States Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade, which
supported a woman's right to have a legal abortion.'2 In the Ninety-
second Congress, more legislation had been passed to further the cause
of equal rights for women than in all previous Congresses combined,
largely attributable to women's rights advocates' active lobbying in
Washington. One recent legislative success was the passage of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act,'29 effective on October 28, 1975, which pro-
127. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment passed by Congress on March 22,
1972 (H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.) in January 1977 required the ratification
of three more state legislatures before it could become our Twenty-Seventh Constitu-
tional Amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment is based on the principle that sex
should not be a determining factor by which government affects the legal rights of its
citizens. The text of the proposed amendment reads: Section 1. Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisons of this article. Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years
after the date of ratification.
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The effect of this decision was prevented from being
overturned in May 1976 by a final Senate defeat (vote 47 to 40) of the proposed Helm's
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which would have barred the right to obtain an
abortion. Senate Votes Against Anti-Abortion Amendment, Thwarting "Right to Li-
fers." VI WOMEN TODAY 65 (May 10, 1976). A class action suit was filed on Oct. 1,
1976. by the National Abortion Rights Action League (N.A.R.A.L.) and four leading
gynecologists alleging that the anti-abortion amendment to the Labor-H.E.W. appropri-
ations bill which prohibits payment of Medicaid money for abortion, and which became
law Oct. 1, 1976, is unconstitutional and blatantly discriminatory against poor women.
N.A.R.A.L. Files Suit Against Anti-Abortion Amendment. VI WOMEN TODAY 139
(Oct. II, 1976). See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct.
2831 (1976), that held, inter alia, that a spousal consent provision and a blanket parental
consent requirement for minors were unconstitutional in a Missouri abortion statute,
and that the provision requiring a physician to exercise professional care to preserve a
fetus' life and health on pain of criminal and civil liability was also unconstitutional.
In the fall of 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to rule on various abortion
issues, such as whether indigent women can obtain a nontherapeutic abortion at state
expense, in Mahon v. Roe, U.S. 75-1440. In this case, a Conn. attorney general is
appealing a New Haven, Conn. Dist. Ct. ruling that required the state to pay for
abortions requested by women on welfare. The Court will also review a Missouri case,
Poelker v. Doe, U.S. 75-442, after the Eighth U.S. Cir. Ct. of Appeals ruled that the
city of St. Louis, Mo., must provide physicians at city hospitals who are able to ethically
perform abortions. In Beal v. Doe, U.S. 75-554, the Court will review the Third U.S.
Cir. Ct. of Appeal's decision which held that the Federal Social Security Act compels
states participating in Medicaid to provide abortion funds.
129. 12 C.F.R. § 202, Reg. B (1976). This Act prohibits a creditor from discrimi-
nating against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any
aspect of a credit transaction. It is one of three bills introduced by Congresswoman Bella
_ o a QAm
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vided the legal mechanisms by which to correct numerous existing dis-
criminatory lending practices throughout banking and credit institu-
tions, such as ignoring a wife's earned income regardless of its actual
monetary value. By March 1976, 32 bills aimed at women's rights had
been introduced into the Ninety-fourth Congress on such diversified
issues as child care, civil rights, education, employment, health, the
media, social security, and income tax revision. 1'0
A pending innovative bill, exemplary of the legislature's recogni-
tion of the sociological changes in women's role, is aimed at providing
an opportunity for expanded retirement security for housewives which
would extend the 1974 Individual Retirement Account law to permit a
spouse to contribute the same amount for the other spouse. This bill,",'
directed primarily at the housewife, recognizes that although the house-
wife "does work valued at between $5,000 and $15,000 per year" she has
"little or no retirement protection and security." A further innovative
bill entitled "Equity in Social Security for Individuals and Families"
would eliminate the concept of dependency for the non-salaried spouse
and would base social security coverage for married persons on the
Abzug in the Ninety-third Congress aimed at corrective legislation against the existence
of separate credit standards for men and women.
On April 20, 1976, the Justice Dep't filed its first suits to enforce prohibitions
against sex discrimination in lending as provided for in the 1974 Amendments to the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 against a New Jersey mortgage corporation and a Utah loan
association. Various loan associations were charged with Bliscriminatory practices
against women and their families such as using sex as the criteria to determine the
conditions of loans, requiring women loan applicants, but not men, to submit written
assurances of their intention to continue working during the entire term of the loan, and
discounting all or part of a wife's income in determining qualifications for loans. United
States v. Prudential Savings & Loan Ass'n, et al., Civil Action No. C-76124 (DCA Utah
Apr. 20, 1976); United States v. Jefferson Mtfg. Corp., Civil Action No. 76-0694 (DCA
N.J. Apr. 20, 1976).
A coalition of ten civil rights groups and housing and civic organizations filed suit
in May 1976 in a Washington U.S. District Court against four federal agencies which
regulate the nation's home mortgage lending institutions: the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Depository Insurance Corp.,
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Among the more than thirty types of discrimi-
natory conduct cited in the complaint were loan criteria that had a discriminatory
impact on women and minorities such as disregarding a wife's income. 10-Group Coali-
tion Files Suit Against Four Federal Agencies Charging Bias. VI WOMEN TODAY 67
(May 10, 1976).
130. Status of Legislation Affecting Women, 5 WOMEN'S EQUITY ACTION
LEAGUE WASHINGTON REPORT 2-3 (May 1976).
131. S. 2732, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Retirement Accounts for Housewives
Proposed. 6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 2 (June 15, 1976).
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assumption that they are equal entities in an economic partnership. 32
Social Security benefits and coverage, whether based on one salary or
two, would annually be divided equally between married partners and
credited to their separate accounts.
Two bills introduced into the Ninety-fourth Congress aimed at
ameliorating the transitional ills that would accompany a redistribution
of women's economic opportunity in our society are the Equal Oppor-
tunity and Full Employment Act and the Displaced Homemakers Act.
The Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Act'1' would attempt
to provide jobs for all people seeking both full and part-time employ-
ment, and would provide such services as adequate day-care facilities,
thus recognizing the need for special remedies for those suffering the
effects of past and present discrimination. The Displaced Homemaker
Act' 1 is directed at providing multi-service programs, job training and
counseling, health and educational services, and financial management
assistance for those three to six million "displaced homemakers" who
are unable to function independently in today's society because of wid-
owhood or divorce.
The National Women's Political Caucus and similar politically
oriented women's advocates groups have urged women to realize that
if they want political, economic, and social change they must assume
responsibility for effecting the mandatory preliminary legal changes
themselves. The National Women's Political Caucus and the Women's
Campaign Fund have encouraged women to enter political careers's
132. Equity for Wives Under Social Security, 5 WOMEN'S EQUITY ACTION
LEAGUE WASHINGTON REPORT I (July 1976).
133. H.R. 50,1609, 1610, 2209, Equal Opportunity and Full Employment Act, as
amended by Subcomm. Print, March 20, 1975.
134. H.R. 7003, S. 2541, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). A "displaced homemaker"
is defined as one who has provided unpaid household services for other family members
for most of her adult life, whose dependent source of income has been terminated
through divorce or widowhood, and who lacks marketable skills to thereafter enable her
to support herself. Under present laws, these homemakers are ineligible for unemploy-
ment benefits because their labor in the home has been unpaid and they often do not
qualify for old age benefits under existing social security laws. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WOMEN AND WORK, LEGISLATION TO AID DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS INTRODUCED IN
BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS (Nov. 1975).
135. In 1976, women held less than 5% of all elected offices in the United States,
according to a study conducted by the Center for American Women and Politics at
Rutgers University. In 1974, 1,800 women ran for national and statewide offices, and
765 of them were elected. In 1976, the National Women's Political Caucus estimated
that 2,300 women would run for such offices. Currents. 6 THE SPOKESWOMAN 7 (March
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through such campaigns as that to "re-integrate the United States Sen-
ate" in 1976. More women legislators are likely to lead to more elected
and appointed women administrators, which is likely to lead male politi-
cal leaders to compete for women's increasingly powerful vote and
thereby to recruit more women to hold office. lu Indicative of the Exec-
utive Department's increasing responsiveness to women's efforts to de-
termine their political future was President Ford's acceptance in July
1976 of a 115-point report of the National Commission on the Observ-
ance of International Women's Year, aimed at ending much of the
"sexism still so rampant throughout our country."1 7 The President's
acceptance was implemented by his issuance of Executive Order 11832,
the purpose of which is to fulfill the points raised by the National
Commission. As part of his commitment to the 115-point program,
President Ford had directed a review of the United States Code by the
Attorney General and all affected federal agencies to determine the need
for revision of unjustified sex-based provisions. Such review was to be
conducted in coordination with a similar review proposed by the Presi-
dent to be initiated by the Governors of all the states.
Further evidence of the responsive posture of the executive and
federal judicial branches toward women's rights is their endorsement of
the entrance of women into traditionally male-dominated governmental
sectors. For example, in 1972 women were appointed for the first time
in history as F.B.I. agents, postal inspectors, sky marshalls, secret serv-
ice agents, and narcotics agents. Not only have the Army, Navy, and
Air Force resolved to double and triple their ranks of women and give
women jobs previously reserved for men, such as pilot training, but a
1975 law"' passed and given overwhelming support by the House and
Senate directed that women be admitted to armed service academies
beginning in the fall of 1976. More than 800 women had received Con-
gressional nominations to the Naval, Army, and Air Force Academies
to compete for 300 first-year places allotted to females."' The advent
15, 1976). No women have ever been appointed to the United States Supreme Court.
In 1975, there were no women senators, and women held only 19 of the 435 seats in the
United States House of Representatives. NAT. COM'M ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTER-
NATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION 341 (1976).
136. Freeman, The Political Impact of the ERA. in IMPACT ERA, supra note I,
at 67.
137. Nat. IWY Com'm Submits Report: President Ford Accepts It. VI WOMEN
TODAY 100-1 (July 19, 1976).
138. Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 8 (Oct. 7, 1975).
139. More than 800 Women Get Congressional Nominations to Military
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of women into the military service is likely ultimately to present for
judicial review the issue of the laws and traditions behind male-only
combat.10 As one legal analysis concluded, "[like other laws apparently
written to protect women as a class, these statutes have had a profound
adverse impact on opportunities for women in the military services.""'
For example, in 1975, Schlesinger v. Ballard12 upheld a military statute
in favor of allowing women more time than men in which to achieve
advancement before discharge. However, Justice Brennan pointed out
that the majority chose to pass over the issue of whether the discrimina-
tory pattern chosen by Congress that was beneficial to women was itself
constitutional. Indicative of an increasing approval of women's equality
in the armed forces was the overwhelming House passage of a bill"10
on September 13, 1976, which would abolish the offices of Director of
Lady Marines and Director of the Waves, and disband the Women's
Army Corps. A House committee report stated that having a separate
corps was a "... vestige of the time when women were not treated
equally," and that "[elach female officer in the future, like each male
officer, will be a member of some functional corps of the service."'"
Recent judicial decisions indicate a growing commitment by the
courts to apply greater objectivity to their rulings on women's rights
issues. For example, such decisions have demonstrated that sex discrim-
Academies. VI WOMEN TODAY 53 (April 12, 1976).
140. Specific laws have survived in the military services, not covered by any of
the laws prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, which forbid service of women
on combat ships whether or not in combat (10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970)) and on planes in
combat (10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1970)). Gates, supra note 29, at 64. Four wmnen in the U.S.
Navy are challenging, as unconstitutional, the law prohibiting women from serving
aboard U.S. Navy vessels in a class action suit filed in the U.S. Dist. Ct. in Washington
in December 1976. Four Navy Women File Class Action Suit to be Assigned Sea Duty.
Vi WOMEN TODAY 163 (Dec. 27, 1976).
141. Gates, supra note 29, at 64. See also Edwards v. Schlesinger, 377 F. Supp.
1091 (D.D.C. 1974). The court granted summary judgment to the Air Force Academy
and Naval Academy when the exclusion of women therein was challenged on equal
protection grounds. The court upheld the reasoning that the exclusion of women from
the Academies is rationally related to a legitimate government interest because the
purpose of the Academies is to train officers for combat, and women are barred from
combat.
142. 419 U.S. 498, 511-12 n. 1 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Johnston, Sex
Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U. CAL. L.A. L. REv. 235 at 244 n.50
(1975).
143. H.R. 13958, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
144. House Passes Measure Abandoning Wacs, Waves and Lady Marines, VI
WOMEN TODAY 129 (Sept. 27, 1976).
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ination based on maternity conditions and such requirements as manda-
tory maternity leaves or blanket denials of unemployment benefits for
periods preceding and following child-birth will be found to be an un-
constitutional denial of due process and equal protection. 45 A recent
New York District Court of Appeals decision found that pregnant Mar-
ines were not permanently unfit for duty and therein declared a 1970
Marine Corps regulation which so stipulated'" to be a violation of due
process and equal protection. In the fall of 1976, the Supreme Court is
to decide the issue of whether or not a divorced woman under age sixty-
two will have the same right to receive social security benefits for her
dependent children as does a married woman with dependent children. " ,
145. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec. etc., 0423 U.S. 44 (1975). The Court's
decision on Utah law is expected to have great impact on twenty other state unemploy-
ment insurance laws with special provisions relating to pregnancy which existed as of
July 1975. Most of these laws deny pregnant women benefits regardless of their individ-
ual ability to work, availability for work, or efforts to find a job. The International
Women's Year supplement report to the Unemployment Insurance Service Benefit
Series indicates that, despite guidelines issued under Title VII, employers are still un-
willing to hire pregnant women and often classify them as unfit for employment. Blanket
Denial of Jobless Pay During Pregnancy is Unlawful. VI WOMEN TODAY 24 (Feb. 16.
1976).
In Gilbert v. General Elec., 375 F. Supp. 367 (1975) cert. granted, Oct. 6, 1975,
reargued Oct. 13, 1976, exclusion of pregnancy disability from sickness and accident
benefits was found to violate equal employment opportunity provisions of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Ma-
chine Workers had shown how General Electric pays benefits for various other kinds
of disabilities, including football knees and hair transplants, while denying payments
only in pregnancy-related areas. On Dec. 7. 1976, however, the Supreme Court, in a 6-
3 decision, ruled such exclusion of maternity benefits from private employer sickness
and accident disability insurance plans was not in violation of Title VII. General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). Women's rights advocates have since indicated they
will seek legislative remedies to preclude the effect of the Supreme Court decision, such
as supporting a Congressional amendment to Title VII or a separate bill which would
make exclusion of such coverage illegal under Title VII. Women's Rights Activists to
Fight Maternity Ruling, Miami Herald, Dec. 9, 1976, § C, at I, col. 1-2.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974) affd 511 F.
2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975). A woman employee successfully challenged under Title VII the
company exclusion of pregnancy benefits from its employee income protection plan and
the requirement that female employees return to work within three months of childbirth
or face termination.
146. Crawford v. Cushman, Jr., 531 F.2d 114 (1976). Marine Corps Reg. MCO
Pl900.16, MCO 500.12 (7-16-75), etc.
147. Mathews, Sec. of H.E.W. v. Helen de Castro (No. 75-1197), cited in
Mother's Rights Cases Come Before Supreme Court. VI WOMEN TODAY 65 (May 19,
1976).
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Further issues before the 1976-1977 Supreme Court term include the
role of the state in providing abortions, the question of whether preg-
nancy may be excluded from the list of disabilities covered by a disabil-
ity benefits plan for employees, the constitutionality of the "male only"
membership policy of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the question
of whether widowers, but not widows, must prove they received one half
of their support from their spouse at the time of the spouse's death. " ,
The Supreme Court recently bypassed making a decision upon the issue
of whether female school teachers and staff members may be discharged
for bearing illegitimate children, awaiting the outcome of a pending
H.E.W. regulation on this issue."
7. THE FUTURE
Repeated studies and polls indicate that the American public is
becoming increasingly receptive to the idea that women and men should
share equally the privileges and responsibilities of our society.10 It is
likely that widening employment opportunities, lawsuits to raise wages
and collect damages for past discrimination, affirmative action pro-
grams, and new training programs in untraditional fields will create
higher income for female workers ultimately, "' as well as create more
subtle changes in such economic structures as the present 36-hour work
week. For example, economist Barbara Bergmann predicts that an in-
flux of women into the labor force equal to that of men could be ab-
sorbed by having a 31-hour work week for both women and men. 52 In
addition, such influx could be absorbed by utilizing innovative concepts
such as flexible work-hours or job-sharing programs.'"
148. Supreme Court Cases Include Several that Are of Interest to Women, VI
WOMEN TODAY 136-37 (Oct. 1I, 1976).
149. Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews (No. 74-1318), cited
in Mother's Rights Cases Come Before Supreme Court, VI WOMEN TODAY 65 (May
19, 1976).
150. MURPHY, supra note 30, at 73-79.
151. Bell, Economic Realities Anticipated, in IMPACT ERA, supra note 1, at 82.
152. Bergmann, supra note 39, at 158-59.
153. The United States Labor Dep't stated that flexible work hour schedules and
removal of barriers for part-time employment are currently subjects of collective bar-
gaining and proposed legislation. In 1976, thirty organizations in the federal government
representing more than 28,000 employees were engaged in flexible hours programs.
Senate Hearings Held on Alternative Work Patterns, VI WOMEN TODAY 59 (April 26,
1976). On May 6, 1976, the House passed H.R. 9043, which created a three-year
experimental program of four-day work weeks and flexible working hours for federal
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Further subtle changes likely to occur within related institutions are
modifications of the existing legal marriage contract. Required under
each of its present unwritten but rigid provisions rooted in the common
law are inflexible and outmoded roles for husbands and wives which
continue to be legally enforced,"'4 despite the advent of more egalitarian
family patterns. New laws emerging in surrounding areas point to a
need for a flexible legal marriage model more suited to the diverse roles
husbands and wives assume in a modern nuclear family unit. A flexible
legal model would ultimately reflect the growing acceptance of women
in the labor force along with their greater financial and social independ-
ence, an extended range of domestic responsibilities shared between
husbands and wives, and a modification of parenthood as a joint enter-
prise to be enjoyed and shared by both husband and wife. 55
Whether equality under the laws will approach reality is, in the
opinion of many legal analysts, dependent upon the existence of a firm
Constitutional foundation for equal treatment. In the judgment of Con-
stitutional commentators, the government now in fact possesses the
"unquestioned authority" to assure such equality.15 However, as stated
in the words of Chief Justice Burger, "[iln the absence of a firm Consti-
tutional foundation for equal treatment for men and women by the law,
women seeking to be judged on their individual merits will continue to
encounter law-sanctioned obstacles."' 7 Passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment, as reputed by its advocates, would provide such a Consti-
tutional foundation.1m Its proponents urge that its passage would create
awareness of sex discrimination, make legal recourse a realistic solu-
employees in order to ascertain more fully the advantages and disadvantages of flexible
working hours for future use. House Passes Legislation Setting Up an Experimental
Flex-Work Program, VI WOMEN TODAY 74 (May 24, 1976). Currently some cities and
industries across the nation are experimenting with the concept of job sharing, by which
two people share one fulitime job and divide it between them according to time worked
or tasks performed. One Mass. study found that two part-time workers were more
efficient than one worker doing the same job. Curtis, Can Two Work as Cheaply As
One?, Miami Herald, March 21, 1976, § F, at 1, col. 1-2, 4-5.
154. Weitzman, supra note 17, at 185. See also Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 116 (1974), and Johnston, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U. CAL. L.A. L. REV. at 264 n. 134.
155. Weitzman, supra note 17, at 196-97.
156. Cowan, supra note 105, at 176.
157. K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG, H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 63 (ist ed. 1974), Introduction to Appellant's Brief in U.S. Sup.
Ct. in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
158. Cowan, supra note 105, at 176-77.
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tion, and justify self-respect.M Its predicted impact would be to provide
a Constitutional safeguard against rescission of existing nondiscrimi-
nation laws and executive orders, particularly during periods of eco-
nomic recession; to abolish restraints on women by enabling them to
earn a better living; and to abolish restraints on men by freeing them
from bearing the sole financial responsibility for the lifetime support of
others.'" Clearly such a profound impact would enhance enormously
the career choices, lifestyles, and work patterns for both men and
women.
Institutional, political, and ethical shifts are presently occurring
which will affect the very framework of social behavior. Customs, such
as our ways of living and bringing up children and the consideration of
what is appropriate to and conventional in today's society, are likely to
be redefined during our generation and over future generations."' Re-
gardless of its final manifestation, a strong plurality of indicators sug-
gests the question remaining is not whether sexual equality under the
law will be realized, but in what passage of time that realization will
take place.
8. CONCLUSION
The myths of woman's place, motherhood, equal opportunity,
woman's power, and egalitarian marriages are anachronisms amid con-
temporary social realities. In point of fact, women are participating in
the labor force and in myriad untraditional roles in historically unprece-
dented numbers. There is much to indicate that if women continue their
pressing commitment for change, they will be increasingly successful in
their efforts to end legislative and judicial discrimination. As they be-
come more politially sophisticated, skillful, and resourceful, their de-
mands for equality will intensify, their dissatisfactions will increase, and
their aspirations will rise. Constitutional and statutory equality would
then provide the necessary framework by which women could achieve
social, political, and economic equality for the ultimate benefit of both
sexes.
Barbara Wolf
159. IMPACT ERA, supra note I, at 4.
160. Chaftez, The ERA and Redefinitions of Work: Toward Utopia, in IMpACT
ERA, supra note 1, at 111-12.
161. Bell, supra note 151, at 76.
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Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech Versus an
Attorney's Criticism of the Bench: A Proposal for
Parity between Lawyer's and Layperson's
Right to Free Speech
The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
stringently limits an attorney's out-of-court verbal and written criticism
of judges and courts. It purports to -do so in an effort to preserve the
public's respect and confidence in our judicial system. However, it ap-
pears from the Code and applicable case law that the attorney's right
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment has been either ig-
nored or considered inferior to his professional responsibilities to the
legal system.
This article will examine the constitutionality, under the First
Amendment, of these codified limitations, and will contrast them to the
limitations imposed by law upon a layperson's freedom of expression.
Amendments* to the Code of Professional Responsibility will also be
presented in an effort to harmonize these often conflicting rights and
limitations.
Under these amendments, an attorney's right to free speech need
not be inferior to his duties and responsibilities to his profession. Only
by allowing a lawyer to speak his mind freely can the American judicial
system ever be expected to improve. As active participants in the courts,
lawyers have the education and experience to assume a position as
critics and commentators on the performance and attitudes of judges.
i. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND ITS RESTRAINTS
The Code of Professional Responsibility serves both as an inspira-
tional guide to members of the legal profession and as a source for
disciplinary action. It is composed of three interrelated parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.'
1. The reason for including the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules in
the Code was to "forestall or answer an attack against the Disciplinary Rules on the
ground that they are arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional. . . ." Wright. The Code
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The Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms. . . . They em-
body the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and
the Disciplinary Rules are derived."' 2 The Ethical Considerations "...
represent the objectives toward which every member of the [legall pro-
fession should strive,' ' 3 and thus provide a body of principles to guide
lawyers in regulating their professional conduct. The Disciplinary Rules
are mandatory and ". . . state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."'
The Code further notes that "an enforcing agency, in applying the
Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic princi-
ples embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethi-
cal Considerations."'
This interrelation among the sections allows the Canons and Ethi-
cal Considerations to be filtered through the Disciplinary Rules and thus
serve as a basis for disciplinary action.$ Therefore, to determine the
Code's effect on a lawyer's freedom of expression, it should be consid-
ered in its totality.
For example, it is misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."' Because the lan-
guage of this Disciplinary Rule does not define the specific conduct
sought to be regulated, the following Ethical Considerations operate to
define and limit its scope.
A lawyer "should be temperate and dignified" in his dealings.8
When purporting to act on behalf of the public in seeking change, "he
should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously believes to
be in the public interest."' When commenting on judges or other adjudi-
catory officials, he should always be "certain of the merit of his com-
plaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unres-
trained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in
of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. !, 11 (1970).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement
[hereinafter cited as ABA CoDEI].
3. Id.
4. id.
5. Id.
6. See Justices of the App. Div., First Dept. v. Erdman, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301
N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S. 441 (1973), where a dissenting judge indicated that Ethical
Considerations alone could be the basis for disciplinary action.
7. ABA CODE, DR 1-102 (A)(5).
8. ABA CODE, EC 1-5.
9. ABA CODE, EC 8-4.
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our legal system."' 10 This last Ethical Consideration, in particular,
echoes the traditional fear of the Bar that criticism of the legal system
will lessen confidence in the courts, causing laypersons to resort to self-
help rather than to the judicial process.
Because of this fear, a statement by an attorney that would make
the legal system appear corrupt or incompetent, or a statement that
could be construed to reduce public confidence in the legal system, could
be subject to disciplinary action as conduct "prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice." Thus, the term "conduct," as used in Disciplinary
Rule 1-102 (A) (5),11 and as defined by the Ethical Considerations,
encompasses a broad area of speech including statements made in a
lawyer's official capacity, in his private capacity, or on behalf of the
public.
The Code explicitly recognizes that a lawyer, by virtue of his under-
standing of the law and his direct involvement with the courts, has both
a right and duty to speak out for needed change in the legal system. 12
However, this apparent recognition of an attorney's right to freedom of
expression is curbed by the restrictions of the Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules. The confusing case law, combined with the
vagueness of the Code itself, presents a lawyer with an ironic situation.
By trying to comply with the spirit of the Code and his own sense of
professional responsibility, the outspoken lawyer could find himself dis-
ciplined by the Bar and possibly expelled from the same system he was
trying to improve.
2. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RESTRAINTS
In Bradley v. Fisher,3 the United States Supreme Court first
emphasized the obligation of attorneys to adhere to high standards of
honor and propriety. This case involved an appeal from an order disbar-
ring an attorney who defended John H. Suratt in his trial for the murder
of Abraham Lincoln.
The presiding judge summarily disbarred the attorney because he
allegedly had accosted the judge in a "rude and insulting manner," and
10. ABA CODE, EC 8-6.
I1. "A lawyer shall not: Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice."
12. ABA CODE, EC 8-1. "By reason of education and experience, lawyers are
especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective
measures therein."
13. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
| 1:97
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had charged the judge with making insulting comments from the bench.
The judge further alleged that he had been threatened with personal
chastisement.'4
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, upheld the disbarment and
proceeded to state the words which, to this day, echo in disbarment
proceedings:
The obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by ex-
press declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their judicial acts."
The Court further indicated that a threat to a judge of personal
chastisement, when made by an attorney out of court, would constitute
valid grounds for disbarment."6
The Court did not, however, weigh the professional obligations of
an attorney against his First Amendment right of free speech. By failing
to do so, it established the practice of treating a lawyer's right of free
speech more strictly than that of a layman. For example, in Bradley,
the facts indicate that the communication from the lawyer to the judge
was not heard by anyone in the courtroom. 7 Therefore, if the attorney
had been a layperson, an action for slander would have been ground-
less.'8
The standards of Bradley were incorporated into the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which were adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1908."1 These Canons tend to ignore a lawyer's freedom of speech
by expressly prohibiting public criticism of judges or other lawyers in
14. Id. at 337.
15. Id. at 355.
16. Id. at 356.
17. Id. at 338.
18. Since the interest protected is that of reputation, it is essential to tort liability
for either libel or slander that the defamation be communicated to someone other than
the person defamed. Where there is no communication to anyone but the plaintiff, there
may be criminal responsibility, or a possible action for the intentional infliction of
mental suffering, but no tort action can be maintained upon the theory of defamation.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 766 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF ToRTs].
19. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 24.
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other than the "proper tribunals."' The judicial system is thus encased
in a sphere of immunity from criticism by lawyers, for the purpose of
maintaining the necessary public confidence in our courts. This imposed
silence has, for the most part, been enforced by the courts, to the detri-
ment of First Amendment rights.
Typical of the cases resulting in attorney disbarment for criticism
of judges or the judicial system are Cobb v. United States21 and
Wilhelm's Case.2 In Cobb, a letter from an attorney, published in a
newspaper, accused a "judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang which [had] paralyzed [the judge] for two years."' The court
stated that "a published communication reflecting upon the character
or integrity of a judge. . . is conduct unbecoming an attorney for which
he may be summarily disbarred. ' ' 4 There was some indication in the
opinion, however, that if the charges were proven true, no disciplinary
action would lie. This heavy burden of proof, however, was placed on
the attorney.
In Wilhelm, while a proceeding to disbar a fellow attorney was
pending, Wilhelm made an impassioned speech on behalf of his col-
league, saying that "they were trying to crucify him [and] referred to
the disbarment proceedings against [his colleague] as a conspiracy."' 3
The court, in upholding disbarment, held that the speech was intended
to incite popular feelings against the judge and interfere with a fair and
impartial consideration of the case. The court made no mention of the
attorney's right to freedom of speech, nor did it apply the clear and
present danger test,21 which is used to determine whether spoken words
20. Id. No. 29.
21. 172 F. 641 (9th Cir. 1909).
22. 269 Pa. 416, 112 A. 560 (1921).
23. 172 F. 641, 645.
24. Id. at 644.
25. 112 A. 560, 561.
26. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In Bridges, the Court
quoted language from earlier cases to the effect "that there must be a determination of
whether or not the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils."
Id. at 261. "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immin-
ence extremely high before utterances can be punished." Id. at 263. For other decisions
upholding attorney disbarment without application of the "'clear and present danger'
test," see In re Doss, 367 Ill. 570, 12 N.E.2d 659 (1937) (disbarment for critical com-
ments in newspaper stories which appeared after the trial in which the attorney and
judge were involved); In re Knight, 264 App. Div. 106, 34 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1942) (disbar-
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are protected by the First Amendment.
Some courts, in applying the Bradley standard,21 have held the First
Amendment inapplicable. Because of a lawyer's oath of admission to
the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the courts seem
to have created a double standard which distinguishes a lawyer's right
to free speech from that of a layman.2 In effect, these courts have held
that a person gives up his right to criticize the judicial system when he
becomes a lawyer. A lawyer is considered an officer of the court at all
times, and must bear his yoke of discipline in exchange for his member-
ship in the Bar.?
A case highlighting the different standards imposed on attorneys
and laypersons is In re Woodward,3 where the court, in upholding a
three-year suspension of an attorney, said:
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech. . . until he
runs afoul of the penalties of libel and slander, or into some infraction of
our statutory law. A member of the Bar can, and will, be stopped at the
point where he infringes our Canon of Ethics.'
A fairly recent case illustrating the same point is In re Raggio,32
where the district attorney of Washoe County, Nevada, criticized a
ruling of the state supreme court during a television interview.
The court held that free speech does not give a lawyer the right to
publicly denigrate the court,3 and that the statements by the district
attorney caused the court to become a center of controversy, which
resulted in the erosion of "public confidence in our system of adminis-
ment for critical comments contained in written statements circulated by an attorney
to state and Bar officials).
27. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
28. See, e.g., In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723 (1920); State Bar Com. ex rel.
Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 P. 703 (1912); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492,
89 N.E. 39 (1909).
29. See Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) for a
discussion by Judge Cardozo of the duties of an attorney as an "officer of the court."
30. 300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1957).
31. Id. at 393-94.
32. 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971). The district attorney had characterized the
court's opinion as "most shocking, certainly to this office. . . . I feel that it's an
example of judicial legislation at its worst. In my opinion, this is the most shocking and
outrageous decision in the history of the supreme court of this state. It's unexplainable,
and in my opinion totally uncalled for." Id. at 500.
33. Id.
Nova Law Journal 1:1977 1
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tering justice."u Without considering the motive behind his statements,
the court reprimanded him, saying:
We are never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the
administration of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our
work and the manner in which we perform it, and shall protect their right
to so express themselves. A member of the Bar, however, stands in differ-
ent position by reason of his oath of office and the standards of conduct
which he is so sworn to uphold. Conformity with those standards has
proven essential to the administration of justice in our courts. u
It is clear that these cases which have applied the Bradley standard
have firmly established a rule that an attorney's right to free speech is
curtailed in deference to the Bar's deeply entrenched fear that a critical
comment by a lawyer will reduce respect for the legal system."
However, In re Sawyer-" marked a turning point in the application
of the rigid Bradley standard. In Sawyer, an attorney, while defending
certain persons accused of violating the Smith Act,3' made a public
speech in which she referred to the "horrible and shocking things at
trial; the necessity, if the Government's case were to be proved, of
scrapping the rules of evidence; and the creation of new crimes unless
the trial were stopped at once."'"
The U.S. Supreme Court, in opposing her disbarment, said:
We conclude that there is no support for any further factual inference that
the petitioner was voicing strong criticism of Smith Act cases and the
Government's manner of proving them, and that her references to the
happenings at the Honolulu trial were illustrative of this, and not a reflec-
tion in any way upon Judge Wiig personally or his conduct of the trial."
34. Id.
35. Id. at 500-501. The court did not say in what way these standards has proven
essential.
36. A few cases standing alone in this area of precedent refused to let the Bradley
standard infringe on a lawyer's constitutional rights. See, e.g., In re Hickey, 149 Tenn.
344, 258 S.W. 417 (1924); State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Circuit Ct., 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W.
193 (1897).
37. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1950). The Smith Act makes it unlawful for any person to
advocate the overthrow of any government of the United States by force or violence or
the organization of any group for that purpose.
39. 360 U.S. 622, 630.
40. Id. at 628.
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Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, further stated: "We can
conceive no ground whereby the pendency of litigation might be thought
to make an attorney's out-of-court remarks more censurable, other than
that they might tend to obstruct the administration of justice,'", and
added that ". . . lawyers are free to criticize the state of law." 2
This case illustrated three different judicial opinions about review
of an attorney's freedom of speech. Both Justice Brennan's and Justice
Frankfurter's tests were conspicuously liberal in comparison to Stew-
art's adherence to the traditional Bradley standard. 3 Both would allow
criticism of the legal system. Justice Brennan would look to the effect
of the speech and restrict it only if it tended to interfere with the admin-
istration of justice. Justice Frankfurter would examine the motives be-
hind the speech and restrict only those speakers who attempt to preju-
dice a pending case. It is significant that eight Supreme Court Justices
indicated that a lawyer can criticize the legal system, and thus refused
to accept the traditional Bradley standard. Although Sawyer did not
authoritatively determine the extent of an attorney's protection from
imposition of discipline by the Bar,44 several courts have expanded con-
stitutional protection for an attorney's speech.
For example, Justice Brennan's test was applied in Polk v. State
Bar of Texas,15 where a lawyer, who was also a defendant in a criminal
action, sought to enjoin the State Bar of Texas from issuing a public
reprimand. The state court had found that a press release by the defen-
dant, criticizing the judge and prosecutor, was in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The press release stated: "I consider this
41. Id. at 636.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Stewart, J., in his concurring opinion, asserted the traditional standard for-
mulated in Bradley that an attorney must conform to ". . . inherited standards of
propriety and honor" as a condition to his right to practice law. He joined the majority
only because he felt there were not enough facts to warrant discipline under Bradley.
Id. at 646, 647.
Frankfurter, J., in his dissent, recognized the right of lawyers to criticize the courts.
"Indeed, they are under a special responsibility to exercise fearlessness in doing so," he
said. His opinion stated, however, that a court must balance an attorney's freedom of
speech against the need for high standards in the legal profession and that conduct of
the kind found in Sawyer could not be deemed to be protected by the Constitution. Id.
at 668-69.
44. See State Bar v. Semann, 508 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
45. 374 F. Supp. 784 (1974).
46. Polk was able to attack the decision on First Amendment grounds in federal
court, since that issue had never been raised in the state court. Id. at 787.
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one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical district attor-
ney and a perverse judge to assure me an unfair trial. 47 Polk alleged
that a public reprimand would violate his right to free speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that since he acted in his capac-
ity as a private citizen and not as an attorney, the state had no legitimate
interest in regulating his speech. The Federal District Court reversed
and stated:
It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders his right
to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed attorney in this state
... .[OInly in those instances where misconduct threatens a significant
state interest can a state restrict an attorney's exercise of his rights under
the Constitution.
Because there was no showing by the State Bar that Polk's statements
interfered with the orderly administration of justice, the court held that
"the state [had] no more interest to punish Polk for his conduct as a
private citizen than it [did] to punish a mechanic, businessman or other
nonlawyers for the same conduct."" If a reprimand were to be issued
here, the court said, it would have a chilling effect on any future speech
47. Id. at 786.
48. Id. at 787. The court defined two instances when the State would have the
requisite significant interest. The first was where an attorney's conduct "shows his
inability to represent clients competently and honestly," and second, where his conduct
"interferes with the process of the administration of justice, such as bribery of jurors,
subornation of perjury, misrepresentations to a court or any other conduct which under-
mines the legitimacy of the judicial process." Unless the lawyer's conduct clearly falls
into one of these two categories, "a state may not regulate an attorney's exercise of his
right to free speech under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct." Id. at 788.
49. Id. The court also rejected
the contention. . . that in order to maintain the general esteem of the public in
the legal profession both professional and non-professional conduct of an attorney
in all matters must be above and beyond that conduct of non lawyers. While this
elitist conception may be applicable in non-First Amendment circumstances, the
interest of the State in maintaining the public esteem of the legal profession does
not rationally justify disciplinary action for speech which is protected and is
outside the scope of an attorney's professional and official conduct. Where the
protection of the Constitution conflicts with the efficiency of a system to ensure
professional conduct, it is the Constitution that must prevail and the system that
must be modified to conform.
Id. See also Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668 (1858), where an attorney's abusive criticism
of a judge was held not to be misconduct, since it was made outside the scope of his
official conduct as an attorney.
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protected under the First Amendment ° Polk is significant in its com-
plete rejection not only of the Bradley standard, but also of the tradi-
tional fear that critical comment would harm the legal system.
A case equating a lawyer's right to free speech to that of a layman's
is State Bar v. Semann,5 which indicated that an attorney's out-of-court
statements about public officials, including judges, were subject to the
libel siandard of New York Times v. Sullivan.12
Semann involved a consolidation of two appeals which grew out of
the same set of facts. In response to a newspaper editorial criticizing a
district judge, Semann wrote a letter to the editor in which he expressed
his agreement with the editorial and compared the judge unfavorably
with three other criminal court judges, saying: "Standing beside these
men [the judge] is a midget among giants."53 Another attorney wrote
a letter in reply, highly praising the judge and saying that Semann's
criticism of him was based on the fact that, when the judge was an
assistant district attorney, he "had fought Mr. Semann. . .toe-to-toe
and blow-by-blow . . . in the courtroom. 'M Semann replied to this
letter with still another published letter in which he first belittled hig
adversary as an attorney, and then denied the statement regarding his
motive for criticizing the judge. The Grievance Committee found that
the three letters violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A)(5)51 and Discipli-
nary Rule 2-101(A)m of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
ordered formal reprimandsY
The court set aside both formal reprimands, and said:
It is recognized that persons who make derogatory statements about
public officials, including judges, are protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution from imposition
of civil and criminal liability, unless the statement is made with knowl-
50. 374 F. Supp. 784, 788-89. See also Justices of App. Div., First Dept. v.
Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S. 441 (1973), where the court
avoided making a constitutional ruling, but nevertheless reversed an order to censure
for an attorney's critical comments which appeared in Life magazine.
51. 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. 508 S.W.2d 429, 431.
54. Id.
55. See note II, supra.
56. "A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use or participate in the
use of any form of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory
statements calculated to attract lay clients."
57. 508 S.W.2d 429, 431.
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edge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.
Such protection . . extends on the same terms to lawyers, at least for
utterances made outside the course of judicial proceedings."
The court could find nothing in the Code specifically relating to
criticism of fellow attorneys but recognized that such action, when con-
ducted in a public forum, could, in extreme situations, be prejudicial to
the administration of justice. "However it cannot be said that isolated
incidents of the nature contained in [the last two letters] raise a fact issue
of professional misconduct as prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 1-102."1
These cases indicate the confusing situation confronting an attor-
ney. Urged by the Code to participate in improving the legal system,"
he faces the possibility of imposition of discipline because of that same
Code's concentration on the maintenance of respect for the legal sys-
tem."1 Although the First Amendment recognizes an attorney's right to
free speech, conduct that could reduce respect for the legal system can
still be punished, as it was under Bradley, as "conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice."' 2 This confusion is compounded by
courts' tendencies to hold lawyers' expressions to a higher standard of
propriety than that of a layperson.
3. RESTRAINTS ON LAYPERSONS
A. Contempt Powers
Paralleling the cases in which disciplinary action was taken against
lawyers for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice are cases
in which contempt powers of the court were used to punish laypersons
for interference with the administration of justice. The standard of con-
stitutional protection of the layperson's speech, however, compared with
that of a lawyer's, is much greater.
An important case which dealt with a layperson's freedom of
speech was Bridges v. California." In that case, a union official caused
the publication of a telegram that was sent to the Secretary of Labor.
58. Id. at 432-33.
59. Id. at 433.
60. ABA CODE, EC 8-1, 8-2.
61. ABA CODE, Preamble, EC 1-5, 8-6.
62. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5).
63. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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The telegram stated the union's intention not to allow the state courts
to override the majority vote of the union in choosing its officers and
representatives. The Court, in reversing the contempt conviction, held
that contempt sanctions for out-of-court publications were to be gov-
erned by the "clear and present danger" standard. Under this standard,
sanctions can be imposed if the substantive evil of the speech is ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. 4
There is also language in one Supreme Court case, Craig v.
Harney,5 expressing the position that judges may not invoke their con-
tempt powers merely to shelter themselves from criticism. In that case,
a newspaper editor had been held in contempt for news reports and
editorials which criticized the judge's handling of a private law suit. The
editorial called the judge's behavior "high handed" and a "travesty on
justice." Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated: "The law of con-
tempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to
the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude
able to thrive in a hearty climate."6
In Wood v. Georgia,67 the Court applied the "clear and present
danger" test in determining whether a judge could hold the local sheriff
in contempt for having "issued to the local press a written statement"
critical of the judge's political motives and his handling of the local
grand jury.6"
In reversing the contempt conviction, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
said:
Men are entitled to speak as they please on matters vital to them; errors
in judgment or substantiated opinions may be exposed, of course, but not
through punishment for contempt for the expression. . . Hence, in the
absence of some other showing of a substantive evil actually designed to
impede the course of justice in justification of the exercise of the contempt
64. Id. at 263. See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), where the
Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger standard and reversed a contempt
citation against a newspaper editor for his critical editorials and cartoons aimed at local
judges.
65. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
66. Id. at 376.
67. 370. U.S. 375 (1962).
68. The judge had given special instructions to the grand jury to investigate
charges of election law violations in the county. He was also accused of racial prejudice,
since the investigation was to concentrate on the phenomenon of negro block voting.
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power to silence the, petitioner, his utterances are entitled to be
[constitutionally] protected."
The above cases indicate that the clear and present danger standard
protects a layperson's out-of-court conduct against the imposition of
contempt penalties unless it is shown to pose an imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Thus, without more, comments concerning a
judge's fitness or actions taken in his official capacity would seem to
be protected under the First Amendment. If this type of conduct by a
layman does not pose a danger to the administration of justice, then, a
fortiori, the same conduct by a lawyer should be protected by the First
Amendment.
B. Libel and Slander
In addition to the contempt powers of the court, a layperson's right
to speak freely is also subject to a possible suit for libel or slander.
However, a public official such as a judge would probably have a diffi-
cult time sustaining such an action against a layperson because of the
lenient test imposed by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan.0 In Sullivan, the Court created a constitutional privilege for
statements concerning the official conduct of a public official. For dam-
ages to be awarded, the defamation must have been made with "actual
malice." That is, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant knew
the statement was false at the time it was made, or that the statement
was made with reckless disregard of the truth." The term public official
refers to "those among the hierarchy of government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.""
In Gertz v. Welch,7 3 the New York Times rule was extended to
69. 370 U.S. 375,389 (emphasis added). Looking at the record in light of the clear
and present danger test, the Court said: "[In the absence of any showing of an actual
interference with the undertakings of the grand jury, this record lacks persuasion in
illustrating the serious degree of harm to the administration of law necessary to justify
exercise of the contempt power." Id. at 393 (emphasis added). The Court also rejected
the argument that because the petitioner was a sheriff, he owed a special duty and
responsibility to the court and its judges, and that therefore his right to freedom of
expression must be more severely curtailed than that of a private person. Id. at 394.
70. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. See LAW OF TORTS, 821.
72. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
73. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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include statements concerning public figures. A person is deemed a
"public figure" if he achieves general fame or notoriety for a limited
range of issues into which he has voluntarily or involuntarily become
involved.74 A judge appointed to the bench would thus be a public figure,
and an elected judge would be a public official. In both cases, critical
comment by a layperson of a judge's official conduct would seem to be
constitutionally protected so long as it was not made with actual malice.
Recognizing that this liberal standard is not applied in Bar discipli-
nary proceedings against attorneys, it is necessary to determine if the
stricter standard applicable to attorneys is justified. The Bar appears to
base its regulatory interest upon the fear that critical comment will
reduce public confidence in the legal system and respect for the law,
thereby interfering with the administration of justice. To determine if
there is a need for this higher standard, it is necessary to explore
whether, in actuality, this fear is justified.
4. MAINTAINING RESPECT FOR THE
LEGAL SYSTEM
Mr. Justice Black, in Bridges v. California,75 stated:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be 'won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongfully appraises the character of the
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resent-
ment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance re-
spect.7
The framers of the Constitution envisioned the First Amendment
as a means of promoting robust debate in a free market place of ideas.
That Amendment has also been held to protect statements made outside
the courtroom unless the statements constituted a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice.1
74. See LAW OF TORTS, 823.
75. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
76. Id. at 270-71.
77. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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Another consideration weighed heavily by the framers and the Su-
preme Court is the need of the public for information about certain
areas of public concern. The Court, in Sullivan, held that speech critical
of a public official's conduct would be protected under the First Amend-
ment unless the statement was shown to have been made with "actual
malice." Neither factual error nor injury to official reputation suffices
to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct. 8
The Court in Sullivan also talked about the chilling effect of requir-
ing someone to prove the truth of his statement, or face liability for it."
This situation closely parallels the requirements of Ethical Considera-
tion 8-6 that a lawyer be certain of the merit of his complaint. The
difficulty of proving the "certainty" of his complaint exerts a "chilling
effect" upon an attorney's enjoymentof his constitutional rights.8 In
addition, this requirement disregards the need for constructive criticism
of judges, especially where that judge is an elected official, and the need
to point out deficiencies and suggest needed improvements in the sys-
tem. This chilling effect is especially pronounced when the attorney's
statement is general, and the truth of that statement is, by its very
nature, hard to prove.
For an attorney to suffer additional restraints on his First Amend-
ment rights, the courts should require a showing of a clear and present
danger that his speech will hinder and obstruct the administration of
justice. As an attorney, his statements are presumed to interfere with
the administration of justice. The Code seems to base its regulation of
an attorney's out-of-court speech on an irrebuttable presumption that
the speech will interfere with the administration of justice. This fact is
not necessarily and universally true. It is the content of the speech, and
not the occupation of the speaker, that should determine the danger to
the legal system. If this distinction is noted, it becomes evident that this
presumption has no basis in fact. An attorney, by virtue of his under-
standing of the law and his direct involvement with the courts, is best
able to articulate those areas of the system needing improvements. A
statement made by an attorney should carry no more weight than the
same statement uttered by a mayor, governor, or senator, and should
78. 376 U.S. 254, 279-83.
79. Id. at 279.
80. See, e.g., Okla. Bar Assoc. v. Grimes, 436 P.2d 40 (1967), where the disbar-
ment of an attorney for accusing justices of a state court of accepting bribes was ordered
withdrawn when, after the disbarment, some members of the court were found to have
been guilty of corruption.
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not be any more restricted. Statements by an attorney, critical of the
legal system, do not present a clear and present danger to the adminis-
tration of justice. The injury to the legal system that the traditional fear
embodies has no basis in fact.
5. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE CODE
Recognizing this unequal treatment of lawyers, the American Bar
Association should take steps to assure that a lawyer's criticism of his
profession can be more compatible with his First Amendment rights.
The Bar should recognize that this lack of constitutional protection
exerts a chilling effect on a lawyer's free speech, since an expensive and
lengthy appeal must be taken before any infringed rights can be vindi-
cated. Therefore, the Code should be amended in light of the First
Amendment. This would remove the chilling effect that exists under the
present Code.
Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended)
A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT IS
LIKELY TO PRESENT A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A PENDING CASE.81
This Disciplinary Rule, by virtue of the.amendment to Ethical
Consideration 8-6 (below), would not apply to speech by an attorney,
spoken as a private citizen, unless that speech can be shown to present
a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.
The addition of the words "in a pending case" would restrict an
attorney's statements made in his legal capacity to those instances where
a case has not been concluded and there is a danger that comments
could di&t6fly prejudice the trial. The word "pending" here refers to a
case that has not reached a final judgment and would include cases
pending on appeal.
Ethical Consideration 8-6 (amended)
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves,
are entitled to receive support of the Bar against unjust criticism. Where
a lawyer is speaking in his official capacity, or on behalf of a client, he
should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate lan-
81. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A)(5) now reads: "A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
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guage, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate
statements, in this capacity motivated by reasons other than a desire to
improve the legal system, are not justified. A lawyer, as a private citizen,
has the right to criticize such officials publicly. His statements in this
capacity are constitutionally protected unless it is shown that the state-
ments present a clear and present danger to the administration of jus-
tice. Because the lawyer's capacity will be determined from the circum-
stances of his conduct, he should make clear in what capacity he
speaks.2
This amendment reflects the necessity of a lawyer, when speaking
in his official capacity, to consider carefully the merits of his complaint
because, in this capacity, his statements could have a disproportionate
effect on the administration of justice.
Where a lawyer is speaking as a private citizen, the state has a
greatly diminished interest in regulating his speech. A lawyer is speaking
as a private citizen when he is not speaking on behalf of a client or as
attorney of record, and he is stating his own opinion or an opinion he
personally shares with a segment of the public.
The above amendments should have the effect of splitting the Disci-
plinary Rules applicable to a lawyer's speech. Disciplinary Rule 1-102
(A) (5) (amended) would apply to speech by an attorney in his official
capacity. Disciplinary Rule 8-102 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact
concerning the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment
to a judicial office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against
a judge or other adjudicatory officer.
This rule would apply to an attorney's speech as a private citizen
and would hold him to the same standard as a layperson. In a grievance
committee hearing it would thus be necessary for the Bar first to deter-
mine in what capacity the attorney's comments were made. If the com-
mittee found that the statement was made in the capacity of a private
citizen, the Bar could discipline the Attorney under Disciplinary Rule
82. Ethical Consideration 8-6 now reads:
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves are entitled to
receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism. While a lawyer as a citizen
has a right to criticize such officials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of
his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for
unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our
legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the
legal system are not justified.
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8-102 only if it were shown that the attorney made the statement with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. The
burden of proving this would be placed on the Bar rather than on the
attorney. If the Bar determined that the conduct of the attorney was
directed toward producing imminent lawness action, and was likely to
incite or produce such action, disciplinary action would be proper under
Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended).
6. APPLICATION
Wilhelm's Case,3 where the attorney made an impassioned speech
on behalf of his colleague who was the subject of a disbarment proceed-
ing, provides an interesting example of how the Bar would have to
proceed under these amended rules. Under these new standards, the Bar
would first have to determine in what capacity the speech was made.
Here, because the speech was made to a public gathering and not in a
courtroom or other judicial assembly, and because Wilhelm was
speaking on his own behalf, the statement would be classified as coming
from a private citizen. For action to lie under Disciplinary Rule 8-102,
the burden of proof would then be on the Bar to show that he knew the
statements were false when he made them. However, since the case was
pending at the time the speech was made, if the Bar could show that
the speech was likely to incite or product imminent lawless action,
discipline would lie under Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended.).
In Polk v. State Bar of Texas," Polk's statement in his press release
was made about a pending case in which he was the defendant. It
therefore could only have been made in his capacity as a private citizen.
To apply the standard of Disciplinary Rule 8-102, the Bar would have
to show that Polk knew his statement to be false at the time he made
it. Since Polk was commenting on the way his own case was progressing,
it is doubtful that knowledge of its falsity could be shown. Nor would
discipline succeed under Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (5) (amended),
since the opinion of the case clearly indicates that the Bar did not show
that Polk's statement interfered with the administration of justice. Thus,
the application of the standard suggested here would preclude discipli-
nary action on the grievance committee level, and would remove the
chilling effect of the unamended rules, since no appeal would have to
be taken for the attorney's First Amendment rights to be considered.
Chet Zerlin
83. 269 Pa. 416, 112 A. 560 (1921).
84. 374 F. Supp. 784 (1974).
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Constitutional Law: The State Cannot Require
Spousal or Parental Consent for Abortions during the
First Trimester of Pregnancy: Planned Parenthood
of Missouri v. Danforth
Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all licensed physicians
performing abortions or wishing to perform abortions, and on behalf of
their patients desiring the termination of pregnancy,' to have declared
unconstitutional House Bill 1211 of the Missouri General Assembly,2
and seeking an injunction against its enforcement.
Plaintiffs challenged Section 3(2), s which required the patient,
prior to submitting to an abortion during the first trimester (twelve
weeks) of pregnancy, to certify in writing her free and informed consent
to the operation;' Section 3(3),5 which required, during the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy, the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the
abortion was deemed necessary by a licensed physician to preserve the
life of the mother;$ and Section 3(4),J which required written consent of
one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if she was unmarried
and under eighteen, unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physi-
cian as necessary to preserve the life of the mother.8 A three-judge
1. 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
2. H.R. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified as Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010 et seq.; 188.015; 188.020; 188.035; 188.050; 188.060 (1974).
3. Id. § 3 (2). Later codified as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (2) (1974).
4. 96 S.Ct. at 2836.
5. § 3(3) H.B. No. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified
as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(3) (1974).
6. 96 S.Ct. at 2836.
7. § 3(4) H.B. No. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified
as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(4).
8. 96 S.Ct. at 2836. Although not relevant to the point of this article, plaintiffs
also challenged Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.015(2) (1974), defining viability; § 188.035(l),
requiring physicians to exercise reasonable care to protect the fetus' life and health; §§
188.010 et seq., § 188.040, declaring an infant who survives an abortion, which was not
performed to preserve the health of the mother, a ward of the state; § 188.050, prohibit-
ing saline amniocentesis as deleterious to maternal health; §§ 188.050, 188.060, estab-
lishing record-keeping requirements to preserve maternal health. Plaintiffs attacked
these provisions on the grounds (among others) that they violated "the right to privacy
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federal district court9 upheld the statute'0 and denied injunctive relief
against its enforcement." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court 12
reversed, 3 and HELD, the State may not require the consent of a
spouse or parent"5 as a condition to an abortion during the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy.
Historically, one of the earliest cases establishing one's right to
privacy of his physical being was Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford.'" There it was noted by the Court:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."7
The Court termed this the right "to be let alone."'"
In early fundamental rights cases, the courts applied the "rational
in the physician-patient relationship"; the female patient's right to determine whether
to bear children; the physician's right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment by requiring him to make decisions "beset. . . with inherent possibilities
of bias and conflict of interest."
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides for a three-judge district court to determine
questions of the constitutionality of state statutes where, as here, a permanent injunction
restraining the operation of such a statute is sought.
10. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
1I. However, the court did find the first sentence of Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035(l)
(1974) unconstitutional because it failed to exclude the stage of pregnancy prior to
viability, and as such was overbroad. Id. at 1371.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
the order of a three-judge panel in a federal district court.
13. The Supreme Court upheld § 188.015(2), defining viability, 96 S.Ct. at 2838.
The Court also upheld § 188.020(2), requiring free and informed consent by the patient,
id. at 2840; § 188.050, 188.060, pertaining to making and keeping of records of all
abortions performed, id. at 2847. The Supreme Court declared § 188.050, proscribing
saline amniocentesis as a method of abortion, unconstitutional as an "unreasonable or
arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit. . . the vast majority of abortions after the first
twelve weeks." Id. at 2845.
14. Id. at 2842 (White, J., Berger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2844 (White, J., Berger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In this case, the Court upheld the refusal to require Mrs.
Botsford to submit to surgical diagnosis as a result of her suit for personal injuries
against the Union Pacific Railway for damage sustained when an upper berth in a
sleeping car fell on her head.
17. Id. at 251.
18. Id.
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relationship test"" as the standard to determine whether exercises of
state police powers were proper. Under this test, the states were allowed
broad discretion in exercising their police power, but were required to
maintain a reasonable connection between a statute's effect and a state's
interest in restricting rights of its citizens. 2
More recent fundamental rights cases have held that a compelling
governmental interest is required where the state seeks to restrict an
individual's fundamental rights.2' In addition to the enumerated rights,
such as the right of free speech, the right to a jury trial, and the right
of freedom from self-incrimination, the Supreme Court, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 established that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
19. See Comment, Equal Protection of the Laws: Education Is Not a Fundamen-
tal Right, 26 U. FLA. L. R. 155 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Education Is Not a
Fundamental Right). See also Constitutional Law-Abortion Parental and Spousal
Consent Requirements Violate Right to Privacy in Abortion Decision, 24 KAN. L. REv.
446, note 17 at 448 (1976).
20. Id. An example of the rational relationship test arose in the 1923 Supreme
Court case Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In this case, a man was convicted
for violating a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any subject in any language
other than English, and the teaching of any foreign language to any student before the
eighth grade. In overturning the conviction, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting:
Without doubt it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract. . . to marry, establish a home and bring up
children and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . .The established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect (emphasis
added). Id.
21. "It is basic that no showing merely of a reasonable relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only
the gravest abuses endangering paramount interest give occasion for permissible limita-
tion." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945). See Education is Not a Fundamental Right, note 19 supra, citing Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) as the first case to distinguish between strict judicial
scrutiny and a "reasonable relationship" standard.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, appellants gave information, instruction,
and medical advice to a married couple for the prevention of conception. Upon exami-
nation, appellant prescribed, to the wife, the best means suited to her. As a result,
appellant was arrested and convicted for violating a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
use of, or assisting in the use of, any drug or device to prevent conception. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and found the statute to be unconstitutional as a violation
of the right of privacy. Id. at 485.
Planned Parenthood v. Dan forth 103 11 : 19 77
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give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy." 23 In Griswold, appellant, a licensed physician, was convicted for
giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons
concerning the means of preventing conception .2 The Court reversed
the conviction and established the right to privacy as fundamental, not-
ing that it was "no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."'
Faced with the question of the right to an abortion, the Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade .2 established that a woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy lies within the "zone of privacy," and as a result,
regulation of abortions must be narrowly drafted to express only legiti-
mate state interests.? While Roe v. Wade established the right to an
abortion as fundamental, it was silent as to whether requirements of
spousal or parental consent were within the scope of compelling state
interests.'
These questions were first answered by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Poe v. Gerstein,"° wherein the court was faced with the
question of the constitutionality of a Florida statute3' requiring paren-
tal consent for a minor to obtain an abortion and spousal consent for a
married woman to obtain an abortion. The court acknowledged that a
state has broader authority over children's activities than over the simi-
lar activities of adults.32 However, the court found fundamental privacy
rights established under Roe to apply also to minors, and found the
interests set forth by the state in Poe insufficient to establish a compel-
23. Id. at 484.
24. Id. at 480.
25. Id. at 485.
26. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id. at 155.
29. Id. at 165 note 67.
30. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. § 458.22(3), FLA. STAT. (1975). This statute provides in part: "One of the
following shall be obtained by the physician prior to terminating a pregnancy: (a) [I1f
she [the pregnant woman] is married, the written consent of her husband unless the
husband is voluntarily living apart from the wife, or (b) If the pregnant woman is under
18 years of age and unmarried, in addition to her written request, the written consent
of the custodian or legal guardian must be obtained."
32. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975). The court cited as an example
"the power of state to prohibit children from viewing material to which an adult would
have a constitutional right." Id. citing Mckeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
33. Id. at 791.
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ling state interest in requiring parental consent.? As a result, the court
found the statute unconstitutional."
The court, in Poe, also struck down a portion of the statute which
inquired consent of the spouse for a married woman to obtain an abor-
tion.3 The court held the state's interest in protecting the rights of the
husband,7 or in maintaining the stability of society, s insufficient in
light of the fundamental rights of the woman.
The present case was the first opportunity3 for the Supreme Court
to resolve the issue concerning the legitimacy of state interests in requir-
ing consent, either spousal or parental4° While the Court did not specifi-
cally say that the state's interests in protecting the husband's rights were
not legitimate, it did find that these interests were not sufficiently
"compelling" to warrant restriction of the woman's fundamental per-
sonal right of privacy. 1
The Court noted its awareness of the "deep and proper concern and
interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife's preg-
nancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying.'
2
However, the Court expressed the opinion that the strength of a mar-
riage or family will not be benefited by providing the husband the power
of ultimate decision over his wife's actions with regard to abortions. 3
Balancing the interests of the wife and husband, the Supreme Court held
that the wife's interest is greater, noting: "Since it is the woman who
physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in
her favor."" Since the rights of the state are not sufficient to merit
34. Id. at 792-94. The interests deemed as sufficient by the state to justify restrict-
ing the minor's right were: preventing illicit sexual conduct among minors; protecting
minors from their own improvidence; fostering parental control; and supporting the
family as a social unit.
35. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. § 458.22(3)(a) FLA. STAT. (1975).
37. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
38. Id.
39. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
40. The issue was a very real one in light of the fact that Poe v. Gerstein had held
Florida's consent requirements invalid, while the three-judge district court upheld those
of Missouri in the instant case. See text accompanying notes 6 and 7 supra.
41. 96 S.Ct. at 2842.
42. Id. at 2841.
43. Id. at 2842. "It seems manifest that ideally, the decision to terminate a
pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the wife and her husband."
44. id.
1 :1977
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unreasonable restrictions of the woman's privacy, at least in the first
trimester, the Court held that the state could not give authority to the
husband which the state itself did not have."5
The Supreme Court, by its decision in the present case, affirms the
conclusion reached by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Poe v. Gerstein." In Poe, the court discussed various interests
which the father may have in the fetus, and analyzed these rights as they
exist throughout the term of the pregnancy. The court also analyzed a
state's interest in protecting the father's rights." By citing Griswold v.
Connecticut," the Fifth Circuit disposed of the state's assertion of an
interest in the stability of society ahd the well-being of its citizens and
concluded that no case has "sanctioned state determination of intrafam-
ilial decision making process with regard to child bearing decisions."',
While the Court refused to sanction state interference with family
decisions, it did hold the state's interest in protecting the husband's
rights regarding the fetus to be more substantial, noting that his interest
"would most logically emanate from his paternity of the fetus, and thus
appear analytically as a precursor of the father's relational interest in
his child."5 ' O The Court noted, however, that "since a fetus is not a
person," as established in Roe v. Wade," "neither is it a child." 52 The
logic of paternal interest was further weakened by the fact that the
statute did not require the husband to be the father of the potential child
in order to give him the power of consent1
The findings by the district court in the present case are contradic-
tory to those of the Fifth Circuit in Poe." While the court did not
directly address the issue of paternal rights, the court did analyze the
state's interest in protecting the marriage and familial relationship. The
45. Id.
46. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794-96 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 795. The Court noted two interests which the father might have that
would be endangered by his wife's abortion. First, an interest in the fetus with which
his wife is currently pregnant; and, secondly, an interest in the procreation protential
of the marriage.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. Id.
51. 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973).
52. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 796.
54. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
However, Webster, J., in the dissent find' agreement with Poe and supports its conclu-
sions. Id. at 1374.
• o mm .
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district court held that the only state interests involved in Roe" were
the protection of maternal health and the protection of the fetus.5 '
In upholding the Missouri consent statutes, the district court relied
on a series of cases which regard marriage as an institution, 7 and estab-
lish the right of procreation as fundamental to a marriage." The court
stated: "The interest of the state in protecting the mutuality of decisions
vital to the marriage relationship is compelling at all times during the
marriage."5'
As noted previously, 0 the Supreme Court in the instant case was
in accord with the reasoning of Poe.61 However, the Court did not find
the spouse to be without an interest in the abortion decision. The Court
simply found that any interest of the spouse was not sufficiently compel-
ling for the state to restrict the woman's right to privacy.12 The Court
noted that the decision to have an abortion should be made jointly by
the husband and wife, noting: "No marriage may be viewed as harmoni-
ous or successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on
so important and vital an issue."5 ' While supporting a mutual decision
by the parties, the Court concluded that this mutuality would not be
enhanced "by giving the husband a vjeto power exercisable for any rea-
son, or for no reason at all."" When disagreement exists it should be
the woman who determines the outcome, since she physically bears the
burden of carrying the child."5
The decision reached in the present case resolves but a few of the
many questions arising from the abortion issue. For instance, how
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Mo.
1975).
57. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878), finding marriage to
be a social contract usually regulated by law, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. Maynard v. Hill, 135 U.S. 190 (1888), noting marriage as creating the
most important relation in life, and as having always been subject to the control of the
legislature.
58. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), holding procreation to be a
fundamental aspect of marriage.
59. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362,1370 (E.D. Mo.
1975).
60. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
61. 96 S.Ct. 2831.
62. Id. at 2842.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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broadly does the right of privacy extend in preventing the necessity of
parental consent for medical treatment requested by a minor? Florida
Attorney General Robert Shevin has pointed out that the instant deci-
sion is "limited strictly to abortions and only because of the right of
privacy issue . . . you can't say that in terms of an operation or any
other surgical procedure."" Still, consent provisions appear valid for
some operations.
While it is clear that the present decision is based on the private
nature of abortion, it would seem illogical to assume that control over
certain parts of the body is within the realm of the right of privacy while
control over other parts, such as the ears, face, or even the genitals, 8 is
not.
A second issue arising is that, in being provided the right to obtain
an abortion without spousal consent, the wife now has the ability to
determine whether procreation will take place within the marriage. In
a discussion of Doe v. Doe"' it was noted that "the assertion of a legal
right by the wife, by obtaining an abortion may establish new ground
for divorce."70 If the denial of procreation were not allowed as the basis
for a divorce action, then assertion of the wife's right would control any
potential right of procreation which the husband might have, since adul-
tery generally is illegal" and socially disfavored.
A third result of the present decision is the potential power of
extortion given to a pregnant woman. If an unmarried woman becomes
pregnant, for example, she has the option of giving birth to the child
and forcing the father to provide for its support or of having an abortion
and freeing the father from any obligation to support. To extend this a
step further, the woman could bargain with the father for a certain sum
as consideration for her undergoing an abortion. Since the
"compensation" would be hers, with no cost of maintaining the child
66. Miami Herald, July 16, 1976, Sec. AA at 1.
67. Id. For example, a person under eighteen years of age who chooses to have
his or her ears pierced must produce a consent form signed by his or her parent.
68. Id. The article points out that sterilization of a boy or girl under eighteen still
requires the consent of a parent.
69. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E. 2d 128 (1974).
70. Comment II NEw ENGLAND L. REV., 205, 222 (1975). This proposition is
based on the notion that procreation is fundamental to marriage.
71. Id. at 222. See § 798.01 FLA. STAT. (1975), and § 798.03 FLA. STAT. (1975),
proscribing adultery.
72. Id.
- - o
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(since there would not be a birth, and the father could pay a large
amount and still not incur the expense of supporting a child for the
period of minority), this could become a lucrative proposition on the
part of the mother. This "bartering" for an abortion would enable
potential parents to circumvent the holding in Shinall v. Pergeorelis,73
that "a release executed by a mother is invalid to the extent that it
purports to affect the rights of the child."7 This enables the mother to
bargain away any rights the fetus might have if it were to become a
child.
To carry the implication of the present case to a logical extreme,
it might be argued that since the choice of bringing the child into the
world is ultimately that of the mother, she should bear full responsibility
for, and have full control over, the child. This argument could be made
in the following manner: The decision of Roe held that a fetus is not a
person during the first trimester of pregnancy. As a result, the woman
has total determinative power over whether the fetus becomes a child. 75
Since the father only helped to set in motion the biological functions
which created the fetus, his responsibility (and liability) should extend
only that far. He should be responsible only for damages incurred be-
cause of his actions up to and including the abortion. Any decision to
proceed beyond the fetal stage of pregnancy is that of the mother, and
she should therefore accept responsibility for the birth of the child and
its support.
Four basic problem areas have been presented which result from
the decisions reached by the Court in Planned Parenthood: the scope
of the consent requirement for minors; the power of the wife to deter-
mine the occurrence of procreation in the marriage; the potential extor-
tionary power given to the pregnant woman; and the argument for the
mother's liability for a child after the first trimester of pregnancy. These
four areas illustrate some of the critical issues to be dealt with in the
73. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So.2d 431 (Fla. lit DCA 1975). In this case, a
single woman who had become pregnant initiated an action against the putative father.
As a result of pre-trial negotiations, the mother executed a release to the putative father,
in return for $500 and a signed admission that the child was the father's. Soon thereafter,
the mother again instituted paternity proceedings against the father. The court held that
the release was invalid on the principle that an illegitimate child's right to support from
its putative father cannot be contracted away by its mother.
74. Id. at 433, citing Walker v. Walker, 266 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
75. Based on the present holding that the abortion decision is ultimately that of
the mother. 96 S.Ct. 2381.
! !
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complex framework of abortion. The burden is now placed on the indi-
vidual states to provide the constitutional protection to which the
mother is entitled, as well as protection for the potential father and
child.
David F. Holmes
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1:1977 CASE COMMENT III I
Freedom of Religion: State Aid to Religiously Affiliated
College Can Co-Exist with the First Amendment's
Establishment of Religion Clause: Roemer v. Board
of Public Works of Maryland
Plaintiffs, four individual Maryland citizens and taxpayers, brought this
action challenging the constitutionality of a Maryland statute, granting
general state aid to private institutions of higher learning. Because the
defendants who received aid were religious colleges,2 plaintiffs alleged
that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution3 by fostering government sup-
I. MD. EDuc. CODE ANN., art. 77A, § 65-69 (1975) authorizes the payment of
state funds to any private institution of higher learning that meets certain minimum
criteria, and refrains from awarding "only seminarian or theological degrees." The aid
is in the form of an annual fiscal year subsidy to qualifying colleges and universities,
based upon the number of students, excluding those in seminarian or theological aca-
demic programs. The grants are not disbursed for any particular purpose, but, under a
provision added in 1972 ( 68-A), they cannot be used for "sectarian purposes." The
program is administered by the Maryland Council for Higher Education, which assures
that recipient institutions (1) do not award primarily theological or seminary degrees,
and (2) do not use the funds for "sectarian purposes." At the end of the year, the
recipient institution must make a report and separately specify the nonsectarian expend-
itures.
2. In addition to the responsible state officials, plaintiffs-appellants joined as
defendants five colleges they claimed were constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid.
Four were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, and one with the Methodist
Church. The Methodist affiliate, however, was dismissed as a defendant-appellee, and
the Supreme Court dealt only with the four Roman Catholic affiliates. Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 2343-44 (1976).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . .
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from
Church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, or for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
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port of religion. A three-judge federal district court' upheld the statute
as not violating the Establishment Clause.' On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court6 affirmed and HELD, the Maryland statute does not
foster state support of religion in contravention of the Establishment
Clause.7
In examining the issue of separation of church and state, the Su-
preme Court has not expected a "hermetic separation of the two,
[recognizing that such a pure distinction] is an impossibility."8 The
Court has further described the line of separation as a "blurred, indis-
tinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a par-
ticular relationship."' The Court has, however, expected and insisted
upon State neutrality toward religion. 0
To preserve this guarded neutrality," a three-pronged test is ap-
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (Black, J.).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 1976) and 28 U.S.C. 2284 (1970) (amended
1974) provided for a three-judge district court to hear all cases in which an injunction
was sought to restrain the enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute on
the grounds of that statute's unconstitutionality.
5. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), affd. 96
S.Ct. 2337 (1976).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) allows for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any case
required "by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges."
7. 96 S.Ct. at 2337 (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2344.
9. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Reflecting this indistinct sepa-
ration, the Supreme Court has sustained public aid to a hospital staffed by an order of
Catholic nuns. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). It has allowed state reim-
bursement to parents for fares paid for transportation by public carriers of children
attending public and Catholic schools. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
It has also approved the lending of secular textbooks to parochial school students. Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court has also rejected the argument that
no state aid to religious institutions is permissible because it frees the institution's
resources to be put to sectarian ends. 96 S.Ct. at 2345.
10. 96 S.Ct. at 2345.
II. The history of governmentally established religion both in England and in this
country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular
form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history
showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon
Nova Law Journal : 977 1
116
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/1
Roemer v. Board of Public Works1:1977 13 1
plied in cases involving Establishment Clause issues.' 2 The test first
scrutinizes the statute in question to see that it has the necessary, secular
legislative purpose. Next, it tests the statute to determine if it has the
impermissible primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Fi-
nally, it examines the operation of the statute to assure that it does not
weave excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v.
Kurtzman," which itself crystallized the three-pronged test, and a subse-
quent case, Hunt v. McNair,5 have offered refinements to the basic test.
In Lemon, the Supreme Court dealt with statutes from two states.
One awarded a salary supplement to teachers in private schools, if those
teachers agreed only to teach the same courses and use the same materi-
als as those in the public schools, and if they agreed not to teach courses
in religion. The other statute authorized state education officials to
"purchase" secular educational services from private schools, and to
reimburse participating schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
materials.
The Court struck down the salary supplement program because it
would cause "[the] kind of state inspection and evaluation of the reli-
gious content of a religious organization [that] is fraught with the sort
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids."'" The Court struck
down the other program because it would foster the same kind of rela-
tionship.17 While applying the third, or excessive government entangle-
ment prong, the Court designated three additional factors for considera-
tion. They include: (1) the character and purpose of the benefited institu-
tion, (2) the nature of the aid provided, and (3) the resulting relationship
between the state and the religious authority."8
Hunt, which upheld a state law providing for state participation in
the support of government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands
as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion"
by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an
awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and reli-
gious persecutions go hand in hand.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962).
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
13. Id. at 612-13.
14. 403 U.S. 602.
15. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
16. 403 U.S. 602, 620.
17. Id. at 621.
18. Id. at 615.
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the issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of a Baptist College,"
refined the second, or "primary effect" prong. In its opinion, the Court
said:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive
that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting.3
A third case which heavily influenced the Court in Roemer was
Tilton v. Richardson.2' It involved a federal plan for grants and loans
to institutions of higher learning for the construction of academic facili-
ties. The act was drafted to insure that the subsidized facilities would
be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient
institutions. In upholding this plan, the Court relied on the more ma-
ture, sophisticated, and academic atmosphere of a college as opposed
to that of an elementary or high school. The Court also favorably
considered the non-ideological nature of the aid; that the aid is a one-
time single purpose grant, and that cumulatively this would lead to very
little potential for political divisiveness.
Applying Lemon's basic test and its complex refinements, the Su-
preme Court has been able to look at Establishment Clause cases with
a focus on all relevant factors. Utilizing such a view, the Court has
upheld state aid in cases such as Hunt, Tilton, and now Roemer, where
the aid did not appear to further a sectarian mission. However, this
cumulative viewpoint has also allowed the Court to strike down aid
tainted with the appearance of furthering an institution's sectarian mis-
sion."
19. The act excluded any aid to "any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place of religious worship [or to] any facility... used primarily in
connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity. .. ."
The program was upheld because the Court found the aid not to have a "primary effect"
of advancing religion because the institution was not "pervasively sectarian." 413 U.S.
at 743, 745 (quoting S.C. CODE § 22-41.2(b) (Supp. 1971).
20. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U:S. 734, 743"(1973).
21. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
22. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973), where the Court struck down aid to elementary and secondary schools which
were found to conform to a profile of a substantially religious school, as opposed to
the schools involved in Tilton and Hunt. The aid involved (1) direct subsidies for repair
of buildings, (2) reimbursement of parents for a percentage of tuition paid, and (3) tax
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In considering the present case, the Court acknowledged:
The slate we write on is anything but clean. Instead, there is little room
for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to church-
affiliated private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those principles
.. . or to expand upon them substantially, but merely to insure that they
are faithfully applied in this case.2
The Supreme Court, in its analysis of Roemer, immediately in-
voked the use of Lemon's three-prong test. The first prong, the purpose
of the statute, was briefly discussed and dismissed as not being in issue.
The Maryland statute was conceded to have the secular purpose "of
supporting private higher education generally, as an economic alterna-
tive to a wholly public system." 2'
Applying the second, or "primary effect" question, the Court de-
scribed it as the "substantive [question] of what private educational
activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds."2'
Recognizing the "primary effect" refinements of Hunt," the Court con-
cluded, "(1) that no state aid at all [can] go to institutions that are so
'pervasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from
sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out,
they alone may be funded."' 1
In applying this test to the Maryland statute,28 the Court relied
heavily upon the findings of the federal district court. The lower federal
court had found the appellee colleges to be "not 'pervasively sectar-
ian,"' and supported that conclusion "with a number of subsidiary
findings concerning the role of religion on these campuses."29 These
breaks for parents. All three were found to have an impermissible "primary effect" of
advancing religion. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472 (1973), also struck down a system of aid to elementary and secondary schools that
provided for reimbursements for the school's testing and record keeping expenses. It
did so because the schools met the same sectarian profile as the schools in Nyquist, and
there was a "substantial risk" that religious instruction might be included on examina-
tions supported by the state, or that state-funded tests would "be drafted with an eye,
unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsor-
ing church." Id. at 480.
23. 96 S.Ct. at 2348.
24. Id. at 2348-49.
25. Id. at 2349.
26. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
27. 96 S.Ct. at 2349.
28. Md. Educ. Code Ann., art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975).
29. 96 S.Ct. at 2349.
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subsidiary findings produced several salient features about the schools,
the more important ones being: the existence of "institutional auton-
omy" from the Roman Catholic Church;31 the absence of religious
indoctrination as a substantive purpose of any defendant;"' the exist-
ence of "an atmosphere of intellectual freedom [free from] religious
pressures";2 the classification of classroom prayer as "peripheral to
the subject of religious permeation";3 and a system of faculty hiring
and student acceptance not determined on a religious basis.,, Hinting
to the critical issue of the case,3 the Court acknowledged that the
district court's findings had described religious institutions similar in
almost all respects to those considered in Tilton and Hunt." The Court
found no difference between the institutions, thereby holding that the
Catholic colleges were not pervasively sectarian.Y
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2349, 2350.
34. Id. at 2350.
35. In analyzing the third-prong of Lemon's test (excessive entanglement), the
Court revealed that it considers the character of the aided institution as more important
than the nature of the aid itself. Therefore it found this case more closely aligned with
Tilton and Hunt than with Lemon, Nyquist, or Levitt. 96 S.Ct. at 2353. In its analysis,
the Court relied heavily on descriptive profiles of the schools in question. The profile
of the Lemon, Nyquist, and Levitt schools revealed institutions that:
(a) [impose] religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils
at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and
dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theol-
ogy or doctrine of a particular faith; (e) are an integral part of the religious
mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose the
inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty appoint-
ments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty may teach.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68.
The profile of the Tilton, Hunt schools, however, proved that:
[Njon-Catholics were admitted as students and given faculty appointments. Not
one . . . require[d] its students to attend religious services. . . . [theology
courses] are not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion. The
schools . . . made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. Finally
• . . these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of aca-
demic freedom. ...
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1971). The Court, once convinced that the
colleges affected by the Maryland statute fit the profile of Tilton, began to move toward
a holding consistent with that case. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
36. 96 S.Ct. at 2350-51.
37. Id. at 2351.
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Continuing with the requirements of Hunt, the Court next consid-
ered whether aid was in fact only extended to the "secular side. ' 3 The
Court again agreed with the finding of the district court that the exten-
sion of aid only to the secular side was assured "by the statutory prohi-
bition against sectarian use, and by the administrative enforcement of
that prohibition through the [Maryland] Council for Higher Educa-
tion."'" As if to urge and assure compliance with the statutory safe-
guards, the Court said it would expect the Council and the colleges to
avoid any "'specifically religious activity,' and minimize any constitu-
tional questions."'"
Having examined the purpose of the statute and its primary effect,
the Supreme Court next considered the difficult question of "excessive
entanglement."" If the "primary effect" question was termed to be
substantive, this was described as a procedural one. Did the operation
of the statute, by its requirements of school application and Council
approval, report submission and administrative review of expenditures,
entwine the religious institutions into an excessive entanglement with
government? In this analysis of the entanglement test, the additional
three factors mentioned in Lemon were given significant emphasis. 42
Since the schools were found to be not "pervasively sectarian" under
the second prong of the test, the Court felt that the "character of the
aided institutions" was such that the "secular activities could be taken
at face value. . . .The need for close surveillance of purportedly secu-
lar activities is correspondingly reduced."' 3 '
The second factor in Lemon's refinement of the entanglement test,
namely, the "form of the aid," was passed over and included in the third
factor, the "resulting relationship" of secular and religious authority.4
Initially, the Court disposed of what might be considered a very entan-
38. See text accompanying note 27, supra.
39. 96 S.Ct. at 2351. "None of the moneys payable under this subtitle shall be
utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes." MD. EDUc. CODE ANN. art. 77A, §
68A.
40. 96 S.Ct. at 2351.
41. Id. at 2352.
42. See text accompanying note 18, supra.
43. In looking at this "character-of-institution" factor, the Court used its profile
analysis already determined in the consideration of whether or not the colleges were
"pervasively sectarian." See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. The colleges were
found to perform "essentially secular educational functions . . . that are distinct and
separable from religious activity." 96 S.Ct. at 2352.
44. Id.
17 1
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gling element of the aid: that it was to be granted on an annual basis.
The annual nature of the aid was not considered fatal to the program,"5
"in. . . light of the character of the aided institutions, and the resulting
absence of any need 'to investigate the conduct of particular classes.' "46
After dealing with this superficial flaw in the Maryland program,
the Supreme Court indicated what it considered to be the essential
reason for upholding the aid in question. Although a "one-time, single-
purpose" construction grant, as in Tilton, was preferable over the type
created by the Maryland program,47 Tilton was considered to be con-
trolling, even though the form of the aid was readily distinguishable."s
The Court narrowed its analysis of the aid program before it to one
fundamental question: Is it distinguishable from Tilton by the form-of-
aid, or by the character-of-institution? It held the difference to be form-
of-aid only and of questionable importance.4" This case's characterrof-
institution difference with Lemon, however, was held to be "most im-
pressive."' 0 In contrast to the factual situation in Lemon,5 where perva-
sively sectarian elementary and secondary schools were involved, the
Maryland Council for Higher Education could supervise the program
without entanglement because the "secular and sectarian activities of
the college are easily separated. 52 Any contacts between the+ Council
and the colleges were "not likely to be any more entangling than the
inspections and audits incident to the normal process of the college's
45. Id. at 2352, 2353.
46. Id. at 2352 (quoting language from the district court).
47. Id. at 2353.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Since Nyquist and Levitt fell in line with Lemon, this case's difference with
Lemon automatically prevented it from falling in line with Nyquist and Levitt, as
appellants urged. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
51. Repeating the elements of its important "profile," the Court looked at the
characteristics of the schools in Lemon. Elementary and secondary schooling comes at
an impressionable age; the schools were supervised by the Catholic diocese; each had a
local Catholic parish that assumed
ultimate financial responsibility for it; principals were appointed by religious
authorities; religion pervaded the school system, and teachers were instructed that
religious formation is neither confined to formal courses nor restricted to a simple
subject area. These things made impossible what is crucial to a non-entangling
aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular
functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary
to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes.
96 S.Ct. at 2353 (quoting the opinion from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 617, 618).
52. Id.
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accreditation by the State."'m Such inspections could not be done so
innocuously with the schools in Lemon.
A concern voiced in Lemon that government-religion entanglement
could lead to "political divisiveness"" was also dismissed by the Court
on the grounds that the student population of a college, unlike the
parents of elementary or secondary school students, is diverse and
widely dispersed, thus creating no local political power base from which
to lobby and seek more aid for their respective institutions.
The Court admitted the obvious when it said: "There is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement'of church and state."" The only
hint offered was that all relevant factors identified by the three-pronged
test of Lemon and its refinements must be considered "'cumulatively'
in judging the degree of entanglement."" The Court did, however, spe-
cifically agree with the importance given by the district court "to the
character of the aided institutions," and with the lower court's findings
that the colleges "are capable of separating secular and religious
functions."'" In so affirming, the Supreme Court upheld its commitment
not to refine further the existing test of Lemon and its probing factors,"
but it did give valuable insight into how the test is to be applied, and
which factual matters it considered critical.
Few would argue that government cannot be kept antiseptically
free from religion." Fewer still would want such a situation. Even Jus-
tice Douglas, who ardently supported a clean separation of church and
state," acknowledged that it would be undesirable to insist on such total
separation that government became hostile to religion:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2353, 2354. In Lemon the Court said that annual subsidies would create
a relationship of dependence between the state and the institutions, and that increased
demand and dependence for state funds would create a danger of political fragmentation
along religious lines. 403 U.S. at 623.
55. 96 S.Ct. at 2354.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2348.
59. See text accompanying notes 8-9, supra.
60. 403 U.S. at 697 (Douglas, J., dissenting): "I dissent not because of any lack
of respect for parochial schools but out of a feeling of despair that the respect which
through history has been accorded the First Amendment is this day lost." (The majority
had upheld federal construction grants to institutions of higher learning).
19 1
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room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When
the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs,
it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spirit-
ual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education
nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person.
But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to widen the effective scope of religious influence."'
Falling in line with some of Douglas' language are cases which have
allowed aid on the grounds that government cannot refrain from making
available to religious institutions what it makes available to all. 2 In fact,
in Walz v. Tax Commission," aid in the form of property tax exemp-
tions was extended to church properties in order to assure that govern-
ment and religion could minimize their frictional contacts.
Where then does Roemer fit in balancing these solemn inter-
ests-the integrity of the "Establishment Clause" and the necessity that
government not discriminate against religion? Roemer's holding has
been described as a "hairline crack in the wall between church and
state." This reaction fails to note, however, that the wall was never
61. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). In this case, Douglas joined
in affirming a New York program which allowed public schools to release students,
during school hours, on written requests of their parents, so that they may leave the
school buildings and grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or
devotional exercises. Contra McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
62. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In Meek, a textbook
program was upheld on the authority of Allen. Two other forms of aid, however,
involving (1) instructional material and equipment, and (2) a supply of professional
staff, were struck down as having an impermissible primary effect of establishing reli-
gion because of the predominately religious character of the schools. A discussion of
Meek is noted in The Supreme Court. 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 104 (1975).
63. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
64. Miami Herald, June 23, 1976 (Editorial) at 6, High Court Ruling Shakes
Nova Law Journal
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absolute.5 Confined by its facts,6 Roemer serves to lucidly guide state
legislatures in drafting legislation that refrains from "quarantining reli-
gious institutions,"1 and, at the same time, refrains from unconstitu-
tionally supporting them.
Noting the importance of the differing character-of-institutions
profiles between the schools in Roemer, Tilton, and Hunt, and those in
Lemon, Nyquist, and Levitt, it seems that aid to religious elementary
and secondary schools will have a difficult time passing constitutional
scrutiny. It is likely that these schools will be found to be "pervasively
sectarian," which necessarily will create "entanglement" problems, as
the state seeks to monitor the aid and insure that it is put only to secular
uses.
68
For institutions fitting the profile of Roemer, however, aid to their
secular functions should not fall on constitutional grounds.69 As long as
the aid originates from a statute having a secular legislative purpose,
and the state is financing a separable secular function of overriding
importance, it should stand.70 The holding in Roemer assures religious
institutions that they will not be denied secular aid simply because it
Separation of Church, State.
65. "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separa-
tion, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403 U.S. at 614.
66. Clearly, Roemer's holding applies only to religious institutions engaging in
the art of educating, and educating in a secular manner within an atmosphere of intellec-
tual freedom. Also, it is concerned only with state aid to those institutions. Roemer does
not deal with issues such as prayer in public schools or Sunday closing laws.
67. 96 S.Ct. at 2344.
68. This does not, however, totally discount "the form of the aid" consideration.
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). There the court upheld aid to elementary
and parochial schools in the form of a textbook loan program. Although these schools
were considered religion-pervasive, the textbook program was upheld because the secu-
lar content of a textbook could be readily ascertained, whereas what a teacher teaches
cannot be.
69. But see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 753 (Brennan, 3., dissenting):
I do not see any significant difference. . . in telling the sectarian university not
to teach any nonsecular subjects in a certain building, and. . . telling the Catho-
lic school teacher not to teach religion. The vice is the creation through subsidy
of a relationship in which the government polices the teaching practices of a
religious school or university.
70. 96 S.Ct. at 2355 (White, 3., with Rehnquist, J., concurring). Brennan, 3., in
his dissent, said that "the Establishment Clause. . .forbids the government to provide
funds to sectarian universities in which the propagation and advancement of a particular
religion are a function or purpose of the institution." Id. at 2356.
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incidentally aids them in their sectarian functions. It also assures them,
however, that state aid will not be available to further their efforts in
proselytizing, or pursuing their sectarian mission. The "blurry and in-
distinct" wall separating government from religion before Roemer
stands intact after Roemer. It remains up to the states, if they value
private education as an economic alternative to a wholly.public system,
to draft legislation with a careful eye on the character of the recipient
institution in mind. For it seems that once the institution fits the profile
of Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer, the other judicial requirements are easily
met.
Gary L. Sweet
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Fourth Amendment: A Second-Class Constitutional
Right for the Purpose of Federal Habeas Corpus:
Stone v. Powell
On February 17, 1968, Lloyd Powell and three persons entered a liquor
store in California. Powell became involved in an altercation with the
store manager and, in the scuffle, shot and killed the manager's wife.
Some ten hours later, an officer of the Henderson, Nevada, police de-
partment arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy ordi-
nance.' The search incident to Powell's arrest produced a thirty-eight
caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. Powell was
extradited to California and convicted of second-degree murder in the
Superior Court of San Bernadino County. On a motion to suppress, the
trial court rejected Powell's argument that the evidence should be ex-
cluded because of its discovery pursuant to arrest under an unconstitu-
tional vagrancy ordinance. On appeal to the California District Court
of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. The court concluded that the
error in admitting the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 Habeas corpus relief was denied by the California Supreme
Court.
In August 1971, Powell filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
He argued that he had been unlawfully arrested because the vagrancy
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, that the evidence
which led to his conviction should have been excluded. The district court
held, however, that even if the statute was unconstitutional, the deter-
rent purpose of the exclusionary rule did not require the exclusion from
1. The ordinance provides: "Every person is a vagrant who: (I) Loiters or wan-
ders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business; and
(2) who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when asked by any
police officer to do so; (3) if surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a
reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification."
2. The court of appeals relied on the harmless error rule of Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967): "We conclude that there may-be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of the conviction."
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evidence of the fruits of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest.3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed The court
concluded: "the exclusion of the evidence would deter legislators from
enacting unconstitutional statutes."' 5 The United States Supreme Court
reversed and held: "where the State had provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search-and-seizure was introduced at his
trial." 6
1. SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court in Powell noted: "the authority of the federal
courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus was established by the Judiciary
Act of 1789."1 The scope of the "Great Writ" was limited to inquiries
into the jurisdiction of tribunals passing sentence over prisoners in cus-
tody of the United States." In 186, the writ's scope was expanded to
include state prisoners.' With this expansion, the federal courts became
authorized to give relief where a state or federal prisoner-was restrained
of liberty in violation of the Constitution, a treaty, or a law of the
United States. However, the limitation as to the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court persisted; 0 "[a]nd, although the concept of 'juris-
diction' was subjected to considerable strain as the substantive scope of
3. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussing the California
Court of Appeals holding).
4. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. Id. at 98.
6. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976). Stone v. Powell was considered
with Warden v. Rice on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Warden concerned respondent's allegation of an unconstitutional ordinance;
however, both are of identical issue.
7. Id. at 3042.
8. id.
9. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c.28, § 1, 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
10. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891) (no federal habeas corpus review of an
adverse decision if all possible state appeals have not been made); In re Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545 (1891) (habeas corpus only allowed for determination of jurisdiction of the
state court regarding police powers); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895) (mere
error in the conduct of a trial cannot be made the basis of jurisdiction in a court of the
United States to review proceedings upon writ of habeas corpus); Pettibone v. Nichols,
203 U.S. 192 (1906) (state prisoners held in custody of the state, charged with state
criminal laws, will be left to stand trial there and may not be discharged by way of
habeas corpus).
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the writ was expanded, this expansion was limited to only a few classes
of cases."'"
This jurisdictional limitation was relaxed when the Court held in
Frank v. Mangum2 that if a habeas corpus court found that the State
had failed to provide an adequate corrective process for a full and fair
litigation of federal claims, the court could determine whether the deten-
tion was lawful, whether or not jurisdictional.
Brown v. Allen" and Daniels v. Allen"4 expanded the scope of the
writ still further. These cases involved state prisoners who applied for
federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the trial courts incorrectly
denied motions to quash their indictments because of alleged discrimi-
nation in the selection of grand jurors. The claimants were found to be
entitled to a full reconsideration of the constitutional isssues including
a hearing in the federal district court, although the state supreme court
had rejected these claims.
A final barrier to the broad collateral re-examination of state crim-
inal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in
Fay v. Noia.5 Fay removed the barrier created by Daniels, in which
habeas relief was refused because papers were not timely filed. Fay
narrowly restricted the circumstances in which a federal court may
refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims. The Court
noted that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that the
judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require."'"6
The question arising after Fay was whether there should be collat-
eral re-examination of state criminal convictions by way of habeas cor-
pus for all alleged constitutional violations.
In Kaufman v. United States,17 the Court held that a claim of an
unconstitutional search-and-seizure was cognizable in a 28 U.S.C. §
2255 proceeding or modern post-conviction procedure."6 In the
11. 96 S.Ct. at 3042. The expansion occurred primarily with regard to convictions
based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes or detentions based upon an allegedly
illegal sentence. Id. n. 8.
12. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
13. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (a companion case to Brown v. Allen).
15. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
16. Id. at 438.
17. 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969).
18. This procedure is commonly equated with habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1970).
Federal custody: remedies on motion attacking sentence. A prisoner in custody
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Kaufman case, the Supreme Court for the first time suggested that the
scope of federal collateral review included state convictions involving
Fourth Amendment violations. However, the instant case rejected the
holding and dictum of Kaufman concerning the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of the state court
decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings. 9
The Supreme Court's reasons for rejecting Kaufman are two-fold.
First, the Court noted that a substantial majority of the federal courts
of appeal, prior to Kaufman, had concluded that collateral review of
search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on motions filed by federal
prisoners under the modern post-conviction procedure." The primary
rationale in support of this contention was that Fourth Amendment
violations are different in kind from denials of Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights in that "claims of illegal search-and-seizure do not impugn
the integrity of the fact finding process or challenge evidence as inher-
ently unreliable."'" Therefore, the Court concluded that because Fourth
Amendment violations differ from Fifth and Sixth Amendment viola-
tions there should be a re-examination of the scope of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, and that such review should be permitted only when
the petitioner was not accorded a full and fair opportunity to raise and
adjudicate the constitutional issue in state court. Second, the Court re-
under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws of the U.S., or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which im-
posed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. A motion for such
relief may be made at any time. Unless the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the U.S. attorney, grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise
open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack [emphasis added], the court shall set aside the judgment and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
19. 96 S.Ct. at 3045, n. 16. Federal statutory habeas corpus proceedings as it
applies to state prisoners is described in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
20. See, e.g.. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
21. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 224 (1969).
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evaluated the exclusionary rule, and questioned whether its justification
(deterrence of police misconduct) requires collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims."
2. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the people to be
*secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.""
In an attempt to implement this guarantee, the judicial system
created the exclusionary rule.u Prior to Weeks v. United States,2 there
existed no real barrier to the introduction of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings.21 Weeks estab-
lished that a defendant could petition before trial for the return of
property secured through an illegal search and seizure conducted by
federal authorities.
The next step in the evolition of the exclusionary rule was the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence and its fruits from state judicial
proceedings.Y Wolf v. Colorado2l applied the Fourth Amendment to the
states by interpreting it as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
as such enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause." But the Court refused to impose the rule as
a mandatory method of enforcement by state courts, and left them free
to adopt or reject it. Finally, the exclusionary rule was held applicable
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.2'
22. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. at 3047.
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
24. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). "It meant [the exclusion-
ary rule], quite simply, that conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions. . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts. . . and that
such evidence shall not be used at all.")
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26. 96 S.Ct. at 3046. See also Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). "The
fact that papers. . . may have been illegally taken. . . is not a valid objection to their
admissibility."; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (an unconstitutional seizure
of papers of the accused creates a duty on the trial court to entertain objection to their
admission); cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (the
Fourth Amendment protects corporations and its officers from compulsory production
of corporate books and papers when the information which formed the basis of the
warrant was obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure.
28. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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3. WHETHER THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REQUIRES
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
Over the years, courts have formulated three justifications for the
exclusionary rule. One justification utilized by the courts was that the
accused, through the Fourth Amendment, possessed a constitutional
right to exclude evidence obtained as a result of unlawful searches and
seizures.30 The second justification was based upon the so-called
"judicial integrity theory." This theory required the courts to exclude
evidence obtained by the government's "unclean hands" in order that
the courts not be a party to a constitutional violation." The third
rationale is the deterrence theory, which was designed to remove the
incentive for unlawful police searches by excluding evidence from use
at trial. As stated in United States v. Calandra:
[The exclusionary rule]. . . is not calculated to redress the injury to the
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any reparation comes
too late. The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.3
Powell demonstrated that the courts have limited the justification
of the exclusionary rule solely to the police deterrence theory., The
Court then proceeded to impose further limitations on the rule, stating
that the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the
introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or for the
benefit of all persons.u It has not been held applicable to grand jury
proceedings, nor has it been applied to evidence impeaching the credibil-
30. Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future.
12 AM. CRIM. LAW REV., 507, 508 (1975). Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
355-67 (1974). "[Mly dissent rejected the premise that an individual has no constitu-
tional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded from all use by the
government. .. ."
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,483-84(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
32. 414 U.S. at 348 (1974).
33. 96 S.Ct. at 3055.
34. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (no standing to contest
admission of evidence seized under defective warrant since there was no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the goods seized): Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Fourth Amendment violation may only be urged
by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, and not those aggrieved solely
by the introduction of damaging evidence).
128-
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ity of a defendant who has testified in his own defense.5 A further
limitation has been the requirement of standing."
After delineating the exclusionary rule's historical limitations, the
Court applied a cost/benefit analysis and concluded that the costs of the
rule were not outweighed by its benefits." In its analysis, the Court
considered the rule's present justification-police deterrence-and ig-
nored the theories of personal private right and judicial integrity.
The so-called costs or disadvantages of the exclusionary rule which
the Court noted are:
[F]ocus of the trial and attention of the participants therein is diverted
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central
concern in a criminal proceeding. . . . [t]he physical evidence sought to
be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and. . . if applied
indiscriminately, it may well have the opposite effect of generating disre-
spect for the law and administration of justice."
After stating what the Court believed to be the exclusionary rule's
severe costs, the Court discussed its possible advantages and deemed
them relatively insignificant:
There is no reason to believe, however, that the educative effect of the
exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure
claims could not be raised in federal habeas review of state convictions.
Nor is there any reason to assume that any specific disincentive already
created by the risk of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of
convictions on direct review would be enhanced if there were the further
risk that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct
review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring
years after the incarceration of the defendant.
3
35. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-93 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (standing has been
found to exist only when the government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to
incriminate the victim of the illegal search, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of the evidence gathered as a consequence of a search
directed at someone else).
37. 96 S.Ct. at 3051.
38. Id. at 3049-50.
39. Id. at 3051. The majority also discussed the disadvantages of granting habeas
corpus: (1) intrusions on values important to our system of government, such as utiliza-
tion of limited judicial resources; (2) the necessity of finality in criminal trials; and
(3) the minimization of friction between federal and state systems of justice.
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According to the Court, therefore, the costs outweighed any bene-
fits derived through collateral review of alleged Fourth Amendment
violations.
4. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DECISION
There are a few areas of uncertainty created by the Court's opinion.
Though the Court has limited its opportunity to hear Fourth Amend-
ment claims by state prisoners in federal collateral proceedings, it has
not relinquished its right to do so. In explaining the distinction, the
Court claimed: "Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks
jurisdiction over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule
is limited to eases in which there has been both a showing [of a denial
of opportunity for full and fair litigation] and a Fourth Amendment
violation.' 40
In light of the Supreme Court's intention to retain jurisdiction over
such claims, an ambiguity arises. What does a "full and fair opportunity
to litigate" mean, and how will the Court interpret it?
The Court in Powell cited the case of Townsend v. Sain.1 In
Townsend, the Court described six criteria which would require a fed-
eral district court to hold a separate evidentiary hearing in the case of
collateral review of a state or federal conviction. It held:
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant
under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding
procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full
and fair hearing; (4) there is substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier
of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 2
The Court continued:
[T]here cannot be the semblance of a full and fair hearing unless the state
court actually reached and decided the issues of fact tendered by the
defendant."
40. Id. at 3052, n. 37.
41. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
42. Id. at 313.
43. Id. at 313-14.
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Therefore, Townsend seemed to set forth the general guidelines which
determine whether a federal district court should hold a hearing on
habeas corpus review for want of a proper hearing on the merits at the
state level. However, even in Townsend, which was decided in 1963, the
Court noted: "if the prior state hearing occurred in the original trial
-for example, on a motion to suppress allegedly unlawful evidence-it
will usually be proper to assume that the claim was rejected on the
merits.""
Thus, the two requisites for collateral review under Powell are:
(1) the showing of a denial of a full and fair opportunity to litigate,
which the Court in Townsend assumed will be decided on the merits in
a motion to suppress; and (2) a Fourth Amendment violation. It there-
fore appears likely that there will be little future occasion for collateral
review of Fourth Amendment violations involving state prisoners, so
long as the state courts rule on the defendant's motion to suppress.
Justice Brennan, in his lengthy dissent, recognized the costs and
benefits derived from the exclusionary rule and its abolishment which
the majority of the Court did not figure into their original equation.'"
First, Brennan stated: "The denigration of constitutional guaran-
tees and constitutionally mandated procedures, relegated by the Court
to the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens taught to
expect judicial respect."" To do away with federal habeas relief by using
the exclusionary rule's supposed sole justification, police deterrence, and
then merely weighing costs versus benefits, such as the majority of the
Court has done, defeats important constitutional safeguards.
Second, "[c]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation
cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the
44. Id. at 314.
45. 96 S.Ct. at 3071-72, where White, J., in his dissenting opinion, pointed out:
Two confederates in crime, Smith and Jones, are tried separately for a state crime
and convicted on the very same evidence, including evidence seized incident to
their arrest allegedly made without probable cause. . . .Their convictions are
affirmed by the State's highest court. Smith does not petition for certiorari [but
Jones does and is granted it. His conviction is reversed]. . . .Smith then files
for petition for federal habeas corpus. He makes no claim that he did not have a
full and fair hearing in the state courts, but asserts his Fourth Amendment claim
had been erroneously decided and that he is being held in violation of the Federal
Constitution. . . .Smith's petition would be dismissed, and he would spend his
life in prison while his colleague is a free man.
46. Id. at 3065.
135
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1977
132 Nova Law Journal 1:1977
fullest opportunity for plenary federal review." 7
Third, he emphasized "the need for federal review of federal consti-
tutional claims because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.""8
Fourth, judicial integrity, a rationale which the majority de-
emphasized as a justification for the exclusionary rule, should be consid-
ered a primary rationale, according to Brennan. Citing Justice Holmes,
Brennan said: "It is . . .a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part."' Moreover,
Brennan cited Brown v. A llenY' which noted: "it is an abuse to deal too
casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion, even though they involve limitations upon state power and may be
invoked by those morally unworthy."
Fifth, Brennan dealt with the majority's concern with comity and
friction between federal and state tribunals. He pointed out that in the
interest of comity, to lessen federal-state friction, collateral review re-
quires exhaustion of state remedies and not lack of power." Therefore,
collateral review dictates that federal habeas corpus review be delayed
pending initial state court determination. But the Court noted: "[Dielay
only was the price, else a rule of timing would become a rule circum-
scribing the power of the federal courts on habeas, in defiance of unmis-
takable congressional intent."52
Finally, Brennan demonstrated how the majority's opinion lacks a
constitutional basis for denying federal habeas corpus relief to state
prisoners when Fourth Amendment violations are involved. He writes:
The Court adheres to the holding of Mapp that the Constitution
required exclusion of the evidence admitted at respondents' trials. How-
ever, the Court holds that the Constitution does not require that respon-
dents be accorded habeas relief if they were accorded an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claims in state courts.
Yet once the Constitution was interpreted by Mapp to require exclusion
of certain evidence at trial, the Constitution became irrelevant to the
manner in which the constitutional right was to be enforced in the federal
47. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. at 3063, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424
(1963).
48. 96 S.Ct. at 3067.
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
50. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); cf Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 432; England v. Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
51. 96 S.Ct. at 3060.
52. 96 S.Ct. at 3060, n. 10; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963).
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courts; that inquiry is only a matter of respecting Congress' allocation
of federal judicial power between this Court's appellate jurisdiction and
a federal district court's habeas jurisdiction. Indeed, by conceding that
today's decision does not mean that the federal district court lacks juris-
diction over respondents' claims, the Court admits that respondents have
sufficiently alleged that they are in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion within the meaning of § 2254 and that there is no constitutional
rationale for today's holding.53
Justice Brennan concluded by stating:
[Als a practical matter the only result of today's holding will be that
denials by the state prisoners of violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights will go unreviewed by a federal tribunal. I fear that the same
treatment ultimately will be accorded state prisoners' claims of violations
of other constitutional rights; thus, the potential ramifications of this case
for federal habeas jurisdiction generally are ominous."
5. CONCLUSION
The holding presented in Stone v. Powell can either become as
frightening as Justice Brennan perceives or as merely procedural as
Justice Powell portrays.u Whether personal rights and liberties are to
be curtailed in the future or whether state courts will sufficiently uphold
Fourth Amendment constitutional rights will be determined only in
future court decisions.
Michael Wayne Ullman
53. 96 S.Ct. at 3084.
54. 96 S.Ct. at 3071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. "In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary
rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the state
prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial
and on direct review ... we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule." 96 S.Ct. at
3052, n. 37.
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Voir Dire Examination: Minority Defendants Are Not
Always Entitled to Have Specific Questions Asked of
Potential Jurors Regarding Possible Racial Prejudice:
Ristaino v. Ross
Defendant Ross was convicted of armed robbery, assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent
to commit murder. Ross was black; the victim, a security guard at
Boston University, was white.
At trial, Ross's counsel asked the judge to question the prospective
jurors about any possible racial prejudices they might have against the
defendant. The trial judge refused to ask specific questions but asked
the prospective jurors general questions concerning bias or prejudice.1
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,2 Ross's
convictions were upheld. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari,3 vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for recon-
sideration. The Court based its decision upon the results reached in
Ham v. South Carolina. In Ham, the Court held that the defendant was
constitutionally entitled to have questions asked of prospective jurors
about potential racial bias. 5 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts re-
considered Ross and again affirmed,6 holding that Ham did not affect
the result reached in its earlier deliberation because Ham involved "spe-
cial circumstances";7 Ham had claimed he was arrested as a result of
1. Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1973).
2. Id.
3. Ross v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901 (1973).
4. 409 U.S. 524 (1973). In Ham, defendant was convicted of possession of mari-
juana and sentenced to 18 months confinement. Certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court to determine if the trial judge's refusal to examine jurors on voir
dire about possible prejudice violates defendant's federal constitutional rights. Ham was
a young bearded Black who was well known locally for his work in civil rights activities.
His basic defense at the trial was that law enforcement officers were "out to get him"
because of his civil rights activities, and that he had been framed on the drug charge.
5. Id.
6. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1973).
7. "Special circumstances" have been interpreted to exist when a defendant is
arrested allegedly because of his race or minority status. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589
(1976).
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his civil rights activities. In contrast, the defendant in Ross did not
present any special circumstances resulting in his arrest, but was an
ordinary black person accused of a crime against a white person.
Ross's second petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied.' Following this denial, Ross filed a petition in the
United States District Court of Massachusetts seeking a writ of habeas
corpus.' In granting the writ, the district court held that the petitioner
had a constitutional right to have the issue of racial prejudice specifi-
cally called to the attention of prospective jurors on voir dire examina-
tion. 10
The State appealed this decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the granting of the writ."
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed 2 the lower court
and HELD that the need to question jurors specifically about racial
prejudice did not rise to constitutional dimensions without the presence
of "special circumstances."'"
The first case to deal with the issue of questioning racial bias at
voir dire examination was Aldridge v. United States," in which a black
man was tried and convicted for the murder of a white police officer.
During the voir dire examination, the judge did not ask the prospective
jurors any questions specifically relating to racial prejudice, although
such questions were requested by defense counsel. Based on this infirm-
ity, the United States Supreme Court reversed' 5 holding that it is better
to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice than to allow the
possibility that a juror might sit on a case with a disqualifying state of
mind.'
8. Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973) (three justices dissenting).
9. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974). In a recently decided case,
Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976), the Supreme Court put an end to this type of
habeas corpus action, noting: "[W]here the state has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at the trial." The Court noted that it would "deny
federal habeas jurisdiction (as sought by Ross) over claims of Fourth Amendment
brought by state prisoners." Id. at 3052.
10. Ross v. Ristaino, 388 F.Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974).
1. Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1974).
12. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
13. Id. at 597.
14. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 315. The Court noted: "If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, they
1136
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Many courts have since relied on Aldridge in upholding a minority
defendant's right to question jurors on voir dire about potential racial
prejudice. These courts have held that refusal to ask the questions when
propounded by the defense constitutes reversible error.17 In one such
case, a black man was convicted of raping a white woman.'" In this case,
questions designed to reveal racial prejudice were not allowed to be
asked of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court of Connecticut re-
versed, stating:
It appears from the remarks made by the [trial] court that its ruling was
based upon the ground that in a court of justice no distinction should be
made between Negro and white persons and that, therefore, the very
thought that it was possible for a juror to be so prejudiced against Ne-
groes that he would be less apt to believe their testimony. . . should be
carefully kept from the minds of prospective jurors ...
We cannot be blind to the fact that there may still be some who are
biased against the Negro race and would be more easily convinced of a
Negro's guilt than of a white man's guilt ...
So long as race prejudice exists, even in a relatively few persons,
there is substantial chance that one of those few will appear in court as a
venireman."
Until 1973, when Ham was decided, Aldridge was steadily inter-
preted as setting a broad rule that a minority defendant has a right to
have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. In United
States v. Robinson," the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit noted unequivocally: "[A]ny doubts as to the mandatory re-
quirements of the Aldridge rule were dispelled by. . .Ham .... 21
[the jurors] were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the
question; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing
him to sit." Id. at 314.
17. See, e.g., King v. United States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157
(3d Cir. 1973); People v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1973); People v. Wray, 49 Mich.
App. 344, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973); State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d
152 (1950).
18. State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956).
19. Id. at 154. The court also cited Aldridge as holding that the exclusion of
questions designed to reveal a prospective juror's prejudice against the Negro race was
reversible error.
20. 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 1159.
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A Michigan case, People v. Wray,12 also dealt with Ham and con-
sidered it solid support for a defendant's right to ask questions concern-
ing possible racial bias of jurors. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
noted:
The outcome of the instant appeal is squarely controlled by a recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court [Ham v. South
Carolina. . . . [11n reversing the defendant's conviction, the Supreme
Court [in Ham] unanimously held that the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed a duty upon the
trial court to question jurors on the subject of racial prejudice."
The only factual similarities between Ham and Wray were that
both defendants were black; both were denied requests to question pro-
spective jurors about racial bias; and both defendants' counsel did not
object to the trial court's refusal. The defense in Wray did not establish
"special circumstances," as had been established in Ham.
Robinson and Wray interpreted Ham as indicating that a black
defendant is entitled to propound questions about racial prejudice to
prospective jurors without establishing "special circumstances." How-
ever, Ristaino v. Rossu greatly narrowed the interpretation of Ham by
confining its constitutional holding to situations where "racial issues
. . . were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."' 2s
In Commonwealth v. Ross,2s the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
held that the factual circumstances of Ross, in contrast to the special
circumstances of Ham, did not give rise to constitutional scrutiny. In
Ristaino v. Ross,2' the Supreme Court determined Ham to be control-
ling. However, this produced an internal inconsistency, since Ham was
based on Aldridge, and Aldridge was a much broader ruling, giving
defendants an unconditional constitutional right to question potential
jurors about racial bias. Noting this, the Court concluded: "In light of
22. 49 Mich. App. 344, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973).
23. Id. at 345, 212 N.W.2d at 79.
24. 424 U.S. 589. The Court noted that Ham did not require universal applicabil-
ity, but required assessment as to the "likelihood that absent questioning about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] unsworne. . . .'" Id.
at 596. The Court found that the circumstances of questions of Ham's being a civil rights
activist were sufficient to include specific questions regarding racial prejudice. Id. at 598.
25. Id. at 597.
26. Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).
27. 424 U.S. 589.
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our holding today, the actual result in Aldridge should be recognized
as an exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts.""
The similar facts of Aldridge, Ham, and Ristaino cannot be recon-
ciled with their inconsistent holdings. In Ham, the defendant was a
black civil rights worker, who claimed that his civil rights work was the
cause of his arrest for possession of marijuana. In Ristaino, the defen-
dant was black, and the victim was a white security guard. The Supreme
Court's opinion in this case seemed to indicate that a black man arrested
for possession of marijuana is entitled to have jurors specifically ques-
tioned as to racial prejudice, but a black man arrested for crimes of
violence against a white security officer is not entitled to the same rights.
This distinction seems to hinge on the nature of the special circumstan-
ces of Ham-specifically, the sensitive issue of civil rights work. The
defendant in Ristaino faced a harsher sentence than the defendant in
Ham. However, he appears to have been given less constitutional pro-
tection, owing to the application of the "special circumstances" princi-
ple.
Another apparent inconsistency in the holdings .is that the circum-
stances of the crime in Aldridge and Ross are very similar. In
Aldridge,* a black man was convicted of the murder of a white police-
man. In Ross,* the defendant, also a black man, was convicted of the
commission of violent crimes against a white security officer.
Attempting to reconcile the differences between Ross and Ham, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated, in Ross v. Ristaino:31
In Ham, the defendant was a civil rights leader, while in this case the
black defendant is for the purpose of this inquiry an ordinary black
citizen. But in this case, the charges against the defendant involved viol-
ence against a white, not a victimless crime like possession of marijuana.
Moreover the white victim, a security officer at Boston University, had
a status close to that of a police officer. In addition, the eyewitness
testimony of a white'gas station attendant, was a major part of the state's
case against Ross. . . . On these facts the District Court was not in error
28. Id. at 598, n. 10. Aldridge originated in a federal court because the defendant
was a federal prisoner, whereas Ristaino, which involved a state prisoner, originated in
a state court. Therefore, to clarify an apparently inconsistent decision, the Court in
Ristaino interpreted its Aldridge holding as an exercise of its supervisory power over
the federal courts rather than as a broad constitutional requirement.
29. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
30. 362 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1973).
31. 508 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1974).
Ristatno v. Ross 39 1
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in concluding that the likelihood of infection of the verdict [by racial
prejudice] was at least as great as it was in Ham. In effect, the [District]
Court held that a black defendant charged with violent crimes against a
white security officer would be likely to be a special target of racial
prejudice."3'
The Supreme Court in Ristaino v. Ross3 rejected the court of
appeals treatment of the case by highlighting the factual distinction
between Ristaino and Ham, and by finding a crucial absence of special
circumstances. The Court felt that the lower court read Ham "too
broadly" by finding the facts to require special questioning about racial
prejudice.34
Before Commonwealth v. Ross- was decided, Ham was not inter-
preted narrowly. As previously mentioned, 3 United States v.
Robinson and People v. Wray discussed, interpreted, and applied
Ham. However, neither indicated that Ham was a limiting ruling, espe-
cially since these cases, which followed Ham, involved ordinary circum-
stances and not the special circumstances which are now required. The
narrow, limiting effect of Commonwealth v. Ross"9 has been applied
in recent casesA4 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has consistently
followed its holding in Ross by not allowing "ordinary" black defen-
dants to question prospective jurors about potential racial bias.,
Regretfully, it appears that Ristaino v. Ross' 2 will have a severe
impact on the effectiveness of the voir dire examination by inhibiting
the defense counsel's ability to determine if any jurors are prejudiced
against his or her client. Amendment VI of the United States Constitu-
tion states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a .. . trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
32. Id. at 756.
33. 424 U.S. 589.
34. Id. at 594.
35. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).
36. See text accompanying notes 20 and 22, supra.
37. 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).
38. 49 Mich. App. 334, 212 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1973).
39. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973).
40. United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Perez-Martinez, 525 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1976).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ryles, 363 Mass. 674, 296 N.E.2d 816 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 300 N.E.2d 192 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Bumpus, 309 N.E.2d 491 (1974).
42. 424 U.S. 589.
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wherein the crime shall have been committed ... ."" The holding in
Ristaino v. Ross" will make the constitutional right to an impartial jury
a truly uncertain and theoretical one. By so limiting the scope of the voir
dire examination, it is highly possible that a strongly biased individual
could sit as juror in a criminal case with no chance of being discovered.
It is not likely that any harm would result from questioning prospective
jurors about possible racial bias. However, there is no doubt that great
harm could occur from not asking these questions. Voir dire examina-
tion is a vital part of the jury selection process, and it-should be exer-
cised to its fullest potential.
In Aldridge, the Supreme Court looked to the value of an effective
voir dire examination and said:
If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, [the jurors] were found to be
impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question [as to racial
bias]; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which
would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be
perpetrated in allowing him to sit."
The Ristaino Court made a seemingly inconsistent comment in a
footnote stating:
Although we hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice
was not constitutionally required the wiser course generally is to pro--
pound appropriate questions designed to identify iacial prejudice if re-
quested by the defendant. Under our supervisory power we would have
required as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances here.
The states also are free to allow or require questions not demanded by
the constitution. .... 4
Thus, even though the Supreme Court believed it might have been
wiser to have asked the requested questions, the Court refused to find
that this right had constitutional dimensions. The Court's reasoning is
43. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
44. 424 U.S. 589.
45. 283 U.S. 308, at 314 (1931). The Court went on to say:
We think it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way
could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Id. at 315.
46. 424 U.S. 589, 597 n. 9 (citations omitted).
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not clear. This lack of clarity is magnified by the Court's statement that
"under our supervisory power we would have required as much of a
federal court faced with the circumstances here." 7 In effect, this means
a defendant in a federal court might, under the Supreme Court's super-
visory power, be entitled to have questions about racial bias asked of a
potential venireman, but a defendant in a state court would have no such
right, and would have to rely solely on the discretion of the particular
judge.
By basing their analysis on the existence or absence of "special
circumstances," the Court has missed a crucial point in determining
whether a defendant is entitled to question potential veniremen about
racial bias. The Court makes it appear that the only time one is sub-
jected to racial prejudice is when his or her race has been a cause of the
arrest. 8
Three Supreme Court Justices disagreed with the majority's treat-
ment of Ross v. Massachusetts."9 Justice Marshall's dissent, in which
Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan joined, pointed out that the
Aldridge Court was not concerned with the popularity of the defendant
"but rather with the potential racial bias of the particular jurors who
are to try the accused."' 0 The dissent further pointed out: "The principle
that fairness demands such [voir dire] inquiry is, if anything, far more
pervasive today than it was when Aldridge was decided, in both federal
and state courts." 5' A defendant runs the risk of facing "biased jurors
regardless of the specific crime for which he is being tried. A juror does
not have to hear facts of a case intertwined with racial overtones to have
biased views toward certain minorities.
The dissenting justices ended their opinion by stating:
To deny this petition for certiorari is to see our decision in Ham v. South
Carolina stillborn at birth and to write an epitaph for those "essential
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)
(Marshall, J., Brennan, J., Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. 414 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1973).
51. Id. at 1084. The dissent noted:
[Tio say that petitioner [Ross] is not a potential target of racial prejudice would
be to ignore as judges what we must all know as men ... where, as here and in
the strikingly similar circumstances of the Aldridge case, a Negro is being accused
of an attack on a white policeman, it would be disingenuous at best to assert that
he is not apt to be a particular target of racial prejudice.
Id. at 1085.
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demands of fairness" recognized by this Court forty years ago in
Aldridge. I fear that we "bring the processes of justice into disrepute"
not only by sanctioning the denial of a right required by "essential de-
mands of fairness" but also in failing to compel compliance by the court
below with a precedent of this Court [Ham] barely a year since decided.S
It appears that, as a result of the decision in Ristaino v. Ross,"
the future of the impartiality of state juries will depend solely upon the
trial judge's discretion. As Ristaino illustrates, the Supreme Court has
chosen to narrow its review of state cases involving a defendant's right
to have specific questions asked of prospective jurors. Viewing the in-
stant case along with Stone v. Powel," it appears that the Supreme
Court has initiated a trend toward narrowly limiting its review of claims
made by state defendants of violations of their constitutional rights. One
cannot help wondering why the Supreme Court is abdicating its role as
the protector of a state prisoner's constitutional rights.
Jacquelyn Plasner
52. Id. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the decision in the instant
case for the same reasons stated in Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
(dissenting opinion).
53. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
54. 96 S.Ct. 3137 (1976).
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Constitutional Law: Privilege against Self-
Incrimination: Conviction of a Non-Tax-Related
Offense Secured through the Use of Federal
Tax Returns: Garner v. United States
Roy Garner candidly reported substantial income from illicit wagering
in his 1965, 1966, and 1967 federal income tax returns.' He reported his
occupation as a "professional gambler" in the 1965 return.2 Garner was
subsequently prosecuted for conspiring to violate various federal gam-
bling statutes. 3 At trial,4 the government introduced into evidence the
returns in question. Garner objected to the admission of the returns,
asserting a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination. 5 The returns were admitted over Garner's objec-
tions, and the jury found him guilty of conspiring to violate the gam-
bling statutes.
Garneres conviction was reversed in 1972 by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.' Circuit Judge Koelsch, for the majority, held that
the disclosures Garner made in his returns were statutorily compelled
by Internal Revenue Code § 7203,7 which makes it a crime to willfully
1. A taxpayer is required to report and pay tax on his illegally derived income.
See note 16, infra. I.R.C. § 7203 makes it a crime for a taxpayer, who is required to
make a return or pay a tax, to fail to do so. See note 7, infra.
2. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 at 649-50 (1976).
3. Garner's conspiracy indictment was under 18 U.S.C. § 224 (bribery in sporting
contests effectuated through use of an interstate communication facility); § 371 (conspir-
acy to commit any offense against the United States); § 1084 (interstate transmission
of wagering information by one engaged in the business of wagering); and § 1052 (use
of an interstate facility to distribute proceeds of an unlawful activity). He was also
indicted for the substantive offense of aiding and abetting the violation of § 1084, but
he was acquitted on this count at the close of the government's case. 424 U.S. at 694
n. 1.
4. Garner was tried by a jury in the District Court for the Central District of
California.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in part: "No person . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
6. 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. I.R.C. § 7203 reads, in pertinent part: "Any person required under this title to
pay any . tax to make a return. keep any records, or supply any informa-
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fail to supply required information.8 Such compelled disclosures were
held to be inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent prosecution of gam-
bling law violations because of Garner's privilege against self-
incrimination.
On rehearing en banc two years later, the Court of Appeals re-
versed itself.? Circuit Judge Wallace, a dissenter in the 1972 opinion,
now vriting for the majority, concluded that the privilege could not be
invoked at trial to protect one from disclosures voluntarily made in
previously filed tax returns. 0 Thus, if Garner had wanted the protection
of the privilege, he should have asserted it when the incriminating infor-
mation was required to be filed."
On certiorari,' 2 the Supreme Court of the United States unani-
mously affirmed the en banc determination of the Court of Appeals, 3
and held that since Garner made the disclosures in his tax returns in-
stead of claiming the privilege therein, they were not compelled and,
therefore, not protected by the privilege. 4
I. COMPULSION TO FILE A RETURN
It has been established since 1927, when the Supreme Court de-
cided United States v. Sullivan,' that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not give a taxpayer the right to refuse to file a return because he
has an illegal source of income." In Sullivan, the defendant had been
tion, who willfully fails to pay such. . . tax, make such return, keep such records, or
supply such information. . . shall. . be guilty of a misdemeanor ..
8. 501 F.2d at 232.
9. 501 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974). Circuit Judge Wallace wrote the opinion for the
majority, with Circuit Judge Koelsch dissenting.
10. Id. at 240.
II. id.
12. Certiorari was granted at 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
13. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall concurred. Justice Stevens took no part in this case.
14. 424 U.S. at 665.
15. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
16. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that a taxpayer must report and
pay tax on illegally derived income. § 61(a) provides, in part, that "gross income means
all income from whatever source derived. . . ." The Supreme Court has interpreted this
section broadly, by including as gross income all income, whether legally or illegally
derived. See. e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (gross income includes
embezzled funds); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extorted funds); United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (gambling receipts); United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259 (1927) (income from illicit traffic in liquor).
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engaged in an illicit liquor business in violation of the National Prohibi-
tion Act. 7 He was convicted of willful failure to file a federal tax return
as required by the Revenue Act of 1921,18 over his objection that, be-
cause of the illegal nature of his business, he would be compelled to
incriminate himself if he were required to file a return. The Court held
that the privilege did not protect him from the requirement of filing a
return." The Fifth Amendment might have protected him from answer-
ing incriminating questions asked in the return, but it did not give him
the right to fail completely to file a return." Although not presented
with the question, the Court suggested that a taxpayer who wants the
protection of the privilege should raise it in the return: "If the form of
the return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged
from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could
not on that account refuse to make any return at all."'"
In Garner," the Court cited Sullivan as establishing that a taxpayer
is compelled to file a return. Concluding that Garner was compelled to
file a return did not, however, end the Fifth Amendment inquiry. The
Court still had to determine whether Garner was compelled to incrimi-
nate himself when he could have claimed the privilege on the tax returns
in lieu of disclosing the incriminating information.2 In holding that he
had not been compelled to incriminate himself, the Court established
what had been suggested in Sullivan: Garner's failure to assert the
privilege in the returns rendered the incriminating disclosures non-
compulsory and, as such, not within the protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.2'
2. DISCLOSURE IN LIEU OF
ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
The Court cited United States v. Kordel as a holding squarely
supporting its conclusion that Garner lost the benefit of the privilege by
17. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
18. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §§ 223(a), 253; 42 Stat. 227, 250, 268.
19. 274 U.S. at 263.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 424 U.S. at 652.
23. Id. at 653.
24. Id. at 665.
25. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
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revealing the incriminating information, and five other cases 6 as sup-
porting this principle in dicta. The Court determined that these cases
stood for the proposition that "if a witness under compulsion to testify
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the Government has
not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself."' '
In Kordel the defendants, who were officers of a food corporation,
were prosecuted for a violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act." Prior to the commencement of this prosecution, an in rem action
had been filed against several of the defendants' corporate products.
Pursuant to this civil action, extensive interrogatories were served on the
corporation. During the in rem action, the defendants were informed by
the government that it was contemplating a criminal prosecution against
them for violations of the Act. Rather than claiming his privilege at this
point, one of the defendants answered the interrogatories served by the
government. In the later criminal prosecution the government intro-
duced into evidence information obtained by the interrogatories. The
defendants objected to the admission of this evidence and argued that
the answers to the interrogatories had been compelled, and that their
use would violate the defendants' privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court held that the use of these answers did not violate the defen-
dants' privilege, since they had been notified of the contemplated crimi-
nal prosecution and had disclosed the information instead of claiming
the privilege. The Court, in Garner,1' read Kordel as establishing the
general rule that by volunteering information rather than asserting the
privilege, one has not been compelled to answer.
In United States v. Monia3' the defendants were charged with
conspiring to fix prices .in violation of the Sherman Act.12 Each defen-
dant appeared as a witness before the grand jury, giving testimony
substantially connected with the transaction covered by the indictment
26. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1927), construed in Garner, supra note 2, at 653-54.
27. 424 U.S. at 653-54.
28. Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938), construed in Kordel, supra note 25, at 2.
30. 424 U.S. at 654.
31. 317 U.S. 424 (1943). The Court cites Monia as supporting in dictum its
holding in Garner. See supra note 26.
32. 15 U.S.C. 32 (1903), as amended by 15 U.S.C. 33 (1906), construed in United
States v. Monia, supra note 26, at 425-426.
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without claiming his privilege against self-incrimination or the immun-
ity conferred by the Act.3 The Court held that because of the immun-
ity conferred by the Act, the defendants could not be prosecuted, regard-
less of whether they had claimed the privilege or the immunity.3 Al-
though the decision was based upon statutory immunity, the Court, in
Garner, quoted dictum from Monia to support its conclusion that Gar-
ner was not compelled to incriminate himself:
The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a
witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him.
If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it
or he will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the meaning
of the Amendment.34
The Court pointed out in Garner3 ' that Kordel and the older wit-
ness cases,3 7 which require that the privilege be asserted, accommodate
the competing interests of the individual's right to remain silent on the
one hand, and the government's right to everyone's testimony on the
other hand. Since the witness is the only one who knows whether the
government is compelling him to make incriminating disclosures, the,
burden is properly on him to make a timely assertion of the privilege:3'
"If, instead, he discloses the information sought, any incriminations
properly are viewed as not compelled." 3'
3. CIRCUIT JUDGE KOELSCH
AND "IMPLIED WAIVER"
Circuit Judge Koelsch, in his majority opinion following the first
hearing in Garner by the Ninth Circuit, rejected the premise that the
33. The immunity from prosecution for witnesses testifying under the Sherman
Act was conferred by the Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 775, § 1, 32 Stat. 904, which reads,
in part: "[N]o person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty of forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution
under [the Sherman Act]."
34. 317 U.S. at 430.
35. 424 U.S. at 654-55 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 655.
37. See Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-65 (1917); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-45
(1972).
38. 424 U.S. at 655.
39. Id.
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privilege was "impliedly waived" by Garner because he failed to assert
it in the returns. 0 At the first hearing, the government relied on Stillman
v. United States." In that case Hyman Stillman and his partner, who
were in the wholesale meat business, were convicted of violating the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.42 At their trial the government
had introduced, over their Fifth Amendment objections, their individual
and partnership income tax returns. The Court stated:
If appellants believed that certain declarations in their tax returns might
incriminate them they could have refrained from making the voluntary
tax declarations here in evidence. However, they chose to report the illicit
income rather than risk possible prosecution for making false or incom-
plete returns covering such income. The disclosures upon the tax returns
must therefore be deemed to have been voluntarily entered upon a public
record."O
Circuit Judge Koelsch interpreted the Stillman decision as based on an
"implied waiver" of the privilege." He cited Marchetti v. United
States" as a "recent constitutional development" which had "eliminated
the doctrinal keystone" of the Stillman decision." In Marchetti the
petitioner was convicted of failure to register as a gambler with the
Internal Revenue Service, as required by I.R.C. § 4412,47 and of conspir-
acy to evade payment of a gambler's occupational tax as required by
I.R.C. § 441 1.48 He contended that these statutory requirements violated
his privilege against self-incrimination, since his wagering activities were
40. The Supreme Court in the Garner opinion makes it clear that the term
"waiver" should be limited to those cases where "one affirmatively renounces the pro-
tection of the privilege." While rejecting the concept of waiver in name, the Court, by
its holding in Garner, extends the implied waiver reasoning to incriminating disclosures
made in tax returns. 424 U.S. at 654 n.9.
41. 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
42. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
43. 177 F.2d at 618.
44. 501 F.2d at 231.
45. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
46. 501 F.2d at 231.
47. I.R.C. § 4412 provides that: "Each person required to pay a special tax under
this subchapter shall register with the official in charge of the internal revenue district
... his name and place of residence. . ....
48. 1.R.C. § 4411 reads, in part: "There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per
year to be paid by each person who is liable [to pay the excise tax on wagers as provided
by § 44011" (fine increased to $500 per year, as amended by Pub.L. No. 93-499, § 3(b),
88 Stat. 1550. See note 65, infra.
1150
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in violation of state and federal law. The Court held that the petitioner
did not lose the protection of the privilege by his failure to assert it when
the tax payments were due, and that he properly invoked the privilege
at trial." Circuit Judge Koelsch was apparently saying that Marchetti
so eroded the concept of implied waiver of the privilege that Stillman,
which he concluded was based on implied waiver, was no longer effective
law. Since Stillman and implied waiver were no longer viable, he con-
cluded that Garner did not lose the benefit of the privilege by disclosing
the incriminating information.
In his opinion, Circuit Judge Koelsch overlooked two important
aspects of the relation of Marchetti to the Stillman case and Garner's
situation. First, the Court in Marchetti made clear that the status of the
group with which the petitioner was identified was a major factor in the
holding that the privilege was not waived by failure to invoke it. The
Court found that "wagering is an area permeated with criminal statutes,
and those engaged in wagering are a group inherently suspect of crimi-
nal activities. '"" Because petitioner, as a gambler, was a member of a
"suspect group," any response he might make pursuant to I.R.C. §§
4411 and 4412 would be self-incriminating. The Court distinguished the
situation of the taxpayer, who is required to file tax returns, from that
of a gambler, who is required to register, by concluding that "[u]nlike
the income tax return. . . every portion of [the section 4411 and 4412]
requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of incrimi-
nating petitioner ... ."31 The reasoning used in Marchetti to preclude
an implied waiver of the privilege by gamblers does not apply to non-
suspect groups such as taxpayers. So Circuit Judge Koelsch's reliance
on Marchetti as eroding the doctrinal keystone of Stillman, viz., implied
waiver, seems misplaced.
Second, in Marchetti the petitioner did not disclose any incriminat-
ing information, as did Garner and Stillman. Indeed, the holding of
Stillman is based upon the fact that the information in question was
disclosed in lieu of claiming the privilege. If Stillman had withheld the
information, as did Marchetti, he might not have lost the benefit of the
privilege. 2 This basic difference between the two fact patterns prevents
49. 390 U.S. at 50-51.
50. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 48-49.
52. Stillman, however, would have exposed himself to an I.R.C. § 7203 prosecu-
tion if he had failed to file a return or had withheld information. Marchetti, on the other
hand, was allowed to exercise his privilege by simply failing to file, since he was the
member of a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
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Marchetti from supporting the conclusion that implied waiver has no
place where the Fifth Amendment privilege is involved.
Circuit Judge Koelsch concluded by holding that I.R.C. § 72033
compelled Garner to make the disclosures in question, and that by
submitting to such statutory compulsion, Garner did not waive his right
to assert his privilege at trial.M
4. GARNER'S THREE ARGUMENTS
Garner resisted the application of the general rule that witnesses
must claim the privilege, arguing that in the tax return context incrimi-
nating disclosures made in returns are "compelled."O He relied on three
situations in which incriminating disclosures had been considered com-
pelled despite a failure to claim the privilege."
A. Coerced Confeasion Cames:
Knowing and Intolligent Waiver
First, Garner argued that for one to lose the benefit of the privilege
there must be a knowing and intelligent waiver, even though one did not
claim the privilege prior to disclosure. 7 He relied on coerced confession
cases, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona.M In Miranda, the defendant was taken
into custody in connection with a kidnapping and rape. Without being
informed of his Fifth Amendment privilege, Miranda was interrogated
,by the police for two hours in a special interrogation room. He signed
a written confession which was admitted as evidence at his trial, and he
was subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion, holding that Miranda had not been effectively apprised of his
privilege against self-incrimination, nor had he knowingly and intelli-
gently waived it.
The Court, in Garner," refused to extend the Miranda holding to
disclosures made in tax returns. Miranda dealt with custodial interroga-
tion, a situation necessarily fraught with compulsion to disclose incrimi-
nating information. These dangers are not present in the tax return
53. See supra note 7.
54. 501 F.2d at 232-33.
55. 424 U.S. at 656.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 657.
58. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. 424 U.S. at 657-58.
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context, and the extraordinary safeguard of requiring a knowing and
intelligent waiver was not adopted. The Court stated:
[N]othing in this case suggests the need for a similar presumption that a
taxpayer makes disclosures on his return rather than claims the privilege
because his will is overborne. In fact, a taxpayer, who can complete his
return at leisure and with legal assistance, is even less subject to the
psychological pressures at issue in Miranda than a witness who has been
called to testify in judicial proceedings."
B. Garner Argued Mackey v. United States
Second, Garner relied on Mackey v. United States,61 Marchetti v.
United States, 2 and Grosso v. United States." In Mackey, the defen-
dant was convicted in 1964 of evading payment of income taxes for the
years 1956 through 1960.64 At his trial the government introduced into
evidence sixty wagering excise tax returns which he had filed pursuant
to I.R.C. § 4401," to prove that this was his actual income which he had
reported during the years in question. Subsequent to Mackey's convic-
tion the Supreme Court held, in Marchetti and Grosso, that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was a valid defense for failure to comply with §§
4401, 4411, and 4412," which require a gambler to 'egister and pay an
occupational and excise tax. After Marchetti and Grosso were decided,
Mackey filed a motion to set aside his conviction. The Court in
Mackey 7 refused to apply Marchetti and Grosso retroactively to over-
turn Mackey's conviction. Garner argued that if Mackey had made the
incriminating disclosures after the Marchetti and Grosso decisions, such
disclosures could not have been used against him." Garner further
argued that since Mackey would have been privileged to file no return,
60. Id.
61. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
62. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
63. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
64. Mackey was convicted of violating I.R.C. § 7201, which reads, in part: "Any
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony. .. ."
65. I.R.C. § 4401 reads, in pertinent part: "There shall be imposed on wagers.
an excise tax equal to 10 percent of the amount thereof."
66. See supra notes 47, 48, and 65.
67. 401 U.S. at 674.
68. 424 U.S. at 659.
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any disclosures made would have also been privileged. 9 He concluded
that Mackey stood for the proposition that "an objection at trial always
suffices to preserve the privilege even if disclosures have been made
previously."7 0 The Court did not find this reasoning compelling, and
stated: "[lilt does not follow necessarily that a taxpayer would be immu-
nized against use of disclosures made on gambling tax returns when the
Fifth Amendment would have justified a failure to file at all."'"
The Court did not find Garner in a situation similar to Marchetti
and Grosso, even though all were gamblers required to file tax returns.7
I.R.C. §§ 4401, 4411, and 4412 required Marchetti and Grosso to file
tax returns which were for gamblers only. Since gamblers were members
of a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities" any response by
them would be self-incriminating. 3 The Court distinguished Garner's
situation by pointing out that federal income tax returns are not directed
at suspect groups.7' The Court cited Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board5 as authority for distinguishing federal income tax tax-
payers from gamblers required to file tax returns under I.R.C. §§ 4401,
4411, and 4412. In Albertson, the petitioners, who were members of the
Communist Party, were ordered by the Subversive Activities Control
Board to register with the Attorney General, as required by the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act of 1950.11 Upon review of these orders, the
Court held that, because petitioners were members of a "highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities" and were involved in an
"area permeated with criminal statutes," any response they might make
pursuant to the statute would be self-incriminating, and in violation of
their privilege.77 The Court, in Albertson, distinguished federal income
tax returns from the Communist registration requirement by holding
that tax returns are "neutral on their face and directed at the public at
large."7 8 The Garner Court used this reasoning to distinguish the gam-
bler's tax return from income tax returns.7 The Court concluded:
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. n. 13.
72. Id. at 660.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 382 u.s. 70 (1965).
76. Acts of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 7, 64 Stat. 993; July 29, 1954, ch. 646, 68
Stat. 586, amending 50 U.S.C. § 786 (d).-
77. 382 U.S. at 79.
78. Id.
79. 424 U.S. at 660-61.
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"[Tihe great majority of persons who file income tax returns do not
incriminate themselves by disclosing their occupation. The requirement
that such returns be completed and filed simply does not involve the
compulsion considered in Mackey. "m
C. Section 7203: Compulsion to Incriminate
Finally, Garner argued that a taxpayer who claims the privilege on
his return is threatened with prosecution under I.R.C. § 7203 for failure
to make a return or supply information,"' and that this possibility of
prosecution compelled him to make incriminating disclosures rather
than claim the privilege.12 To support his argument Garner relied on
Garrity v. New Jersey,3 in which the appellants, who were police offi-
cers, were questioned in connection with a state investigation of alleged
traffic ticket fixing. Each was warned before questioning that if he
refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office pursuant
to a state statute.u The police officers answered the questions, and their
answers were used against them in a subsequent prosecution for conspir-
ing to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants ob-
jected to the use of their incriminating answers, claiming that they had
been compelled to answer. The Court concluded that the appellants had
been forced to choose between "self-incrimination or job forfeiture"' '
and held that statements coerced by threat of removal from office could
not be used against the officers in a subsequent criminal proceedingM
Garner argued that the threat of an I.R.C. § 7203 prosecution, like the
threat of removal from office in Garrity, compelled him to make incrim-
inating disclosures instead of claiming the privilege." But the Court
distinguished Garrity, pointing out that Garrity was threatened with
reprisal for a valid exercise of the privilege, while Garner was not so
80. Id. at 661 (footnote omitted).
81. See supra note 7.
82. 424 U.S. at 661.
83. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
84. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965) provides, in part: "Any person
holding ... public office, position or empoyment ... who refuses to testify upon
matters relating to the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding...
upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a
witness against himself ... shall be removed therefrom ......
85. 385 U.S. at 496.
86. Id. at 500.
87. 424 U.S. at 661.
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threatened, since "a § 7203 conviction cannot be based on a valid exer-
cise of the privilege."" The Court expanded this holding in a footnote:
"[Blecause § 7203 proscribes 'willful' failures to make returns, a tax-
payer is not at peril for every erroneous claim of privilege. The Govern-
ment recognizes that a defendant could not properly be convicted for
an erroneous claim of privilege asserted in good faith."89
The Court cited United States v. Murdock" (Murdock 1) as estab-
lishing that a taxpayer, prosecuted for willful failure to supply informa-
tion, is not entitled to a preliminary ruling on the validity of his claim
of privilege," and United States v. Murdock92 (Murdock II) as support-
ing the conclusion that an erroneous, good faith claim of the privilege
is a defense to a § 7203 prosecution. 3 In Murdock I the appellee
claimed deductions for money paid to others in his 1927 and 1928
income tax returns. The Internal Revenue Service requested informa-
tion concerning these deductions. Murdock refused to answer, claiming
his privilege against self-incrimination. He was thereafter prosecuted for
willful failure to supply information under the predecessor to § 7203.94
The Court held that Murdock could be prosecuted for willful failure to
supply information without prior determination as to whether his claim
of privilege was valid.'5 Murdock was subsequently convicted for with-
holding information. In Murdock II the Court reversed the conviction,
holding that a good faith misunderstanding" as to the applicability of
88. Id. at 662.
89. Id. at 663 n. 18. The Court's holding was apparently that a valid exercise of
the privilege was a defense to a § 7203 prosecution. This would seem to imply that an
invalid exercise of the privilege would not be a defense. But in n. 18 the Court pointed
out, without so holding, the government's concession, that an invalid, good faith claim
of privilege would preclude a § 7203 conviction. In a concurring opinion, discussed
below, Justice Marshall argues that to satisfy the Fifth Amendment an erroneous, good
faith claim of the privilege must be allowed as a defense.
90. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
91. 424 U.S. at 664-65.
92. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
93. 424 U.S. at 662-63 and n. 18.
94. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 1114(a), 44 Stat. 116. This section is essentially
the same as § 7203. It provides, in pertinent part: "Any person required under this Act
to pay any tax. . . to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information...
who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information . . . shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor."
95. 284 U.S. at 148.
96. Murdock erroneously believed that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected
him from making disclosures incriminating under state law when pressed for informa-
tion in a federal forum. It was not established until Murdock I. that one being ques-
Nova Law Journal :977 1
158
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/1
1:1977 Garner v. United States 157 1
the privilege could not be the basis of a conviction for willfully failing
to supply information. 7
In Garner, the Court reaffirmed the decision of Murdock II, hold-
ing that a taxpayer cannot be convicted of a § 7203 violation if he makes
a good faith, though erroneous, claim of privilege." It also reaffirmed
the holding of Murdock 1,11 stating: "a § 7203 prosecution., may be
brought without a preliminary judicial ruling on a claim of privilege that
would allow a taxpayer to reconsider."00
Justice Marshall, troubled by the Court's reasoning, filed a concur-
ring opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined. The majority had stated:
"[S]ince a valid claim of privilege cannot be the basis for a § 7203
conviction, Garner can prevail only if the possibility that a claim made
on the return will be tested in a criminal prosecution suffices in itself
deny him freedom to claim the privilege."'' The Court concluded:
As long as a valid and timely claim of privilege is available as a defense
to a taxpayer prosecuted for failure to make a return, the taxpayer has
not been denied a free choice to remain silent merely because of the
absence of a preliminary judicial ruling on his-claim."0
The concurring Justices interpreted the majority opinion as holding that
a valid claim of privileged defense, without more, satisfies the Constitu-
tion.0 3 The Justices were adamant in their belief that only if a good
faith, invalid assertion of the privilege entitles a taxpayer to acquittal
under § 7203, then a threat of prosecution could not compel incriminat-
ing disclosures in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
Although the concurring justices accepted the majority's holding
that a preliminary ruling is not a prerequisite to a § 7203 prosecution,
they believed that the absence of a preliminary ruling was important in
determining whether Garner had been compelled."' They felt that a
tioned in a federal forum could not refuse to answer because of possible incrimination
under state law. The Court disapproved of this holding in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
97. 290 U.S. at 396.
98. 424 U.S. at 662-63 and n. 18.
99. Id. at 664-65.
100. Id. at 664.
101. Id. at 663.
102. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 666-67.
104. Id. at 666.
105. Id. at 667.
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taxpayer must either be given a preliminary ruling or be allowed a
defense of good faith assertion of the privilege. If the taxpayer was not
afforded at least one of these safeguards, he would be denied the free
choice to claim the privilege. Marshall concluded: "[O]nly because a
good faith erroneous claim of privilege entitles a taxpayer to acquittal
under § 7203 can I conclude that [Garner's] disclosures are admissible
against him."'"
5. CONCLUSION
Garner v. United States reaffirmed the rule of Sullivan, that a
taxpayer must file a return, even though his income is derived from
illegal activities. Garner reasserted the holding of Marchetti, that one
who is the member of a group inherently suspect of criminal activities
need not comply with a statutory requirement to disclose information
relating to those activities. A federal income tax taxpayer is not in a
suspect group and must file a return. If a question in the return requires
an incriminating answer, the taxpayer must withhold the information
and assert his privilege in the return to obtain its protection. If the
taxpayer discloses the information instead of claiming the privilege, he
has not been compelled to incriminate himself and the incriminating
information may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion of a non-tax-related offense. If the taxpayer asserts the privilege
instead of disclosing the information, he can be prosecuted under I.R.C.
§ 7203 for failure to supply required information, and he will not be
entitled to a preliminary ruling on whether his claim is valid. If the
taxpayer's claim of privilege is asserted in good faith, it will be a defense
to a § 7203 prosecution, even if his claim is invalid.
In Garner, the Supreme Court has moved toward allowing a pen-
alty to be extracted for the exercising of one's privilege against self-
incrimination. Under the Garner decision a taxpayer can be prosecuted
for withholding incriminating information without a preliminary hear-
ing on whether his claim of privilege is valid. A criminal prosecution
for asserting one's privilege would seem to be the kind of reprisal con-
demned in Garrity. The trend of the Court is toward allowing the asser-
tion of the privilege in a tax return context to become more perilous, in
order to allow the government to proceed in its endless quest for more
information concerning its citizens.
David F. Vedder
106. Id. at 668.
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